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A review of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) and the multitude of Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (“CFTC”) and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule-
making projects suggests that the United States has entered into a “race to the
top” of over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivative regulation. Pressing forward, Con-
gress and the CFTC appear to be at least a year ahead of enacting OTC deriva-
tive reforms in contrast with other foreign competing jurisdictions. In addition,
many of the statutes and rules adopted by the United States go well beyond the
relatively modest commitments that competing jurisdictions have agreed to
meet with respect to reforming their own OTC derivative markets. The US race
to regulate OTC derivatives creates a legal environment ripe for regulatory
arbitrage and the isolation of US OTC derivative markets, leaving the United
States still vulnerable to systemic trading losses suffered in less or non-regu-
lated jurisdictions.
US policymakers and regulators believe that losses stemming from unreg-
ulated OTC derivative trading could result in systemically significant financial
failures in the United States, potentially triggering the next financial crisis. To
prevent these systemic failures, the CFTC is aggressively promulgating rules
and regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank OTC derivative reforms that will
minimize the risk of future losses. The United States is determined not only to
regulate the swap trading activity between US persons, but also the global swap
trading activity of non-US persons who trade with US persons.1
Given the probable costs and burdens of the US regulatory approach, it is
likely that both non-US persons and US persons will try to trade OTC deriva-
tives in less-regulated jurisdictions. Failure to control this regulatory arbitrage
may result in trading, that was previously being done in the US, moving to
darker corners of the already opaque global OTC derivatives market. To control
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regulatory arbitrage, Dodd-Frank has endowed the CFTC and SEC with
unprecedented extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate the swap trading activities
outside of the United States of non-US persons.2
A related concern of regulatory arbitrage, however, is the effect that it will
have on the preeminence of the United States as one of the world’s most impor-
tant and innovative OTC derivative markets. The United States, and the CFTC
in particular, appear to feel ambivalent about this result; instead transfixed on
eliminating any possibility that OTC derivative losses could contribute to sys-
temic financial risks in the United States.3
The CFTC’s response to challenges that US derivative reforms (not in
harmony with other jurisdictions) will make US firms and markets uncompeti-
tive is threefold. First, the CFTC appears to believe that the resulting price
transparency and increased safety of United States markets from Dodd-Frank
reforms will make US markets even more attractive to non-US persons. Sec-
ond, it appears that US regulators and policymakers believe that the size,
importance, and profitability of US derivative markets will be more attractive
to non-US swap dealers the regulatory costs being imposed by Dodd-Frank on
both US and non-US participants. A lowly third on the totem pole appears to be
compromising US rules to match those of less-regulated jurisdictions.4
Because of regulatory arbitrage, however, Dodd-Frank may instead turn
the traditionally robust and innovative US OTC derivative market into an
island, where the only participants are those that have no other options as to
where and with whom they can trade. Even small regulatory differences
between the United States and competing jurisdictions may be enough to move
OTC derivative trading offshore. Instead of US dealers, exchanges, and clear-
inghouses leading the industry, the US market may become a safe, although
smaller, backwater harbor. But such safety may be illusory if swap activity
moves to unregulated markets that may, in the long run, have a systemic effect
on the United States if such trading results in outsized losses.
The simplified analysis of the US approach to derivative reform is that the
United States can protect itself from the potential systemic effects of losses
from OTC derivative transactions through two ways. First, the Dodd-Frank
reforms subject any OTC derivative transaction to US regulation that is exe-
cuted with a US person. That would include trades not only between a US
person and a US person but also trades between a US person and a non-US
person. Under this scenario, the US financial system will not be subject to the
risks of a US person entering into systemically dangerous trading since all
trades will be subject to Dodd-Frank, regardless of where the swap is
executed.5
Second, the United States protects itself from the risks of non-US swap
activities of non-US persons (who trade with US persons) by exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction. The CFTC will subject the swap activity of a non-US
person (that is classified as a swap dealer or major swap participant under
Dodd-Frank) to the Dodd-Frank rules or to the rules of a foreign jurisdiction
2 See infra Part II–III.
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part I.B.
5 See infra Part III.C.3.
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that has rules comparable to Dodd-Frank, regardless of where in the world such
trades are executed. The only true escape from the extraterritorial reach of the
CFTC would be for swap activity to be done between two non-US parties,
neither of whom is subject to either Dodd-Frank registration requirements or to
comparable rules from another jurisdiction.6
A key factor in the potential success of the CFTC’s approach is that the
major global swap dealers, often referred to as the G14, control the vast major-
ity of the global OTC derivative market. Each of the G14 also has significant
trading operations in the United States. The United States has made it clear that
if these dealers want to continue doing business in the United States, they will
not only need to comply with Dodd-Frank with respect to their US customers,
but they will also need to demonstrate that they are subject to comparable
“Dodd-Frank” regulation of their derivative activities outside of the United
States with non-US persons (or comply with US rules). The United States is
gambling that this extraterritorial approach to regulation will result in Dodd-
Frank effectively serving as a global floor of acceptable OTC derivative
regulation.7
The United States is not alone, however, in trying to reform OTC deriva-
tive markets. In 2009, the leaders of the individual G20 countries, which
include the United States, agreed to require by 2012 that standardized OTC
derivatives be traded on exchanges, cleared through central counterparties, and
reported to trade repositories, with non-cleared bilateral trades subject to higher
capital requirements and margin requirements as well (the “G20 Commit-
ments”). Although the respective G20 countries have agreed to the commit-
ments, the devil is always in the details. It is inevitable that regulatory
differences will emerge between the United States and competing jurisdictions.
By enacting rules and regulations that are stricter (or go beyond) those enacted
by the other G20 countries, the United States risks pushing non-US persons
away from US markets, and motivates US persons to devise ways to avoid US
regulation.8
Given the uncertainty, complexity, business disruption, and cost of Dodd-
Frank, there is concern that dealers and other market participants alike will
attempt to structure their trading activities away from United States dealers,
exchanges, and clearinghouses and into jurisdictions that are less restrictive and
more flexible. Although this movement may initially be to other G20 jurisdic-
tions, there is concern that there may develop OTC derivative markets in non-
regulated jurisdictions that allow a party to trade OTC derivatives free (or on
more liberal terms) of the rules, standards, and regulations developed in the
United States and other G20 countries.9
The incentives to avoid US regulation through regulatory arbitrage are on
their face compelling. Dodd-Frank regulation and the G20 Commitments effec-
tively require market participants to completely change how they trade, settle,
and clear OTC derivatives, demanding large amounts of additional margin, new
relationships, documentation, and business practices. Many view the regula-
6 See infra Part III.
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See infra Part I.C.
9 See infra Part II.
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tions as burdensome, costly, and excessive. The Dodd-Frank OTC derivative
statutory provisions exceed 300 pages and the proposed and final rules and
regulations issued by the CFTC already exceed 4,200 pages in the Federal
Register.10
The flip side of regulatory arbitrage, and the hope of the CFTC and US
policymakers, is that these regulations and reforms will make OTC derivatives
markets more transparent, safe, and efficient, and create incentives to trade and
clear them in the United States as opposed to fleeing to less-regulated jurisdic-
tions. Chairman Gary Gensler of the CFTC has highlighted the important
advantages of transparency in the OTC derivative market. In fact, in spite of the
enormous obstacles to clearing OTC derivatives, the volume of cleared OTC
derivatives continues to increase even with Dodd-Frank regulations looming in
the background. It remains unclear, however, whether these gains will incen-
tivize market participants to continue using United States dealers, exchanges,
and clearinghouses as the Dodd-Frank rules and regulations become effective
in the United States.11
One regulatory approach that may contribute to the isolation of US mar-
kets is the potential unwillingness of the United States to allow a non-US per-
son, (whether a swap dealer or not) to comply with its own comparable
regulations (as opposed to Dodd-Frank Rules) when it is transacting swap
activity in the United States. Although such non-US person would be allowed
to comply with what is referred to as “substituted compliance” (i.e., its own
jurisdiction’s regulations) when it is transacting swap activity outside the
United States, it could end up being subject to its own jurisdiction’s regula-
tions, as well as Dodd-Frank when it does business in the US. There are already
indications that non-US persons may decide that such a situation makes US
markets that much more unpalatable.12
The US approach, however, could eventually backfire. Confronted with
what many believe to be costly and burdensome US regulations, many partici-
pants that do not have operations in the United States may now be reluctant to
trade there. Those that do have operations in the United States may still try to
trade elsewhere, attempting to exploit even tiny regulatory differences in other
regulated jurisdictions or perhaps even shuttering their US activities in order to
avoid more complex and costly regulation. It remains to be seen whether the
United States and the other G20 countries will be able to completely harmonize
their regulatory regimes, eliminating the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.
New dealers (not subject to US or G20 jurisdiction) may also spring up to meet
the demand of customers that do not want to be subject to US or even lesser
G20 regulations.
Effecting the OTC derivative reforms envisioned by the United States and
the G20 countries will require great attention and effort to avoid regulatory
arbitrage. The reduction of Dodd-Frank and the G20 commitments to regula-
tory details will be difficult and still remains to be done for many G20 jurisdic-
tions. Particularly contentious issues include margin (i.e., collateral) issues,
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part I.B.
12 See infra Part III.C.2.
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exemptions and safe harbors from mandatory clearing and trading, and business
conduct standards. Using these G20 objectives as a baseline, the United States
has gone well beyond what many jurisdictions may have understood as the
reach of these proposed reforms.13
If the United States persists in insisting on other jurisdictions conforming
to US regulation or risk extraterritorial jurisdiction, the United States may find
itself on the receiving end of the same medicine. Non-US jurisdictions may
decide to impose their own extraterritorial jurisdiction on US swap dealers.
Swap dealers such as Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase may find them-
selves not only complying with Dodd-Frank in the United States, but also sub-
ject to inconsistent and perhaps contradictory G20 regulation imposed because
of the US swap dealer’s activities with non-US persons in a G20 jurisdiction.
Part I will discuss the rise of the global OTC derivative markets and the
fears of regulators and policymakers that systemic risks to the US financial
markets will stem from losses suffered from OTC derivatives. Part I continues
to describe US and the G20’s reform efforts to tame global OTC derivative
markets.
Part II will focus on the nature and causes of regulatory arbitrage. In par-
ticular, Part II will discuss the unique characteristics and peculiarities of OTC
derivative trades and markets that may trigger an exodus of trading and partici-
pants from US markets into less-regulated environments. It will also discuss
examples of regulatory arbitrage in the OTC derivative markets and whether
the resulting price transparency and safety of US derivative markets offset the
high regulatory costs that motivate regulatory arbitrage.
Part III will discuss the CFTC’s and other jurisdictions’ efforts to deal
with regulatory arbitrage through extraterritorial regulation, assessing whether
these very efforts may affect the vitality and viability of US markets for trading
OTC derivatives. If US regulation proves to be overly aggressive and possibly
enacted earlier than that of other jurisdictions, the consequences could be
severe. First, such regulation could discourage the use of the US OTC deriva-
tive markets if such regulation proves to be too costly or burdensome. The
paradox of stricter regulation is that it could drive trading out of US markets
into darker corners of the derivative markets where latent systemic risks to the
US and global financial system could ferment. Second, extraterritorial applica-
tion of Dodd-Frank could generate substantial legal uncertainty and confusion
as parties attempt to cope with determining which jurisdiction’s rules govern
certain transactions. Finally, the effort to avoid US regulation could end up
fragmenting global derivative markets and increasing trading and hedging costs
for all participants.
Lastly, Part IV provides recommendations and ideas that the United States
should consider to avoid the possible loss of OTC trading activity in US mar-
kets. Part IV will offer a way to analyze the trade-offs between increased regu-
lation and regulatory arbitrage. It will also discuss how the United States
should consider compromising its level of regulation with that of other jurisdic-
tions, such as the other G20 countries. Finally, the paper will offer specific
13 See infra Part II.B.
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technical suggestions to the CFTC’s final interpretive guidance that may help
minimize regulatory arbitrage issues.
I. DRIVE TO REGULATE OTC DERIVATIVES
To understand the current drive to create a uniform global regulatory
structure of the regulation of OTC derivatives, it is important to understand the
size and global nature of OTC derivatives. As regulators were confronted with
the financial carnage from the Great Financial Crisis, policy makers and regula-
tors feared that future systemic losses suffered in OTC derivative markets could
ignite the next financial panic.
A. Understanding OTC Derivatives
Although OTC derivatives have been characterized as weapons of mass
destruction by the great Omaha financial sage Warren Buffet,14 derivatives
have always played an important role in commerce. They can provide a critical
means for parties to hedge business risks and to speculate with respect to the
future movement of prices and indexes. Historically, the most common types of
derivatives were options and forward transactions. The derivatives market
vastly expanded as parties used organized exchanges to trade futures and
options on futures.15 Since the early 1980s, the OTC derivatives market has
provided parties with endless possibilities of hedging and speculating using
OTC derivative transactions.
The general term “derivative” encompasses a wide variety of financial
instruments. The classic definition of a derivative is “a financial contract whose
value depends on the values of one or more underlying assets or indexes of
asset values.”16 Derivatives can be divided into several categories. The most
common and simplest division is between derivatives that are traded over
organized exchanges (“exchange-traded derivatives”) and those that are traded
in the OTC market. Both of these markets are measured in the trillions of dol-
lars and continue to grow in size and importance.
The exchange-traded derivatives industry is a mature and active financial
market. The Bank for International Settlements (the “BIS”) estimated that there
were over 86.9 million open futures contracts as of June 2013, of which 27.6
million were entered into in North America.17 The outstanding notional amount
14 WARREN E. BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003).
15 The exchange-traded derivatives market is credited with beginning with the Chicago
Board of Trade in Chicago in 1848. History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regula-
tion Before the Creation of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
16 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DERIVATIVE PRODUCT ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL
BANKS: JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE
ON DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 2 (1993); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-
94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 24
(1994).
17 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW app. A, at 147 (2013), available
at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1306.htm.
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of those trades is estimated by the BIS at $25.188 trillion as of June 2013.18
The BIS further estimated that there were 144 million option contracts open,
45.6 million of which were entered into in North America.19
In the United States, futures and options on futures (and the accompanying
exchanges and clearinghouses) are regulated by the CFTC.20 Currently there
are eighteen exchanges (referred to as “Designated Contract Markets” by the
CFTC) operating in the United States.21 Further, there are thirteen clearing-
houses (referred to as “Derivatives Clearing Organizations” by the CFTC) in
the United States that clear futures and options trades.22
Proponents of the proposed OTC derivative reforms believe that the reduc-
tions in credit risk, increased transparency, and price discovery in the
exchange-traded market can be exported wholesale into the OTC derivative
markets. Clearinghouses act as the intermediary between the buyer and seller.23
A clearinghouse greatly increases the usefulness of futures and options on
futures by permitting parties to enter into trades without having to worry about
the creditworthiness of their counterparty. Of course, the party is still subject to
the credit risk that the clearinghouse may not perform. While there is an actual
buyer and seller for each contract sold, the clearinghouse acts as an intermedi-
ary between the two parties, and actually steps into the shoes of the
counterparty to the respective buyer or seller.24
Since the early 1980s, the OTC derivative market has developed outside of
the exchange/clearinghouse environment. This market is dominated by large
commercial banks, investment banks, and similar financial institutions that act
as swap dealers for the other participants. Parties in this area trade a wide vari-
ety of different OTC derivative products.25 The growth and development of the
18 Id. at app. A, at 146.
19 Id. at app. A, at 147.
20 See Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
21 See Trading Organizations – Designated Contract Markets (DCM), U.S. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=TradingOrgani
zations&implicit=true&type=DCM&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last visited Feb.
20, 2014).
22 Derivatives Clearing Organizations (DCO), U.S.COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COM-
MISSION, http://sirt.cftc.gov/SIRT/SIRT.aspx?Topic=ClearingOrganizations&implicit=true&
type=DCO&CustomColumnDisplay=TTTTTTTT (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
23 Clearing Organizations: Derivatives Clearing Organizations, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/ClearingOrganizations/index
.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
24 CHATHAM FIN., THE END-USER GUIDES TO DERIVATIVES REGULATION: OVERVIEW OF
CENTRAL CLEARING 2 (2012), available at http://www.chathamfinancial.com/wp-content
/uploads/2012/08/Chatham-Financial-Overview-of-Central-Clearing.pdf.
25 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FIRST QUARTER 2012 1 (2012), available at http://www.occ.gov
/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/2012-96a.pdf. In soliciting legal opinions regarding the
enforceability of OTC derivative transactions, the International Swaps and Derivatives Asso-
ciation (“ISDA”) has developed the following comprehensive list (with definitions) of the
various OTC derivative transactions that opining counsel is required to address. This list is
generally considered to be comprehensive of the types of various transactions in the deriva-
tives markets: basis swap; bond option; bullion option; bullion swap; bullion trade; cap
transaction; collar transaction; commodity forward; commodity option; commodity swap;
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OTC derivative industry has been aided and fostered by the market’s principal
trade group, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”).26
As the “buy side” (customers of the swap dealers) was demanding custom-
ized derivative products from dealers to meet hedging requirements and other
needs, dealers became concerned that, under the Commodity Exchange Act,
such products could be classified as illegal off-exchange future products.27 In
an effort to enhance legal certainty and to determine regulatory jurisdiction
over the nascent OTC derivatives market, political pressure was placed on the
CFTC to exempt OTC derivatives from their regulatory jurisdiction. Through
regulatory and larger Congressional action, OTC derivatives were exempted
from CFTC regulation.28 As Gary Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC, noted,
“[l]eading up to the financial crisis, swaps were basically not regulated in Asia,
Europe or the United States.”29 US banks, however, were at least subject to
prudential regulation.30
credit spread transaction; cross currency rate swap; currency option; currency swap; equity
forward; equity index option; equity option; equity swap; floor transaction; foreign exchange
transaction; forward rate transaction; interest rate option; interest rate swap; physical com-
modity transaction; swap option; total return swap; weather index transaction. Memorandum
from Mayer Brown Law Firm on the Enforceability of the Termination, Close-Out and Mul-
tibranch Netting Provisions of the 1987, 1992 and 2002 Editions of ISDA Master Agree-
ments for the Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, app. A, at 1–5 (Mar. 13, 2012) (on file with
author).
26 About ISDA, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also
John Biggins & Colin Scott, Public-Private Relations in a Transnational Private Regulatory
Regime: ISDA, the State and OTC Derivatives Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
309, 309 (2012); Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211,
240–41 (2001).
27 See Steven Lofchie et al., What Is a “Swap” and Other Jurisdictional Questions?, CAD-
WALADER CABINET (April 3, 2012), http://www.cadwalader.com/thecabinet/page.php?page
_id=33#What%20the%20CFTC%20has%20Jurisdiction%20Over%20and%20Why%20It%
20Matters.
28 See CFTC Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July
21, 1989). The CFTC distinguished OTC derivatives from futures based partly on the fact
that OTC trades are individually tailored, are not marketed to the general public, and lack
exchange derivative characteristics such as exchange-style offset and clearing. In 1993, the
CFTC further confirmed the regulatory division between OTC derivatives and exchange-
traded derivatives when it promulgated regulations that exempted OTC derivatives from
CFTC jurisdiction, provided again that the OTC transactions were substantively different
from exchanged-traded transactions that the Commodity Exchange Act was designed to
cover. Id. at 30,695. One important difference was that the transactions were not “standard-
ized as to their material . . . terms . . . .” Commodity Options and Agricultural Swaps, 76
Fed. Reg. 6,095, 6,097 n.23 (Feb. 3, 2011) (emphasis added).
29 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address
on the Cross-Border Application of Dodd-Frank Swaps Market Reforms before the 2012
FINRA Annual Conference (May 21, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom
/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-113.
30 See Memorandum from the Comptroller of the Currency, Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, on the
Risk Management of Financial Derivatives to the Chief Exec. Officers of Nat’l Banks, Gen.
Managers of Fed. Branches and Agencies, Deputy Comptrollers, Dep’t and Div. Heads, and
Examining Pers. 1 (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file with author), issued by the OCC in 1993, for an
example of the requirements that banks acting as dealers are required to meet.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 9 30-APR-14 10:57
550 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:542
The OTC derivatives market has experienced nothing short of explosive
growth since the early 1980s.31 The total notional amount outstanding as of the
end of 2012 (the most recent data) for OTC derivatives was estimated by the
BIS to be approximately $633 trillion.32 The gross market value of these trades
was estimated at $24.7 trillion with the gross credit exposure calculated to be
$3.6 trillion.33
To understand the current OTC derivative reforms, it is important to
understand that the key reforms of exchange trading and clearing through clear-
inghouses find their root and motivations in the exchange-traded derivative
world. There, collateral is king and the trading of futures, options on futures,
and options is only done through regulated exchanges and cleared through
clearinghouses.
In the great debate over OTC derivative regulation, politicians, regulators,
and pundits regularly bolster their cases for regulation by trumpeting the size as
measured by the notional amount of the global OTC derivative market. By
citing to the $633 trillion notional amount statistic, however, they render any
rational discussion about the true risks of the OTC derivative industry almost
meaningless, the number is simply too large to grasp.34 It is important to under-
stand that the notional amount does not provide a direct indication of the
amount that can be lost in these markets. The notional amount instead refers to
the reference amount that payments in a derivative transactions are based
upon.35 For example, an interest rate swap payment would be calculated by
multiplying the relevant rate by the notional amount (which typically would
reference the amount of the liability that was being hedged).
Gross market value instead represents the mark-to-market value of all of
the outstanding transactions as of the end of 2012.36 This is typically explained
as the amount that would be paid by one party to another party at a particular
point in time if the OTC derivatives were to be terminated prior to maturity.
Although $24.7 trillion is an extraordinarily large number as well, it does not
take into account the effect of close-out netting.37
31 Henry T. C. Hu, Keynote Address: The SEC, Dodd-Frank, and Modern Capital Markets,
7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 427, 427 (2011). For a general description and discussion of the
derivatives market, see 6 CHRISTIAN A. JOHNSON, LEARNING CURVES: A GUIDE TO USING
AND NEGOTIATING OTC DERIVATIVES DOCUMENTATION 1–18 (2005).
32 MONETARY AND ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE:
OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1305.pdf. These statistics represent the size of the OTC derivative
market in the G10 countries (in addition to Switzerland).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 DEUTSCHE B ¨ORSE GRP., THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION 38
(2008), available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/global_derivatives_market
.pdf.
36 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND
FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 24 (2007), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf
/r_qt0712.pdf.
37 INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET ANALYSIS YEAR-END
2012, at 3, 9 (2013), available at http://assets.isda.org/media/467fbf64/438d9f0f.pdf/.
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Finally, the gross credit exposure of $3.6 trillion represents the net amount
that would be payable, after taking into account close-out netting.38 This is the
amount of net exposure that participants in the OTC markets have to each
other, that could be lost in the event that parties (and the global OTC derivative
financial markets) are at risk, and that is typically collateralized.39
B. Global OTC Derivatives Markets and Systemic Risk
OTC derivatives were initially developed to help parties manage various
business risks. For example, one of the first publicly-reported swaps was used
to help the World Bank and IBM manage foreign exchange risk through a for-
eign exchange swap.40 Although, given the size of the OTC derivative market,
it could be argued that the industry has an exemplary record, there are numer-
ous historical examples of failures to which critics continue to call attention. As
the recent Great Financial Crisis continued to drag on, regulators and policy
makers began to focus on eliminating the perceived dangers of OTC
derivatives.
Commissioner Gensler41 has been consistent is his rallying cry to regulate:
“And we must not forget the lessons of the 2008 crisis and earlier. Swaps exe-
cuted offshore by U.S. financial institutions can send risk straight back to our
38 Id.
39 ISDA estimates that “collateral in circulation in the uncleared OTC Derivatives Market”
was $3.6 trillion at end of 2011. INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN
SURVEY 2012, at 3 (2012), available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research
/surveys/margin-surveys/.
40 World Bank: The IBM Deal that Opens a Cash Source, BUS. WK., Sept. 7, 1981, at 48;
World Bank Arranges Borrowing in Europe Totaling $290 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
1981, at 34; I.B.M. in Deal on Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1981, at D10; Swapping
Currencies with the World Bank, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1981, at 133.
41 Gary Gensler’s term as Commissioner of the CFTC technically ended in April, but “Fed-
eral rules permit Gensler, a Democrat, to remain as chairman of the commission until the end
of 2013.” Silla Brush, CFTC’s Gensler Interested in Second-Term as Derivatives Overseer,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10
-12/cftc-s-gensler-interested-in-second-term-as-derivatives-overseer. Gary Gensler in many
ways was a peculiar choice to lead the charge in reforming OTC derivative markets. Having
made partner at age 30 at Goldman Sachs, many might worry that he would become a pawn
of Wall Street, putting his considerable talents to watering down reform. Ironically now,
Chairman Gensler “worked alongside Robert E. Rubin, then the Treasury secretary under
President Clinton, and Alan Greenspan, then the chairman of the Federal Reserve, to block
proposals by the commission to regulate the new [derivative] instruments.” Edmund L.
Andrews, Obama Names Insider to Commodities Post, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at B3,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/business/19gensler.html?_r=0. His collec-
tive experience over time, however, with investment banks and swap dealers, appears to
have instead turned him into a crusader for reform, sensitizing him to the risks of gutting
regulation through exceptions and safe harbors. The various regulations written by the CFTC
appear to have become longer and more complicated in an effort to avoid evasion by sophis-
ticated and experienced investment bankers. Although universally recognizable by everyone
in the derivative industry, the New Republic still listed him as one of Washington’s Most
Powerful, Least Famous People. Editorial, Washington’s Most Powerful, Least Famous Peo-
ple, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com//article/politics/96131
/washingtons-most-powerful-least-famous-people.
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shores.”42 He has repeatedly warned that “risk from foreign deals flows back to
U.S. firms.”43 Historically, there have been numerous infamous examples of
companies suffering severe losses caused by the misuse of OTC derivatives,
including the losses suffered by counterparties such as Proctor & Gamble and
Gibson Greeting Cards during the 1990s.44 These losses were followed by the
exponentially higher OTC derivative losses suffered by several hedge funds,
including Long Term Capital Management.45
The Lehman Brothers insolvency in 2008, in particular, gave regulators
great pause, even though Lehman Brothers was in the money on a net basis
with respect to its derivative book when it declared bankruptcy:
Lehman’s derivatives receivables total $23.8 billion and payables total $13.0 billion,
in each case based on marks net of collateral as of September 12, 2008. There are
over 6,100 counterparties, 3,930 of which are expected to owe Lehman money and
2,190 of which are expected to be owed money by Lehman based on the estimated
receivables and payables.46
Even four years later, substantial mediation and litigation is still ongoing to
examine the valuation of the terminated trades.47
The sheer number of Lehman counterparties that actively traded with Leh-
man also added to the concern for the complexity and interconnectedness inher-
42 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Oral Testimony
Before the U.S. House Financial Service Committee (June 19, 2012), available at http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-117b.
43 Vladimir Guevarra, EU, Japan Warn Against New US Swaps Rules, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
18, 2012, 12:32 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444734804578
064600691285288.
44 There are a growing number of companies that have suffered devastating losses as a
result of their derivatives activities. For example, Procter & Gamble Co. lost $157 million on
derivatives tied to movements in the yields “on five-year U.S. Treasury notes and the price
of 30-year U.S. Treasury Bonds.” Jeffrey Taylor & Steven Lipin, Bankers Trust Faces
Inquiry on Derivative Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at C1. Other companies such as Air
Products & Chemicals, Gibson Greetings Inc., and Mead have all lost tens of millions of
dollars by entering into derivatives that moved against them. James P. Miller, Air Products
Takes a Charge of $60 million --- Move Reflects Falling Value of Derivative Contracts Sold
by Banks Trust, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, at A3. Although Air Products lost $107 million
in 1994, it did receive a settlement payment of $67 million from Bankers Trust after it sued
Bankers Trust with respect to the transactions. Timothy L. O’Brien, Bankers Trust Pays $67
Million to Settle Derivatives Dispute with Chemical Firm, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at A5.
Although Gibson Greetings eventually only paid $6.2 million of the $23 million that it owed
to Bankers Trust through a court settlement, it is still indicative of the great potential for
losses. Steven Lipin & Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Signs Accord on Derivatives --- Pact
with New York Fed Toughens Supervision Affecting Sales Practices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,
1994, at A3.
45 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPI-
TAL MANAGEMENT 158–59 (2000).
46 Meet Lehman’s Liquidators: Alvarez & Marsal to Liquidate Investment Bank, Reconcile
Derivative Claims, TEIGLAND-HUNT 3 (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.teiglandhunt.com/webcp
/assets/rtarticles/pdf/55.pdf; see also ALVAREZ & MARSAL, LLC, LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLD-
INGS INC.: THE STATE OF THE ESTATE (2009), available at http://www.edocr.com/doc/3677
/lehman-brothers-holdings-inc-state-estate-january-14-2009.
47 Steven J. Fink et al., Lehman Derivative Litigation Still Looms Large, LAW360 (June 14,
2013, 6:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/450530/lehman-derivative-litigation-still
-looms-large.
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ent in the market.48 Regulators portray the difficulties in unwinding the
Lehman Brothers book as a poster child for the transparency, pricing, and credit
concerns inherent in OTC derivatives.49 In addition to the sheer size of Lehman
Brothers, there were also enormous amounts of activity between its domestic
and international affiliates. The Joint Administrators of Lehman Brothers Inter-
national (Europe) (“LBIE”) estimated that there were several hundred inter-
affiliate balances between LBIE and the other affiliates.50 In addition to this
inter-affiliate activity, LBIE itself had over “130,000 swaps contracts outstand-
ing when it failed.”51
These losses paled, however, in comparison with the losses suffered by
global insurance giant AIG on positions it had taken selling credit derivatives52
through its finance subsidiary, AIG Financial Products.53 As of 2008, its credit
default swap (“CDS”) portfolio totaled $447 billion in notional amount and
covered “super senior” risk tranches of diversified pools of loans and debt
securities.54 More problematic was that counterparties’ exposure to AIG was
uncollateralized due to faith in AIG’s AAA credit rating.55 As of the nine
months ending on September 30, 2008, AIG had unrealized market valuation
losses on its AIGFP super senior credit default swap portion in the amount of
$21.7 billion.56 These, along with other losses, caused the Federal Reserve and
the US Treasury to intervene and prevent AIG from failing.
Regulators recently became even more concerned about the safety of the
bilateral OTC derivatives market when JPMorgan Chase experienced large
48 It is estimated that JP Morgan Chase has approximately 17,000 active counterparties rep-
resented in its OTC derivative trading book of business. Interview with Don Thompson,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, JPMorgan Chase (Apr. 9, 2010) (on file with author).
49 See Jon H. Harsch, CFTC Chair Gensler Calls for Regulating OTC Market to Protect
Both Taxpayers and Derivatives Users, AGRIPULSE 1 (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.agri-pulse
.com/uploaded/Jan0710H2.pdf.
50 See LEHMAN BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL (EUROPE) IN ADMINISTRATION: JOINT ADMINIS-
TRATORS’ PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER 2008 TO 14 MARCH 2009, at 26
(2009), available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/lbie-progress-report-140409.pdf.
51 Gensler, supra note 29.
52 See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007); About CDS: CDS FAQ, ISDA, http://www.isdacds
marketplace.com/about_cds_market/cds_faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
53 For a general discussion of the AIG crisis, see generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE
OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
EXIT STRATEGY (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698
/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-616, FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS: REVIEW OF FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585560
.pdf.
54 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945 (2009);
Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 100 (Nov. 10, 2008) [hereinafter AIG
2008 Report], available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76115/reports
/Q308_10Q.pdf.
55 See Robert Oak, Yesterday AIG had a AAA Credit Rating, ECON. POPULIST (Sept. 17,
2008, 4:17 PM), http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/yesterday-aig-had-aaa-credit
-rating.
56 Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 40 (Nov. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.aig.com/Chartis/internet/US/en/2517447_17501T04_CNB_tcm3171-443244
.pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-APR-14 10:57
554 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:542
losses on credit default derivative trades in spring of 2012 executed by their
trader affectionately referred to as the “London Whale.”57 The losses were par-
ticularly disturbing given that JPMorgan Chase is considered to be one of the
best managed US banks and is the largest bank in the United States as mea-
sured by assets.58
On May 10, 2012, JPMorgan Chase announced a loss on their credit
default trades of “about $2 billion.”59 As JPMorgan Chase struggled to unwind
these positions, the losses grew to $5.8 billion and could potentially increase to
as much as $7.5 billion.60 When pressed about the losses, Jamie Dimon, the
CEO of JPMorgan stated, “[i]n hindsight, this was bad execution, bad strategy,
but also the environment — because this is mark to market . . . .” Dimon
continued, “[b]ut I just don’t want to make excuses.”61
In Chairman Gensler’s continual push to enact OTC derivative regulatory
reforms, he has repeatedly focused on the JPMorgan Chase losses: “ ‘Recent
events at JPMorgan Chase are a stark reminder of how swaps traded overseas
can quickly reverberate with losses coming back into the United States,’ Mr.
Gensler said. ‘Now is not the time to retreat from these much-needed
reforms.’ ”62
57 Andrew Trotman, JP Morgan Chief Jamie Dimon Defends Banks, Says London Whale




59 Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Erases Stock Drop Fueled by London Trading Loss, BLOOM-
BERG NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-13/jpmor
gan-erases-stock-drop-fueled-by-london-trading-loss.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Peter
Eavis, JPMorgan Discloses $2 Billion in Trading Losses, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2012, 10:11
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/jpmorgan-discloses-significant-losses-in-trad
ing-group/. For a discussion of the losses, see James Dimon, Chairman and CEO, JPMorgan
& Chase, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (June 13, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617
/000119312512268992/d366030dex991.htm, and Nelson D. Schwartz & Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss is Said to Rise at Least 50%, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,
2012, 9:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/jpmorgans-trading-loss-is-said-to
-rise-at-least-50/.
60 Kopecki, supra note 59; see also Mary Childs & Shannon D. Harrington, Trading Surges
Boosted Whale Positions Before Audits, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-24/trading-surges-boosted-whale-positions-before-audits
.html; Maureen Farrell, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss: $5.8 Billion, CNN MONEY (July 18,
2012, 9:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/18/investing/jpmorgan-earnings/index.htm;
Steve Schaefer, JPMorgan Profits Withstand $4.4B Trading Loss, FORBES (July 13, 2012,
8:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2012/07/13/london-whales-4-4b-loss
-cant-drown-jpmorgan-earnings/; Matt Scuffham & Lionel Laurent, London Whale Took Big
Bets Below the Surface, REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article
/2012/05/11/us-jpmorgan-iksil-idUSBRE84A12620120511.
61 Charles Riley & Julianne Pepitone, JPMorgan Suffers Big Loss, CNN MONEY (May 11,
2012, 9:37 AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2012/05/10/news/companies/jp-morgan-losses
/index.htm?iid=EL.
62 Ben Protess, Regulator May Grant Foreign Banks Brief Reprieve on Derivatives, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/regulator-may
-grant-foreign-banks-brief-reprieve-on-derivatives/?_r=0.
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In addition to avoiding systemic risks to the US financial system, the
CFTC believes that the Dodd-Frank reforms will result in a “more transparent,
accessible and competitive swaps market,” noting that “transparency lowers the
risk of the swaps market.”63 Chairman Gensler outlined in particular the advan-
tages of transparency. First, it allows “the public and users of swaps to see the
pricing and volume of transactions, as well as many bids and offers, in real
time.”64 Second, it allows “both dealers and end users the ability to look to
markets to value positions, allowing for better supervision of and accounting
for risk.” Third, it provides greater liquidity when positions need to be
unwound.65
Gensler further summarizes the transparency advantages of the Dodd-
Frank reforms: “[T]ransparency lowers the risk of the swaps market. . . .
Whether it’s non-financial end users, pension funds, mutual funds, community
banks or insurance companies, they all benefit from the lower costs and greater
pricing information of a more transparent, accessible and competitive swaps
market.”66
C. Efforts to Regulate OTC Derivatives Pre-Dodd-Frank – Commitments
from Global Market Participants to the Federal Reserve and Other
Foreign Regulators
Prior to the Dodd-Frank and G20 regulatory efforts, the Federal Reserve
and other regulators made progress to regulate OTC derivatives and eliminate
future systemic risk. As the OTC derivative market continued to grow, with the
CDS market exploding in particular, regulators pushed the major swap dealers
to reform their trading activities.
Beginning in 2005, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in conjunc-
tion with domestic and international supervisors,67 organized a committee
referred to as the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group “to address the emerging
risks of inadequate infrastructure for the rapidly growing market in credit deriv-
atives.”68 Through a series of commitment letters addressed to these regulators
63 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Keynote Address
on Dodd-Frank Swaps Market Reform at the Sandler O’Neill Global Exchange & Brokerage





67 The group eventually grew to include the following foreign regulators (in addition to US
regulators): French Prudential Supervisory Authority (Autorite´ de Controˆle Prudentiel -
ACP); German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; Japan Financial Services Agency;
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority; and the United Kingdom Financial Services
Authority. See Commitment Letter from the Mgmt. of AllianceBernstein et al., to William C.
Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. 1 n.2 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2011/SCL0331.pdf.
68 For a discussion of the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group and the commitment letters
developed through this process, see OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group, FED. RES. BANK
N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/otc_derivatives_supervisors_group.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2014).
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from the largest global derivative dealers and buy-side participants,69 tremen-
dous progress was made at reforming the CDS market. Unfortunately, as both
regulators and participants have turned their attention toward the Dodd-Frank
and G20 statutory reforms now being implemented, the group appears to be
inactive.
1. Dodd-Frank OTC Derivative Reforms
Although there have been calls to regulate OTC derivatives in the United
States since the early 1980s, the calls to regulators and the US Congress did not
gain any traction until the Great Financial Crisis.70 As the financial crisis deep-
ened, global policy makers and regulators began to look for sources of the next
financial crisis.
The Great Financial Crisis in the United States officially began in Decem-
ber of 2007 when the United States entered into recession and did not climb out
until June of 2009.71 To appreciate the panic and concern of policymakers and
regulators, it is important to consider some of the key statistics during that time
period. The Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked in October 2007, at 14,164,
only to have plummeted to 6,547 by March of 2009.72 Other stock indexes
globally had similar results.73
69 This group grew to include AllianceBernstein; Bank of America-Merrill Lynch; Barclays
Capital; Blackrock, Inc.; BlueMountain Capital Management LLC; BNP Paribas; Citadel
LLC; Citi; Credit Suisse; Deutsche Bank AG; D.E. Shaw & Co., LP; DW Investment Man-
agement LP; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Goldman Sachs Asset Management, LP; HSBC Group;
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.; JP Morgan; Managed Funds Associa-
tion; Morgan Stanley; Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC; The Royal Bank of
Scotland Group; Asset Management Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association; Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale; UBS AG; Wells Fargo Bank, NA; Wellington Management
Company, LLP. See Commitment Letter from the Mgmt. of AllianceBernstein et al., to Wil-
liam C. Dudley, supra note 66, at 3.
70 See Daria S. Latysheva, Taming the Hydra of Derivatives Regulation: Examining New
Regulatory Approaches to OTC Derivatives in the United States and Europe, 20 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 465, 476–80 (2012); see also Frank D’Souza et al., Illuminating the Need
for Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 476 (2010).
71 US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Apr. 23,
2012), http://www.nber.org/cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_
20120423.pdf.
72 Dow Jones Industrial Average (1900 - Present Monthly), STOCKCHARTS.COM, http://
stockcharts.com/freecharts/historical/djia1900.html (last updated Nov. 1, 2013).
73 The UK FTSE 100 went from a high on October 12, 2007, of 6,730.70 to 3,460.70 on
March 9, 2009. FTSE 100: Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp
?s=%5EFTSE&b=12&a=09&c=2007&e=12&d=09&f=2007&g=d (last visited Feb. 20,
2014) (Oct. 12, 2007) (high); FTSE 100: Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://uk.finance.ya
hoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EFTSE&b=9&a=02&c=2009&e=9&d=02&f=2009&g=d (last visited
Feb. 20, 2014) (Mar. 9, 2009) (low). The German DAX went from a high of 8,117.79 on
December 12, 2007, to a low of 3,588.89 on March 9, 2009. DAX: Historical Prices, YAHOO
FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGDAXI&a=11&b=12&c=2007&d=11&e=12&f
=2007&g=d (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (Dec. 12, 2007) (high); DAX: Historical Prices,
YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGDAXI&a=02&b=9&c=2009&d=02&e
=9&f=2009&g=d (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (Mar. 9, 2009) (low). The Hong Kong Hang
Seng index went from a high of 30,922.31 on November 2, 2007, to a low of 11,344.58 on
March 9, 2009. Hang Seng Index: Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com
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Other indicators were equally as grim. Unemployment peaked at 10 per-
cent in October of 2009, with the employment rate stubbornly remaining above
8 percent.74 Citigroup experienced a $17 billion loss in the fourth quarter of
2008, with its share price dropping from $23.84 as of April 1, 2008, to $1.03 as
of March 6, 2009.75 The global financial markets experienced a liquidity crisis
unequalled since the Great Depression.76
After the trauma experienced during the months of September and October
2008, the US Treasury began to proactively propose the regulation of OTC
derivatives in the United States. On May 13, 2009, in a seminal letter to Sena-
tor Harry Reid, US Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner proposed a ratio-
nale and framework for regulating OTC derivatives.77 In the letter, Geithner
outlined four broad objectives: “(1) preventing activities in those markets from
posing risk to the financial system; (2) promoting the efficiency and trans-
parency of those markets; (3) preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other
market abuses; and (4) ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inap-
propriately to unsophisticated parties.”78
In his letter to Senator Reid, US Treasury Secretary Geithner outlined that
the nature of the proposed regulation included clearing standardized OTC
derivatives through regulated central counterparties; prudential supervision and
regulation, including conservative capital requirements, business conduct stan-
dards, reporting requirements, and initial margins for unclear trades; record
keeping and reporting requirements; and granting of additional authority to the
CFTC and SEC to police fraud, market manipulation, and other market
abuses.79
/q/hp?s=%5EHSI&a=10&b=02&c=2007&d=10&e=02&f=2007&g=d (last visited Feb. 20,
2014) (Nov. 2, 2007) (high); Hang Seng Index: Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance
.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EHSI&a=02&b=09&c=2009&d=02&e=09&f=2009&g=d (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2014) (Mar. 9, 2009) (low). The Australian S & P ASX 200 went from a high
of 6770.60 on October 12, 2007, to a low of 3120.80 on March 10, 2009. S&P/ASX 200:
Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EAXJO&a=09&b=12&
c=2007&d=09&e=12&f=2007&g=d (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (Oct. 12, 2007) (high);
S&P/ASX 200: Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EAXJO
&a=02&b=10&c=2009&d=02&e=10&f=2009&g=d (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (Mar. 10,
2009) (low).
74 Databases, Tables & Calculators By Subject: Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2014).
75 CITIGROUP, CITI ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 225 (2008), available at http://www.citigroup
.com/citi/investor/quarterly/2009/ar08c_en.pdf?ieNocache=714; Historical Quotes: Citi
group Inc. Tue, Apr 01, 2008, BIG CHARTS, http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/historical/de
fault.asp?symb=C&closeDate=4%2F01%2F08&x=40&y=25 (last visited Feb. 4, 2014); His-
torical Quotes: Citigroup Inc., Fri, Mar 06, 2009, http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/histori
cal/default.asp?symb=C&closeDate=3%2F6%2F09&x=-563&y=-296 (last visited Feb. 4,
2014).
76 For a discussion of the liquidity crisis and the Federal Reserve’s efforts to stop the credit
markets from imploding, see generally Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circum-
stances: The Federal Reserve and the US Financial Crisis, in LAW REFORM AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 269, 269–70 (Kern Alexander & Niamh Moloney eds., 2011).
77 Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, to Harry Reid, Senator,
U.S. Senate  (May 13, 2009).
78 Id. at 1.
79 Id. at 1–2.
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The US Treasury’s proposals eventually found their way into US law in
the form of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.80 The final passage of Dodd-Frank was an arduous process beginning in
December of 2009 and running through final passage in May of 2010.81
A complex piece of legislation, Dodd-Frank consists of sixteen Titles run-
ning over a thousand pages. Title VII, entitled Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability, the statutory framework for regulating OTC derivatives in the
United States, provides over three hundred pages of detailed statutes, broken
into two subtitles containing a total of fifty-nine sections.82
The breadth of regulation enacted by the US Congress found in Title VII
is breathtaking, completely overtaking and exceeding the regulation called for
in the G20 Pittsburgh commitments. The new statutory framework requires
mandatory exchange trading and clearing of OTC derivatives (with certain key
exceptions),83 position limits,84 margining unclear swaps,85 capital require-
ments for dealers,86 the infamous Lincoln push-out,87 registration of swap deal-
ers and major swap participants,88 reporting and record keeping requirements,89
price discovery,90 business conduct standards,91 clearinghouse regulation and
core principles,92 data repositories,93 conflict of interest rules,94 certain other
miscellaneous provisions, and the provisions governing regulatory arbitrage.
The goal of US regulation appears to be to minimize to the greatest extent
possible any risk of systemic failure from OTC derivative trading with US per-
80 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”].
81 In December 2009, the House bill passed. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009). Five months later, the Senate passed on May
20, 2010, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
(2010). President Obama on July 21, 2010 signed into law the conference committee version.
Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376.
82 Dodd-Frank Act § 1(b) (table of contents showing number of Titles, Subtitles, and
sections).
83 Dodd-Frank Act § 723 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012)) (necessitated the
exchange trading through Swap Execution Facilities requirement).
84 Dodd-Frank Act § 737 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a) (2012)) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Act Position Limits].
85 Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012)) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank Act Unclear Swaps].
86 Id.
87 Dodd-Frank Act § 716 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2012)).
88 Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(a) (2012)); Dodd-Frank Act
§ 764 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(a) (2012)).
89 Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(f) (2012)); Dodd-Frank Act
§ 764 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(f) (2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Record
Keeping].
90 Dodd-Frank Act § 727 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(B) (2012)); Dodd-
Frank Act § 763 (codified as amended ay 15 U.S.C. § 78m(m)(1)(B) (2012)).
91 Dodd-Frank Act § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h) (2012)); Dodd-Frank
Act § 764 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(h) (2012)).
92 Dodd-Frank Act § 725 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1 (2012)).
93 Dodd-Frank Act § 727 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(G) (2012)); Dodd-
Frank Act § 763 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78m(m)(1)(G) (2012)).
94 Dodd-Frank Act § 726 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8323 (2012)); Dodd-Frank
Act § 765 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8343 (2012)).
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sons. It also seeks to minimize the risk that non-US persons doing business
with US persons will enter into swap activity outside the United States that may
cause such non-US persons to fail, thus perhaps causing systemic harm to US
capital markets because of their inter-related connections to the United States.
2. G20 Commitments
It is impossible to understand the issues of regulatory arbitrage and extra-
territoriality in global OTC derivative reform without understanding the efforts
of the G20. The G20 is an informal group of nineteen countries and the Euro-
pean Union, with representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank.95 In addition to these annual meetings, there are also G20 summit
meetings of the leaders of G20 countries held from time to time.96 Commenta-
tors in general have written favorably that the G20 has provided an important
means to coordinate international efforts to regulate financial markets.97
Concern about global OTC derivative reform and regulatory arbitrage
extended beyond the United States to include the other G20 countries as the
financial crisis grew. In an effort to minimize or eliminate regulatory arbitrage,
the G20 countries agreed to cooperate and harmonize international regulation
of OTC derivatives in the Pittsburgh Summit, held September 24–25, 2009.98
In the 2009 G20 Leaders Statement, the G20 countries committed themselves
to the following:
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or elec-
tronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterpar-
ties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade
repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements. We ask the FSB [Financial Stability Board] and its relevant members
to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve trans-
parency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market
abuse.99
The G20 countries followed up on their 2009 commitments with an addi-
tional commitment in the 2011 Cannes Summit Final Declaration to create
“organizations to develop for consultation standards on margining for non-cen-
95 The 19 countries include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States. G20 Research Grp., G20 Members, U. TORONTO,
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/members.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
96 G20 Research Grp., The G20, U. TORONTO, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20whatisit.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
97 Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils Of New Global Governance: A
Case Of The G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491 (2012); Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Coopera-
tion: The Role of the G-20 in Improving the International Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 239 (2012); Gabriela I. Ramos, The OECD in the G20: A Natural
Partner in Global Governance, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 325 (2011); Nathalie Boschat
& Ian Talley, Recovery Redefines G-20 Challenge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2011, at A4.
98 G20 Research Grp., G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, U. TORONTO, http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also
The Pittsburgh Summit: Key Accomplishments, WHITE HOUSE 1–2, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/files/documents/g20/Fact_Sheet_Pittsburgh_Outcomes.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
99 G20 Research Grp., supra note 98.
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trally cleared OTC derivatives by June 2012.”100 The key additional commit-
ment that came out of the Cannes Summit was a commitment to require
margining for non-cleared OTC derivatives.101 The G20 leaders again reiter-
ated their commitment in the 2012 Los Cabos Leaders Declaration.102
There have been two key reports in measuring the progress of G20 coun-
tries. The first is a series of interim reports prepared by the Financial Stability
Board, more commonly known as the FSB. The second was a joint report pre-
pared by the CFTC and SEC in the United States. Both reports indicate some
progress, but also that substantial work needs to be done by the G20 countries
to meet both the 2012 deadline and their G20 commitments.
The FSB has been charged with monitoring the progress of the implemen-
tation of OTC derivative market reforms. The FSB is an organization that is
hosted by the BIS and was “established to coordinate at the international level
the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bod-
ies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory,
supervisory and other financial sector policies.”103 The membership of the FSB
100 G20 Research Grp., Cannes Summit Final Declaration—Building Our Common Future:
Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, U. TORONTO, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca
/2011/2011-cannes-declaration-111104-en.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). The full state-
ment reads as follows:
Reforming the over the counter derivatives markets is crucial to build a more resilient financial
system. All standardized over-the-counter derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and centrally cleared, by the end of 2012; OTC
derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories, and non-centrally cleared contracts
should be subject to higher capital requirements. We agree to cooperate further to avoid loop-
holes and overlapping regulations. A coordination group is being established by the FSB to
address some of these issues, complementing the existing OTC derivatives working group. We
endorse the FSB progress report on implementation and ask the CPSS and IOSCO to work with
FSB to carry forward work on identifying data that could be provided by and to trade reposito-
ries, and to define principles or guidance on regulators’ and supervisors’ access to data held by
trade repositories. We call on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Interna-
tional Organization for Securities Commission (IOSCO) together with other relevant organiza-
tions to develop for consultation standards on margining for non-centrally cleared OTC
derivatives by June 2012, and on the FSB to continue to report on progress towards meeting our
commitments on OTC derivatives.
Id.
101 Id.
102 We reaffirm our commitment that all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded
on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central
counterparties by end-2012, OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories
and non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements. We wel-
come the FSB progress report on implementation. Now that substantial progress has been
achieved in the four safeguards for a resilient and efficient global framework for central clearing,
jurisdictions should rapidly finalize their decision-making and put in place the needed legislation
and regulations to meet the G20 commitment for central clearing. We acknowledge the progress
made to develop the key principles to promote internationally consistent minimum standards for
the margining of non-centrally cleared derivatives and encourage international standard setters to
finalize the proposed global margin standards by the end of this year, to match the implementa-
tion deadline for other OTC derivatives reforms and for the Basel capital framework.
G20, G20 LEADERS DECLARATION para. 39 (2012), available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca
/2012/2012-0619-loscabos.pdf.
103 Overview, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/over
view.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
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is composed of the same countries as the G20, but also includes the Nether-
lands, Spain, Switzerland, several international organizations,104 and several
international standard-setting bodies.105 The FSB has so far delivered six
reports on the progress in implementing OTC derivative reforms, focusing in
particular on the G20 commitments.106
The most recent interim report, delivered on September 2, 2013,107 reports
progress on implementing the G20 framework. In the Executive Summary to
the FSB Report, it notes that “[m]arket participants in general appear to be
making good progress in their preparations for implementation of OTC deriva-
tives market reforms,” and also, however, that “regulatory uncertainty has held
back the finalisation of preparations by some market participants.”108 The
report continues, however, noting that the G-20 countries are continuing to pro-
gress in their work:
The large share of cross-border activity in many OTC derivatives markets means that
clarity in how jurisdictions’ regulatory regimes interact is crucial for all stakeholders.
Two major constructive steps forward have been taken: first, the announcement in
July by the CFTC and the EC of their joint understandings; and subsequently, a
multilateral set of understandings to improve the cross-border implementation of
OTC derivatives reforms, announced in August by the Regulators Group.109
The FSB recommended that G20 countries should continue “to urge
authorities to resolve regulatory conflicts, inconsistencies, duplication and gaps
in order to provide certainty to stakeholders.”110 Further, the FSB still voiced
concerns about cross-border considerations noting that “[u]ncertainties about
the treatment of cross-border activity (whether of market participants or of
infrastructure) under various jurisdictions’ regimes continue to be a concern for
market participants as regulatory requirements take effect.”111
Canada, the Unites States’ key neighbor to the north, is a G20 jurisdiction
taking steps to comply with the G20 goals.  Recently, Canada has “introduced
legislation to Parliament . . . to allow for central clearing for over-the-counter
derivatives contracts,”112 although observers noted that it “is not likely to be
104 These include the Bank for International Settlements, European Central Bank, European
Commission, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, and the World Bank. Links to FSB Members, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, www
.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
105 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; Committee on the Global Financial System;
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems; International Association of Insurance
Supervisors; International Accounting Standards Board; and International Organization of
Securities Commissions. Id. 
106 The six reports are available at Publications – Progress Reports, FIN. STABILITY BOARD,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb_publications/tid_178/index.htm (last visited
Feb. 20, 2014).
107 FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION (2013), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
/r_130902b.pdf.
108 Id. at 1.
109 Id. at 2.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 5.
112 Courtney Tower, Canada Govt Proposes Central Clearing for OTC Derivatives, MNI
(Oct. 18, 2012, 5:29 PM), https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/canada-govt-proposes
-central-clearing-otc-derivatives-0.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 21 30-APR-14 10:57
562 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:542
passed into law quickly.”113 Canada, however, has also been wary that the
Dodd-Frank reforms could lead to unintended consequences and problems.114
On January 31, 2012, the CFTC and the SEC issued the Joint Report on
International Swap Regulation (the “Joint Report”).115 Congress required the
CFTC and the SEC to study the regulation of OTC derivatives across the
United States, Asia, and Europe in hopes of identifying areas of potential regu-
latory arbitrage.116 The Joint Report consists of 153 pages of analysis. The
Joint Report notes that “progress varies across jurisdictions in meeting the 2009
G-20 Leaders’ commitments.”117 The Joint Report further notes that “[t]he G-
20 leaders have agreed to the OTC derivatives commitments, but it is still too
early to determine precisely where there is alignment internationally and where
there may be gaps or inconsistencies.”118
II. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVE MARKETS
From the beginning of the recent push to regulate OTC derivatives, regula-
tors and policy makers have been cognizant that such regulation imposed a risk
of creating regulatory arbitrage. Jonathan Macey, in his seminal article on regu-
latory competition provides a description of the condition: “[A]s technology
has advanced and strong capital markets have developed in other countries, the
phenomenon of “regulatory arbitrage” has become more prevalent. Regulatory
arbitrage occurs when competitors locate their activities in those jurisdictions
that offer the most attractive set of regulations.”119
Regulatory arbitrage, in this article, involves parties choosing to transact in (or
moving business to) jurisdictions that are unregulated or lightly regulated in
comparison to other jurisdictions. This could also be referred to or character-
ized as “jurisdictional arbitrage.”120
113 Id.
114 Jeremy Grant & Bernard Simon, Canada Official Warns on OTC Clearing Reforms, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011, 12:45 AM), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/900e5c68-e30e-11e0-bb55
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2f07LYmY7.
115 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, JOINT REPORT
ON INTERNATIONAL SWAP REGULATION (2012) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT], available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/dfstudy_isr_013112.pdf.
116 DFA Section 719(c) requires the Commissions jointly to conduct a study (“Study”) and then to
report to Congress (“Report”) on how swaps and security-based swaps (collectively “Swaps”,
unless otherwise indicated) are regulated in the United States, Asia, and Europe and to identify
areas of regulation that are similar and other areas of regulation that could be harmonized. Sec-
tion 719(c) also calls for the Report to identify major dealers, exchanges, clearinghouses, clear-
ing members, and regulators in each geographic area and to list the major contracts (including
trading volumes, clearing volumes, and notional values), the methods for clearing swaps, and the
systems used for setting margin in each geographic area.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
117 Id. at 111.
118 Id.
119 Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition,
52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003) (emphasis added).
120 See infra Part III.D for a discussion of regulatory arbitrage within the same jurisdiction.
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A. Examples of Regulatory Arbitrage Outside of OTC Derivatives
There are numerous examples of regulatory arbitrage that have been stud-
ied vigorously. The most famous is probably the competition between jurisdic-
tions for incorporating businesses in order to capture franchise fees and other
benefits.121 A similar race to the bottom is emerging in Europe as well with
respect to the same incorporation issue.122
An analogous situation to the current race to regulate OTC derivatives was
the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley regulatory regime in reaction to the vari-
ous corporate scandals that occurred in the United States in the early 2000s.123
As the United States imposed penalties for corporate malfeasance on the execu-
tives of publicly traded companies, there was concern that foreign companies
would avoid listing in the United States. Although the evidence is somewhat
mixed, it appears that Sarbanes–Oxley had a negative effect on companies list-
ing in the United States.124 There is also evidence that regulatory costs of
121 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1992) (arguing that there is
a race to the bottom with respect to certain issues); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1999); William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in
Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 401 (1994); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corpo-
rate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251, 251 (1977); Ralph K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisen-
berg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1526 (1989). For revisionist views denying the relevance of
interstate competition, see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491,
2493 (2005).
122 See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory
Competition, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 369, 386 n.67–68 (2005) (providing data on so
called “GmbH limited,” i.e. German businesses incorporated as English private limited
companies).
123 See Larry Bumgardner, Reforming Corporate America, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REV., no. 1
2003, available at http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/reforming-corporate-america/.
124 Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regula-
tion: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 234 (2005); Dobrina
Georgieva, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Act Chase Away Foreign Firms? Evidence From ADR
Terminations, 14 ALLIED ACAD. INT’L CONF. 16, 16–17 (2009); Peter Hostak et al., An
Examination of the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Attractiveness of U.S. Capital
Markets for Foreign Firms, 18 REV. ACCT. STUD. 522, 524 (2013), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=956020; Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Eco-
nomic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 155, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=592421; Suraj Srinivasan & Joseph D. Piotroski, Regulation and Bonding: The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International Listings 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Govern-
ance, Working Paper No. 11, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956987; Luigi
Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing its Competitive Edge? 3 (European Corp. Gov-
ernance Inst., Working Paper No. 192, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1028701. But see Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Com-
petitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices over Time 43–44 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 173, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
_id=982193.
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Sarbanes–Oxley have depressed venture capital in the United States.125 In other
words, in spite of the depth, liquidity, and safety of US capital markets, foreign
companies chose not to list their securities in the United States due to regula-
tion that was more stringent than in other jurisdictions, such as England or
Singapore.
Hedge funds have also made decisions to organize or locate in less-regu-
lated jurisdictions to take advantage of, for instance, minimizing tax burdens or
avoiding securities law regulation:
Hedge funds can be domiciled in onshore or offshore locations. Close to a half of the
number of hedge funds in June 2011 were registered in offshore locations. The Cay-
man Islands was the most popular registration location and accounted for 34 [per-
cent] of the number of global hedge funds, down on its 39 [percent] share two years
earlier. It was followed by the US 24 [percent], Luxembourg 10 [percent], Ireland 7
[percent], British Virgin Islands 6 [percent] and Bermuda 3 [percent].126
With respect to where they actually trade and transact business, however, one
commentator noted that “[t]he data examined offer little or no support for the
view that hedge fund managers pursuing riskier strategies or strategies with
potentially more agency problems systematically select jurisdictions with less
stringent regulation.”127
The recent explosion of offshore internet gaming may also provide lessons
about the difficulty of regulating cross-border OTC derivative trading. It is esti-
mated that internet gaming is a $12 billion industry, with over 2,300 sites.128 In
reaction to concerns about the industry,129 Congress enacted the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006.130 This effort, however, has
resulted in a casebook example of regulatory arbitrage. “In legislating to excise
the online gambling industry from its territory, it has effectively driven the
industry offshore to states that will license it, such as the UK.”131 In addition,
125 Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the United
States, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 369, 369 (2007)., available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=923572.
126 THECITYUK, FINANCIAL MARKETS SERIES: HEDGE FUNDS 4 (2012), available at http://
www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/hedge-funds-2012/.
127 Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia Johan, Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PENN J. BUS.
& EMP. L. 783, 783 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1122309.
128 Bunnam Srephichet, Pirates of the Caribbean: Offshore Internet Gambling Sites Cursed
by the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 139,
140 (2007).
129
“[G]overnments have longstanding concerns with the operation of gambling enterprises.
The possibility of funding criminal (and perhaps terrorist) enterprises, expanding social costs
from pathological or problem gambling, protecting minors, and other normative judgments
have all contributed toward government-imposed limits on gambling . . . .” Edward A.
Morse, The Internet Gambling Conundrum: Extraterritorial Impacts of U.S. Laws on
Internet Businesses, 23 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 529, 529 (2007).
130 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 801, 120
Stat. 1952 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)). For a discussion of the Act, see Brant M.
Leonard, Highlighting the Drawbacks of the UIGEA: Proposed Rules Reveal Heavy Bur-
dens, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 515 (2009).
131 Betsi Beem & John Mikler, National Regulations for a Borderless Industry: US Versus
UK Approaches to Online Gambling, 30 POL’Y & SOC’Y 161, 171 (2011).
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there is evidence that US investment capital has followed the movement of the
industry into other, less-regulated jurisdictions.132
B. Regulatory Arbitrage and OTC Derivative Reforms
From the beginning of the recent effort to regulate global derivative mar-
kets, there has been concern that regulatory arbitrage would occur. Faced with
stiff new regulatory requirements in disparate jurisdictions, policymakers and
regulators feared that participants would move their OTC derivative trading
activity to less-regulated environments. The risk of regulatory arbitrage occur-
ring with OTC derivatives is particularly strong due to a variety of factors.
1. Regulatory Gaps Between US Regulation, G20, and Non-G20
Regulation
Regulatory arbitrage will only exist to the extent that there is a difference
between the level of US regulation and that of other jurisdictions. As will be
explained below, it is inevitable that there will be substantive and important
differences between the level of US regulation and that of the G20 in particular,
and other jurisdictions in general. All indications signal that US regulation will
be at a higher level than that of competing jurisdictions. Foreign regulators
have noted that, based on the current CFTC rules and proposed guidance, there
is the possibility that “[a]ffected non-US persons will have to comply with two
sets of regulations, which may be overlapping and conflicting, imposed by the
US and individual non-US regimes. This is compounded by the lack of clarity
and specificity in a number of areas of the Proposed Guidance.”133
To the extent that the United States is unable to harmonize its regulations
with those of competing jurisdictions, participants will weigh the costs of US
regulation against the benefits of trading in a jurisdiction with a lower level of
regulation. As will be discussed below, the United States will attempt to ensure
that non-US persons that trade in the United States will trade outside the United
States in compliance with either US regulation or comparable regulation in a
competing jurisdiction.
2. Legal Uncertainty and Complexity
Dodd-Frank set an aggressive time line and agenda for reforming the trad-
ing of OTC derivatives. As opposed to adopting an incremental approach to
reform, Congress has attempted to completely remake the OTC derivative mar-
ket in a relatively short period of time. Already, deadlines have been extended
several times and the difficulties stem from a failure to finalize rules on a
timely basis and the necessity to develop new technologies, software, and
processes to implement trading under new statutory and regulatory guide-
132 Morse, supra note 129, at 536.
133 Letter from Belinda Gibson, Deputy Chairman, Australian Sec. and Inv. Comm’n, et al.,
to Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Aug. 27, 2012) [herein-
after Foreign Regulators’ Letter] (regarding CFTC Proposed Guidance on Cross-Border
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lines.134 Swap dealers and their customers are left guessing as to when and how
they are to comply with the avalanche of new rules and regulations. This legal
uncertainty and complexity provides a key motivation for participants to trade
in markets where such uncertainty does not exist.
Included in US policy makers’ agenda are reforms such as mandatory
exchange trading and clearing of OTC derivatives (with certain key excep-
tions),135 position limits,136 providing initial and variation margin for uncleared
swaps,137 capital requirements on dealers,138 and new business conduct
standards.139
The amount and complexity of rulemaking that has been required of the
CFTC and the SEC is both breathtaking and inconceivable. The United States
has been engaged in a furious rulemaking effort that is still incomplete. The
difficulty in drafting all of the rules and regulations to implement the Dodd-
Frank statutory requirements appears to have been poorly understood by
policymakers and regulators. Normally the CFTC issues three or four rules a
year, now the CFTC has, “in order to complete the ‘Herculean task’ of finaliz-
ing more than [fifty] rules, . . . established more than [thirty] multi-disciplinary,
rule-writing teams.”140 Their task has also been compounded by congressional
efforts to reduce their funding.141
The CFTC identified thirty-eight areas in which it needed to promulgate
regulations to interpret particular provisions of Dodd-Frank dealing with OTC
derivatives.142 The individual thirty-eight areas are broken into eight catego-
ries: comprehensive regulation of swap dealers and major swap participants;
clearing; trading; data; particular products; enforcement; position limits; and
other titles.143
As of October 11, 2012, the CFTC has issued sixty-eight proposed rules,
four advanced notices of proposed rulemaking, and six proposed exemptive
orders.144 Of those rules and orders, the CFTC “has now finalized [sixty-one]
134 For a discussion of the practicalities of implementing clearing, see Christian Johnson,
The Enigma of Clearing Buy Side OTC Derivatives, 29 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544017.
135 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1675 (2010) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012)).
136 Dodd-Frank Act Position Limits § 737 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a) (2012)).
137 Dodd-Frank Act Unclear Swaps § 731 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012)).
138 7 U.S.C. § 6s(e) (2012).
139 Dodd-Frank Act Unclear Swaps § 731; Dodd-Frank Record Keeping § 764 (codified as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 78o-8(f) (2012)).
140 CFTC’s O’Malia Says ‘High Frequency Regulation’ Causing Angst, AUTOMATED
TRADER (May 31, 2012), http://www.automatedtrader.net/news/Algorithmic%20Trading%
20News/126922/cftcs-omalia-says-high-frequency-regulation-causing-angst.
141 Charles Riley, Broken Budget Process Hurts Wall Street Reform, CNNMONEY (Febru-
ary 10, 2012, 5:07 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/10/news/economy/cftc_sec_budget
/index.htm.
142 CFTC Rulemakings, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc
.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
143 Id.
144 Dodd-Frank Proposed Rules and Advanced Notices, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRAD-
ING COMMISSION, http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankProposedRules
/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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rules, exemptive orders and guidance actions and [three] other actions.”145 It
has published two separate “question and answers” and published three staff
letters.146 Together, the CFTC has published in the Federal Register (three col-
umns per page) over 4,200 pages of rules and regulations (including CFTC
commentary and explanation) interpreting the Dodd-Frank OTC derivative
reform provisions. All of this information literally needs to be digested by regu-
lators and participants in the OTC derivative markets.
As part of the rule making process, the CFTC has made a great effort to
include comment and input from the public. To date, it has held thirty public
meetings since October 1, 2010, and has held twenty-one public roundtable
discussions.147
In addition to the efforts of the CFTC, the SEC has also been charged with
issuing rules and regulations on “security-based swaps.”148 To date, the SEC
has made not nearly the progress as the CFTC in adopting appropriate rules.149
Adding complexity is the fact that many of these rules require the CFTC
to issue them jointly with the SEC, demanding interagency cooperation and
compromise. For example, the CFTC and SEC issued further definitions of
“Swap,” “Security-Based Swap” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement,”
“Mixed Swaps,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping,” effec-
tive on July 23, 2012.150
The energy required to digest and understand all of this detail and com-
plexity is mind-boggling and suggests that the CFTC may ultimately have
entered into an exercise of futility, creating so many requirements and rules that
assessing compliance may become impossible. This onslaught of detailed rules
and regulations is difficult enough for US swap dealers, complete with legions
of lawyers, compliance officers, and executives, to navigate. It becomes a
nightmare for their US customers to understand. One can only imagine how
foreign swap dealers and foreign customers must view the Dodd-Frank regula-
tory reforms.
145 Dodd-Frank Final Rules, Final Guidance, Final Exemptive Orders, and Other Final
Actions, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation
/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankFinalRules/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
146 Dodd-Frank Staff Guidance, Questions and Answers, Memoranda, and Letters, U.S.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct
/GuidanceQandA/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
147 Public Meetings and Roundtables, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
http://cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Dodd-FrankPublicEvents/index.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2014).
148 See Derivatives, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight
/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). Although the SEC was given regu-
latory authority over “security-based swaps,” they have largely been absent in the debate,
leaving the CFTC to do the majority of the heavy lifting with the public.
149 SEC Interim Final Temporary Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www
.sec.gov/rules/interim-final-temp.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014); SEC Proposed Rules,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014); SEC Final Rules, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov
/rules/final/finalarchive/finalarchive2012.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
150 Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Par-
ticipant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77
Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,596 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 27 30-APR-14 10:57
568 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:542
The time-tables for required compliance with these rules are byzantine,
arbitrary, and almost incomprehensible. The CFTC’s approach to handling
deadlines that cannot be reached has been problematic, with foreign regulators
currently pressuring the CFTC “to avoid rushing through proposals on the trad-
ing of swaps among US and foreign [trading] firms.”151
Dodd-Frank originally provided that the provisions were to become effec-
tive on July 16, 2011.152 Because it was unable to finalize the rules necessary
by the original deadline, the CFTC extended the deadline to the earlier effective
date of certain key final rules or December 31, 2011, by issuing a temporary
exemptive relief order on July 14, 2011.153 On December 19, 2011, the CFTC
amended the July 14, 2011 order and extended the effective date until July 16,
2012, again because the CFTC was unable to finalize certain key rules.154 On
July 3, 2012, the CFTC again extended the effective date until December 31,
2012.155 Although many of the key rules have now been finalized, the CFTC
now faces the issue that many of the participants in the OTC derivative market
may be operationally and functionally unable to comply with the Dodd-Frank
derivative mandates.
The CFTC’s approach to extending deadlines has been mystifying. The
only explanation is that the CFTC is reluctant to take its foot off the pedal in
the race to regulatory reform. The CFTC perhaps may be concerned that if
pressure is taken off the derivative reform schedule, it risks key regulatory
reforms being co-opted by aggressive lobbyists and legislative opponents of the
reforms.
It is mystifying, for example, when it was self-evident that the regulatory
reforms were not going to be achieved by July 16, 2011, that the CFTC did not
act before July 14, 2011, to finally and formally extend the compliance dead-
lines. By unnecessarily delaying the unavoidable conclusion that the deadlines
needed to be extended, market participants were forced to do everything in
their power to comply with unattainable statutory requirements by an unrealis-
tic and artificial deadline. The end result was confusion, uncertainty, and
wasted effort.
The problem with the complexity of the rules and regulations is not neces-
sarily that they were not thoughtfully and carefully developed, but that the
sheer quantity and complexity makes digesting these rules, especially in the
151 Vladimir Guevarra, CFTC Under Fire Abroad on Swaps: Officials Balk at Requirement
That Foreign Firms Register Under U.S. Rules, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390444734804578064501772464428.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2012,
1:14 PM).
152 Dodd-Frank Act § 754 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a note (2012)). For a discus-
sion of the deadlines, see CFTC Adopts Second Amended July 14 Exemptive Relief Order




153 Effective Date for Swap Regulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,508, 42,510 (July 19, 2011).
154 Letter from Ananda Radhakrishnan, Dir., Div. of Clearing and Risk, et al., on Staff No-
Action Relief 3 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://cftc.gov./ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergen
eral/documents/letter/11-09.pdf.
155 Second Amendment to July 14, 2011 Order for Swap Regulation, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,260
(July 13, 2012).
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narrow time frame given, a Sisyphean task of futility for many participants. The
efforts to follow, digest, and comply with what appears to be an endless issu-
ance of new rules and regulations, all of which require compliance, leaves
many to believe that they will never master the new OTC derivative reforms.
3. Costs of Conforming
Given the wholesale reforms of the OTC derivative market being enacted
and contemplated, there are tremendous cost motivations to avoid trading in the
more highly regulated jurisdictions. Although the total costs of these reforms
has not been completely reconciled, the costs for participants to implement
these reforms will be high.
The increased cost stems from the reforms requiring participants in the
OTC derivatives industry to completely remake and restructure their business
practices and their infrastructure,156 in order to accommodate such reforms as
mandatory exchange trading and clearing of OTC derivatives (with certain key
exceptions), position limits, providing initial and variation margin for uncleared
swaps, capital requirements on dealers, and new business conduct standards.157
Dealers and end users would need to put into place new products, systems,
procedures, back offices, and processes in order to implement these reforms.158
Commentators have noted that “one thing is clear: this is the biggest phase of
turbulence that the derivatives market has gone through. You are taking 80 per
cent of the market and changing the way it trades.”159
There is no doubt that trading OTC derivatives as currently regulated is a
profitable business, reaping an estimated $50 billion in annual revenues for the
“leading global dealer banks.”160 The reforms, however, promise to be expen-
sive. It is difficult to determine the bottom line effect on swap dealers’ profit-
ability in the United States; however, there have been estimates of the cost of
compliance. Although the report could be viewed as self-serving because it was
prepared by an industry leader, the Europe Equity Research Group of JPMor-
gan analyzed the effect of the OTC derivative reforms on seven global swap
dealers that included Credit Suisse, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, BNP, and Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale in 2009 (the “JPM Report”).161
156 See Stephen Foley & Michael Mackenzie, Swaps Trades on Brink of Tough New
Regime, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0087823c
-123c-11e2-868d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2scDN8LpJ.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 135–39.
158 For a discussion that similar considerations exist for centralized clearing and reporting,
see Gavin Blair, Market Split Over HK OTC Derivative Proposals, TRADE (July 25, 2012),
http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Regions/Asia/Market_split_over_HK_OTC_derivatives
_proposals.aspx?terms=market+split+over+hk+otc (Dr. Alex Frino acknowledged, “[t]hey
are so heterogeneous that working out the risks for each one individually will be so difficult
that the economies of scale for clearing houses won’t work, it will be very expensive. That
would impose costs on OTC derivatives.”).
159 Foley & Mackenzie, supra note 156.
160 Michael Mackenzie & Tracy Alloway, Swaps Profits Threatened by Dodd-Frank, FIN.
TIMES, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/dd5c64ec-ebc3-11e1-985a-00144feab49a.html#axzz2
scDN8LpJ (last updated Aug. 22, 2012, 10:34 PM).
161 Although somewhat dated, JPMorgan Chase prepared a report on the cost on dealers of
anticipated derivative regulation. J.P.MORGAN, GLOBAL INVESTMENT BANKS: NEW OTC
DERIVATIVES REGULATION (2009). The report estimates that these reforms may “lower [an
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The JPM Report’s summary concluded the following:
Regulatory changes in OTC derivatives and market risk requirements lower [invest-
ment bank] returns by decreasing [investment banks] net income -13 [percent] and
increasing [investment banks’] RWA [risk weighted assets] by 21 [percent] on aver-
age in our estimates:
-13 [percent] negative impact on [investment bank] net profits on average: the big-
gest impact comes from OTC post trade transparency with -6 [percent] impact, fol-
lowed by position limits in commodities (-3 [percent] on earnings), and moving CDS
to exchange trading (-2 [percent]). . ..
21 [percent] increase in [investment banks’] RWAs [risk weighted assets] on aver-
age: The main impact from regulatory changes is the higher capital requirements.162
Stock analysts at Standard & Poor’s “expect an annual drop in revenues
for large dealers of between $4bn and $4.5bn once rules that include reporting
requirements, the establishment of swap execution facilities (SEFs), in effect
electronic exchanges, and mandatory central clearing of OTC swaps are fully
implemented.”163
Technology and operational costs alone have been extraordinarily expen-
sive: “A study of Dodd-Frank’s impact on the buy and sell sides finds that
while sell-side firms have spent over a $1 billion [sic] on operational and IT
changes, confusion reigns on the buy side.”164 Other analysts estimate that
“[f]inancial firms will spend an estimated $6.7 billion over a three-year period
to address the technological and operational changes required to comply with
new US and European regulations affecting the growing swaps market.”165
These costs include developing new software programs and platforms, com-
puter and telecommunications equipment, and legions of programmers and IT
personnel.
In addition to the direct costs of complying with US regulation by US
persons, subjecting non-US persons to Dodd-Frank regulation also imposes
both market costs and direct costs to participants:
Potential market disruption or fragmentation, with consequently increased risks to
systemic stability and market liquidity in our markets, may arise as market partici-
pants may have to change their business models or even withdraw from certain busi-
nesses, all within a relatively short period of time. The impact from any resulting
(likely significant) increase in compliance costs and the potential reduction in liquid-
ity of OTC derivatives markets should not be under-estimated.166
4. Collateral Cost and Scarcity
One of the key drivers of regulatory arbitrage in this area will be the grow-
ing and increased role of collateral (i.e., initial margin and variation margin).
investment bank’s] returns by decreasing [investment bank] net income -13 [percent].” Id.
at 3.
162 Id.
163 Mackenzie & Alloway, supra note 160.
164 Ivy Schmerken, Dodd Frank Confusion Reigns on Buy Side – Study, WALL ST. & TECH.
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/regulatory-compliance/dodd-frank-confu
sion-reigns-on-buy-side/232602411.
165 Chris Kentouris, Tackling Swaps Regs: Whopping $6.7 Billion Pricetag, ISS-MAG (Jan.
10, 2012), http://www.iss-mag.com/news/tackling-swaps-regs-whopping-dollar-6.7-billion.
166 Foreign Regulators’ Letter, supra note 132, at 2.
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Regulators believe that a key component to reducing the risk of OTC deriva-
tives is to require drastically increased use of collateral.167 Such collateral
requirements may drive participants out of the US OTC derivative markets to
search for markets where the mandated amount of collateral is not so high.
Dodd-Frank and the G20 commitments require OTC derivatives transac-
tions to be collateralized, regardless of whether they are cleared or uncleared.
Estimates of the global demand for additional collateral run from the hundreds
of billions to trillions, putting tremendous pressure on the supply of eligible
collateral.168
In an effort to agree to an appropriate amount of collateral for uncleared
trading, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the “CBS”) and Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released a consultative
paper entitled “Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally-Cleared Derivatives”
(the “Margin Requirements Paper”).169 A similar working paper was released
by the BIS on cleared derivatives and collateral.170 Although the key focus of
the United States and the other G20 jurisdictions has been to move the market
toward central clearing of OTC derivatives, many of the traditional OTC deriv-
ative products that are currently traded on a bilateral basis may not be clearable,
with regulators, based on the G20 Pittsburgh and Cannes commitments, taking
the position that uncleared trades should still be subject to similar regulatory
margin requirements as the cleared OTC derivatives.171
Critics have argued that the Margin Requirements Paper’s recommenda-
tions will impose serious costs on bilateral trading and markets.172 First, the
ISDA estimates that requiring “a universal two-way exchange of [initial mar-
gin] between financial firms and systemically important non-financial firms . . .
[is] estimated to be in the region of US$15.7 trillion to US$29.9 trillion for
[initial margin] only.”173 Second, the ISDA estimates that meeting the margin
requirements will substantially increase the cost “of providing a plain vanilla
interest rate OTC derivative.”174 Third, the margin requirements would “lead to
167 Aaron Lucchetti, Collateral Rules Criticized, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2011), http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904772304576466360844147694.html.
168 See id.
169 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-CENTRALLY-CLEARED DERIV-
ATIVES (2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs226.pdf.
170 Daniel Heller & Nicholas Vause, Collateral Requirements for Mandatory Central Clear-
ing of Over-the-Counter Derivatives (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 373,
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work373.pdf.
171 See infra text accompanying notes 351–61.
172 See Comments Received on the Consultative Document “Margin Requirements for Non-
Centrally Cleared Derivatives”, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ
/bcbs226/comments.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Margin Requirements].
173 Letter from George Handjinicolaou, Deputy CEO and Head of ISDA Eur., Middle East
and Afr., to Secretariat, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, et
al., on Consultative Document: “Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally-Cleared Deriva-
tives” 2 (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs226/isda.pdf [hereinafter ISDA
Response]. For a discussion of the ISDA calculations, see Peter Eavis, Behind an Estimated
$30 Trillion Drain on Banks, a Lot of Hypotheticals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2012, at B5,
available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/behind-estimated-30-trillion-drain-a
-lot-of-hypothetical-assumptions/?_r=0.
174 ISDA Response, supra note 172, at 7.
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a very high percentage of the collateral pool currently available in the market
having to be pledged as [initial margin].”175 Others believe that the conse-
quences, however, may be much less severe.176
As collateral becomes more scarce and expensive, counterparties will look
to jurisdictions with more liberal collateral rules. Nonconforming jurisdictions
that require less collateral than conforming jurisdictions will become more
desirable from a collateral perspective, driving trading into these jurisdictions.
Under the CFTC rules, uncleared bilateral OTC derivatives trades will
need to be collateralized by both parties with initial margin and the out-of-the-
money party will need to post variation margin.177 As more and more OTC
derivatives trades (either cleared or bilateral) become subject to both initial
margin and variation margin requirements,178 it will become more and more
expensive to pledge collateral.179 Securities that are clearinghouse eligible will
become more and more difficult to acquire. In addition, many non-financial
institutions do not hold large amounts of cash or clearinghouse-eligible
securities.
If jurisdictions establish less rigorous margin and collateral rules than
those in the United States for their home institutions, this could lead to compet-
itive problems. “ ‘If those margin rules for foreign operations are maintained
and Europeans and other foreign jurisdictions do not match it, that would be a
significant competitive disadvantage,’ Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke testified
to Congress on July 21.”180 Chairman Gensler has also noted that “it is essen-
tial that we align these requirements globally, particularly between the major
market jurisdictions.”181
175 Id.
176 Helen Bartholomew, JPM Calms Collateral Fears, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2012), http://
in.reuters.com/article/2012/10/08/derivatives-collateral-idINL6E8L8KCC20121008 (“On its
calculations, JPM analysts believe the additional demand for collateral will be limited as the
majority of the OTC derivatives markets already use collateral agreements.”).
177 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Partici-
pants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732, 23,735 (Apr. 28, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 23).
178 Anouk Levels & Jeannette Capel, Is Collateral Becoming Scarce? Evidence for the Euro
Area, 10 DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK OCCASIONAL STUD., no. 1, 2012, at 3, 3, available at
http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/DNB_OS_1001_WEB_tcm46-268455.pdf (“On the money mar-
ket more transactions are now secured instead of unsecured and in OTC derivatives markets
CCP clearing for standardized contracts becomes mandatory, raising collateral needs for
market participants.”); New OTC Regulation Drives Collateral Scarcity for the $700 Trillion
Derivatives Market, CINNOBER (July 3, 2012), http://www.cinnober.com/sites/cinnober.com
/files/news/120703enna_New_OTC_regulation_drives_collateral_scarcity.pdf.
179 Regulatory Reform and Collateral Management: The Impact on Major Participants in





180 Silla Brush, Goldman Sachs Among Banks Fighting to Exempt Half of Swaps Books,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-30/gold
man-sachs-among-banks-lobbying-to-exempt-half-of-swaps-from-dodd-frank.html.
181 Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks on
Derivatives and the Cross-Border Application of Dodd-Frank Swap Market Reforms at the
Institute of International Bankers’ Membership Luncheon (June 14, 2012), available at http
://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-116.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 32 30-APR-14 10:57
Spring 2014] REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 573
An additional issue is that the margining requirements for non-cleared
OTC derivatives may be more expensive than clearing derivatives. “OTC
derivatives trades that are not centrally cleared are likely to cost more than
cleared transactions, due to pricing by bank counterparties, argues BNY Mel-
lon.”182 One reason for this is that the initial margin may be greater for non-
cleared trades than for cleared trades. One factor in determining the amount of
initial margin is the time that is required to terminate an open trade that has
gone into default. It is generally assumed that uncleared trades will take longer
to terminate, therefore requiring more initial margin.
5. “Credit” versus “Collateral” Business Models
The key reforms of requiring collateral are illustrative of the differences
between the pre-reform exchange traded derivative industry and the OTC deriv-
ative industry. The exchange-trading environment has always been “credit
quality” blind to a certain extent, requiring all participants to fully collateralize
their positions. This is quite different from the business model that has existed
since the 1980s in the OTC derivative industry.
In the OTC derivative industry, parties have historically been willing to
grant unsecured credit to credit-worthy counterparties. Most of this stems from
banks, which customarily grant unsecured credit in certain situations and which
were many of the initial dealers when the OTC derivative industry first devel-
oped.183 In contrast to the exchange-traded world, documentation frequently
contained key credit provisions, such as cross-default provisions that were sim-
ilar to the lending documentation that had been used for years.184
It is certainly probable that participants in nonconforming jurisdictions
will be willing to continue the business model of granting unsecured credit (or
at the minimum lesser collateral requirements) to their counterparties in those
jurisdictions on the same basis as they are doing now.185 Credit-worthy
counterparties will most probably be welcomed to trade with dealers in those
nonconforming jurisdictions, similar to what currently occurs.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage Occurring with OTC Derivatives in the Past
It is not difficult to believe that regulatory arbitrage will occur in the
future if one understands that regulatory arbitrage has been part of the market
since the beginning. The classic example of regulatory arbitrage in the OTC
182 Georgina Lee, Sovereigns Urged to Clear OTC Trades, ASIANINVESTOR (July 18, 2012),
http://www.asianinvestor.net/News/308952,sovereigns-urged-to-clear-otc-trades.aspx
(“Asian sovereigns might be better off centrally clearing over-the-counter derivatives trades
regardless of statutory requirements, because the higher pricing charged on non-cleared,
bilateral trades by bank counterparties is likely to outweigh clearing costs.”).
183 Citibank, Bankers Trust, and JPMorgan Chase were all pioneers in the industry, as well
as investment banks such as Solomon Brothers, Goldman Sachs and Bankers Trust. Many of
the foreign dealers were also banking institutions such as UBS and Deutsche Bank, among
others.
184 For a discussion of collateral documentation, see PAUL C. HARDING & CHRISTIAN A.
JOHNSON, MASTERING THE ISDA COLLATERAL DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 2012).
185 Although there is clearly a trend to require collateral in the bilateral OTC derivative
market currently, the collateral requirements are much less rigorous than that anticipated by
Dodd-Frank mandates.
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derivative area concerns swap dealers’ insistence on trading only with
counterparties organized in jurisdictions with creditor-friendly insolvency
regimes with respect to OTC derivatives.
A key concern of industry participants from the beginning has been the
treatment of OTC derivative contracts in insolvency. Swap dealers are gener-
ally willing to trade only with counterparties that are located in “pro-creditor”
jurisdictions that provide them with additional protections that are often not
present in “pro-debtor” jurisdictions.186 Similar to the “race to the bottom”
described above with respect to the jurisdiction of incorporation, pro-debtor
jurisdictions need to make their insolvency regimes derivative-creditor friendly
if they want swap dealers to trade with participants subject to their particular
insolvency laws.187
Swap dealers worry about their ability to first terminate all of their OTC
derivative trades with a counterparty in the event that the counterparty becomes
insolvent. The swap dealers also worry about whether they would be able to set
off the termination amounts that they owe their insolvent counterparty against
the termination amounts that are owed to them by the insolvent counterparty.
This is commonly referred to as close-out netting and is used to deal with the
problem of cherry-picking.188
To facilitate the due diligence for swap dealers and other participants, the
International Swap & Derivatives Association routinely commissions legal
opinions in different jurisdictions with respect to whether close-out netting is
enforceable (pro creditor). So far, the ISDA has obtained legal opinions on
close-out netting for fifty-eight jurisdictions.189 If a counterparty is not located
in one of those jurisdictions, the counterparty will have difficulty in persuading
dealers to trade with them.
As a practical matter, if a participant wants to trade actively with the
global swap dealers, it either needs to be organized in a pro-creditor jurisdiction
or it needs to lobby its government to reform their insolvency rules.190 For
example, prior to insolvency reforms in Brazil and Mexico, a Brazilian or Mex-
ican party that wanted to enter into OTC derivatives would typically need to
186 For a discussion of pro creditor versus pro debtor jurisdictions, see Robert R. Bliss,
Bankruptcy Law and Large Complex Financial Organizations: A Primer, 27 FED. RESERVE
BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP., No. 1, 2003, at 48, 50–51.
187 For a discussion of these provisions, see generally Harold S. Novikoff & Sandeep C.
Ramesh, Special Bankruptcy Code Protections for Derivative and Other Financial Market
Transactions, A.L.I.-A.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J., Oct. 2009, at 37.
188 William J. Bergman et al., Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic
Implications 1, 4, 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2004-02, 2004), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=505965; Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives
and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working
Paper No. 2005-03, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=730648.
189 See Netting Opinion - List, ISDA, http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_opin.html
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (list of netting opinions); see also DAVID MENGLE, INT’L SWAPS
AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES: THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE-OUT NET-
TING 4 (2010), available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-ISDAResearch
Notes-1-2010.pdf.
190 ISDA has examples of pro creditor insolvency provisions that a jurisdiction should con-
sider passing in order to obtain a favorable legal opinion on close-out netting. MENGLE,
supra note 189, at 4–5.
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form an offshore affiliate, organized in a jurisdiction that recognized close-out
netting.191 Now that both Brazil and Mexico have enacted these reforms, these
Brazilian and Mexican participants are no longer required to search out other
jurisdictions in order to trade.
Even in the United States, there was concern during the late 1980s that US
bankruptcy and bank insolvency law was not sufficiently pro-creditor, leading
to the possibility that swap dealers may decide to concentrate their operations
and trading in friendlier jurisdictions.192 Congress responded to these and other
general safety and soundness considerations by reforming US insolvency law
with respect to OTC derivative transactions.193 Some question today whether
those particular reforms were good for financial markets, creating, for example,
more volatility as counterparties are able to avoid the automatic stay and imme-
diately liquidate their positions.194
D. Counter Balances and Friction to Regulatory Arbitrage Incentives
1. The Value of Price Transparency and Safety to Swap Participants
Regulatory arbitrage theoretically should not exist if the benefits of the
regulations in question outweigh the costs of compliance. US policymakers and
regulators argue that the Dodd-Frank regulations and reforms will make OTC
derivatives markets more transparent, safe, and efficient, and create incentives
to trade and clear in the United States as opposed to fleeing the jurisdiction.
Chairman Gensler has consistently argued that “[i]t’s critical that we do not
retreat from reforms that will bring greater transparency and competition to the
swaps market, lower costs for companies and their customers, and protect the
public from the risks of these international markets.”195 Some market partici-
pants also share his vision for reform.196
If correct, in spite of all of the regulatory costs, volume may actually
increase in the United States if non-US persons enjoy better pricing with less
risk because of the Dodd-Frank reforms that outweigh the regulatory compli-
ance costs and concerns. Many market participants, such as hedge funds, are
anxiously awaiting the Dodd-Frank alternative to the arguably opaque and inef-
ficient bilateral trading environment.197 In fact, many participants are already
191 Interview with Sergio Goncalves, former Partner, Gen. Counsel, Banco BBM (Oct. 15,
2007) (on file with author).
192 6 JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 104.
193 For a discussion of US bankruptcy rules, see id.
194 Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treat-
ment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61, 61–62, 67, 77 (2009); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546–549 (2011).
195 Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Management in Light of JPMorgan Chase’s
Trading Loss: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 128 (2012) (state-
ment of Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n).
196 Kenneth Griffin, We Must Overturn the Status Quo in Derivatives, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26,
2009, 10:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22f8fd28-c262-11de-be3a-00144feab49a
.html#axzz2AAdRb7LA (“Regulators must implement central clearing where appropriate
and put the integrity of our capital markets ahead of the profits of a self-interested few.”).
197 Kenneth C. Griffin, CEO, Citadel, Keynote Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chi-
cago Symposium: Public Policy Symposium on OTC Derivatives Clearing (Sept. 3, 2010)
(author’s notes).
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moving to clear OTC derivative trades due to credit risk concerns with swap
dealers in the current market.198
US policymakers can point to historical examples of success that support
their case that regulatory arbitrage is not necessarily the end result of regula-
tion. After the stock market crash of 1929 and the global depression that fol-
lowed, the stringent securities law reforms and vigorous policing of US equity
markets by the SEC has resulted in perhaps the deepest capital markets in the
world, historically attracting issuers from around the globe to issue in the
United States.199 A similar case can be made based on the success of the OTC
derivatives industry’s sister, the exchange-traded derivative market consisting
of exchange traded futures, options on futures, and options.
These promised benefits, however, may prove to be illusory. Unfortu-
nately the CFTC has yet to make its case through empirical data or cost-benefit
analysis that the benefits of the proposed regulation will exceed the regulatory
burdens placed on participants.
2. Legal Friction and Regulatory Arbitrage
Legal uncertainty in the United States due to Dodd-Frank will surely drive
regulatory arbitrage. Legal uncertainty, however, and a lack of a sophisticated
judiciary in less sophisticated non-G20 jurisdictions may create enough friction
to stunt the movement away from the United States or the G20. Although it will
certainly be possible to set up derivative trading operations in less-regulated
jurisdictions outside of the United States and other G20 jurisdictions,200 parties
will need to consider the reasons (and the implications) as to why there is little
regulation there.
A key concern is whether a jurisdiction has the judicial and legal certainty
necessary to deal with inevitable conflicts and disputes between parties. As
discussed above, has the jurisdiction worked out all of the statutory, regulatory,
and common law concerns associated with close-out netting and insolvency
rules? When the notional amount of derivative trades are measured in the hun-
dreds of millions (if not billions) of dollars, it becomes imperative that the
parties understand how a local court will interpret and enforce their ISDA
Master Agreement and other related documents. Although the parties can cer-
tainly choose to litigate in New York, for example, it would be ironic to come
back to a jurisdiction that you had initially fled due to its regulatory
environment.
Issues such as service of process and sovereign immunity may also sud-
denly become serious legal risks in jurisdictions outside of the G20. Political
and judicial corruption may also become a problem. Only time will tell if less-
regulated jurisdictions will emerge where parties are confident that large-scale
swap activity can occur and thrive.
198 Telis Demos & Tracy Alloway, Funds Dash to Clearing Houses for Swaps, FIN. TIMES
(May 10, 2012, 8:47 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ce83480-99e9-11e1-accb-00144f
eabdc0.html#axzz2sqx9bVxs.
199 See CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, STRENGTHENING U.S. CAPITAL MAR-
KETS: A CHALLENGE FOR ALL AMERICANS 9 (2008), available at http://www.capitalmarkets
summit.com/files/2010/11/2008_Report.pdf.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 119–26.
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III. CAN REGULATORY ARBITRAGE BE CONTROLLED OR ELIMINATED?
Congress has equipped the CFTC with extraordinary powers to control
regulatory arbitrage, mandating that US persons comply with Dodd-Frank and
giving the CFTC extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign activities of both
US and non-US participants. In spite of the firepower given to the CFTC, how-
ever, it still remains to be seen whether such powers will be sufficient or
whether regulatory arbitrage will reduce the current robust US trading markets
to a sizable, but reduced, player in global OTC derivative trading.
The possibility of regulatory arbitrage occurring has recently been a ques-
tion of great concern to global regulators. In a joint letter to Chairman Gensler
of the CFTC dated October 17, 2012, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the
U.K., the Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services at the European
Commission, the Minister of State for Financial Services of Japan, and the
Minister of Finance for the Government of France expressed their general joint
concerns about hasty regulation resulting in a fragmentation of the global mar-
kets caused by inconsistent regulation: “At a time of highly fragile economic
growth, we believe that it is critical to avoid taking steps that risk a withdrawal
from global financial markets into inevitably less efficient regional or national
markets.”201 Asian regulators have recognized a similar concern that the United
States’ failure to recognize the potential regulatory arbitrage could result in
“increasing market fragmentation.”202
As the various Dodd-Frank deadlines move forward, pundits worry about
the possibility of the US market becoming isolated as non-US persons strive to
avoid Dodd-Frank regulation:
Still, some bank executives said moving interbank swaps business outside the US
could reduce US banks’ ability to trade with customers in the long run. As
counterparties move business abroad, that would reduce the pool of potential trading
partners for US firms, potentially affecting their cost of hedging customer business.
Another twist is that the rule could put some swaps, previously overseen by the
CFTC because they involved at least one US counterparty, beyond the reach of the
regulator as non-US banks move trading abroad.203
A. Dodd-Frank and Regulatory Arbitrage
From the initiation of this proposed regulatory reform agenda, US Trea-
sury Secretary Geithner recognized that regulatory arbitrage was to be a consid-
eration that would need to be dealt with on an international regulatory level:
We also will need to work with authorities abroad to promote implementation of
complementary measures in other jurisdictions, so that achievement of our objectives
is not undermined by the movement of derivatives activity to jurisdictions without
adequate regulatory safeguards.204
201 Letter from George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, U.K. Gov’t, et al., to Gary
Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Oct. 17, 2012) [hereinafter
Osborne et al.], available at www.cadwalader.com/thecabinet/get_doc.php?id=29723.
202 Foreign Regulators’ Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
203 Martin Vaughan & Katy Burne, Banks Opt Out in Swap Row: Singapore’s DBS, Swe-
den’s Nordea Won’t Register to Trade With U.S. Firms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2012, 4:24
PM), online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203400604578072221988442386.html.
204 Geithner, supra note 77, at 2–3.
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Although the United States is committed to eliminating regulatory arbitrage,
based upon its frenetic and aggressive rulemaking efforts, it appears to be
poised to do it principally through extraterritorial action,205 as opposed to har-
monization and cooperation.
The potential regulatory arbitrage results of Dodd-Frank can be thought of
as a circle with two concentric rings. The inner circle will consist of trading
activity between US persons or trading activity between a US person and a
non-US person, all of which are subject to Dodd-Frank regulation if they want
to execute OTC derivative transactions. The first ring will consist of trading
between non-US persons that are subject to the regulatory regimes of the other
G20 regimes or trading between non-US persons that are subject to G20 regula-
tion, and non-US persons that are not subject to G20 regulation. To the extent
that there are regulatory advantages to trading in these G20 jurisdictions over
trading in the United States under Dodd-Frank, they will avoid trading in the
United States and abandon trading with US swap dealers or customers that are
US persons.
The second or outer ring will consist of trading between parties that are
not US persons or persons that are not subject to the laws of a G20 country.
Assuming that the current model of bilateral trading proves to be less costly,
more efficient, or easier than trading under the new Dodd-Frank or other G20
rules, it is inevitable that a non-US / G20 OTC derivative market will develop
and probably flourish.
1. Dodd-Frank Regulatory Arbitrage Provisions
Congress and the US Treasury were aware from the beginning of the legis-
lative process that the regulatory arbitrage issues were going to be difficult. The
United States, however, moved relatively slowly in its effort to clarify its posi-
tion on the issue.206
Dodd-Frank specifically provided numerous statutory provisions to deal
with these concerns, providing the CFTC with extraterritorial jurisdiction.207
205 For a discussion of the United States’ use of extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1981).
206 The Commission has not given the public any formal guidance on what [Section 722(d)]
means in practice. In the past, staff at the [CFTC] [has relied] on the assistance of foreign regula-
tors for the supervision of entities located abroad, so long as the foreign jurisdiction is found to
have a comparable regulatory structure in place. Unfortunately, we have not proposed a mecha-
nism to do this with respect to any of the rules being put forth under Dodd-Frank. This has
already created regulatory uncertainty for firms with global operations as they attempt to plan for
the future. Not only will our failure to establish clear rules in this area leave firms unable to
determine what their compliance obligations may be, but it will most certainly drain critical
Commission resources if we attempt to respond to these questions on a case by case basis.
Harmonizing Global Derivatives Reform: Impact on U.S. Competitiveness and Market Sta-
bility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Farm Commodities and Risk Mgmt. of the H.
Comm. on Agric., 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of Jill E. Sommers, Comm’r, Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm’n).
207 See Robert L.D. Colby & Andrew S. Fei, Potential Extraterritorial Application of Regu-
lations Issued Under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, J. L. INVESTMENT & RISK MGMT.
PRODUCTS, June–July 2011, at 1, 1–2; Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 U. MO. KAN.
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Section 722 in Dodd-Frank (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2) provides the general rule
that Dodd-Frank is not intended to “apply to activities outside the United States
unless those activities— ‘(1) have a direct and significant connection with
activities in, or effect on, commerce of the [US]; or ‘(2) contravene such rules
or regulations . . . as are necessary . . . to prevent the evasion of any provision
of this Act . . . .’ ”208 A similar rule exists with respect to the SEC’s jurisdiction
over security-based swaps in Section 772(b).209 The interpretation of those
exceptions, however, appears to be left up to the discretion and judgment of the
CFTC and SEC. In particular, the CFTC staff has taken the position “as a clear
expression of congressional intent that Dodd-Frank swap provisions apply to
activities outside the US under certain circumstances.”210
Section 715 of Dodd-Frank provides the CFTC with teeth in punishing
foreign swap markets if “the regulation of swaps . . . markets in a foreign
country undermines the stability of the United States financial system . . . .”211
In such a situation, the CFTC “may prohibit an entity domiciled in the foreign
country from participating in the United States in any swap . . . .”212 The net
effect is that if the CFTC believes that a foreign market has not enacted suffi-
cient reforms or rules such that it creates instability in the Unites States, it can
prohibit the participants from such markets from trading in the United States,
essentially blackballing players from these “rogue” jurisdictions from trading in
the United States.
The CFTC is directed to “consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory
authorities on the establishment of consistent international standards”213 and is
directed to “conduct a study of the effects (if any) of the position limits
imposed . . . on the movement of transactions from exchanges in the United
States to trading venues outside the United States.”214 The CFTC has also spent
extensive time studying the issue.215
In addition to these regulatory arbitrage provisions, the CFTC has power
with respect to the mandatory clearing requirement under Dodd-Frank to pre-
scribe any rules “necessary to prevent evasions of the mandatory clearing
requirements.”216
CITY L. REV. 965, 965–66 (2012); Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic
Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2014).
208 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 722(d), 124 Stat. 1673 (2010) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (2012)) (emphasis added).
209 Dodd-Frank Act § 772(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2012)).
210 Statement of Carlene Kim, Deputy Gen. Counsel, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n Office of Gen. Counsel, at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n Global
Markets Advisory Committee Meeting 24 (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov
/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_110712_transcript.pdf.
211 Dodd-Frank Act § 715 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8304 (2012)).
212 Id.
213 Dodd-Frank Act § 752 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8325(a) (2012)).
214 Dodd-Frank Act § 719 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 8307(a)(1) (2012)).
215 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC-SEC Staff Roundtable on
International Issues and Dodd-Frank, YOUTUBE (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=4_2Fp9RdOJA.
216 7 U.S.C. § 2(g)(4)(A) (2012).
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As anticipated, there are already congressional attacks on the extraterrito-
rial provisions. For example, the House has introduced H.R. 3283, entitled the
Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act,217 which is still awaiting passage. The bill
would effectively reduce the extraterritorial reach of Sections 722 and 772.218
2. Exempting Foreign Exchange Swaps and Forwards
A key concern of US policymakers was whether to subject foreign
exchange swaps and forwards, a key portion of the global foreign exchange
markets, to Dodd-Frank reforms. The rationale is probably two-fold. First, there
is evidence that, in this particular segment of the OTC derivative market, much
of Dodd-Frank regulation is probably unnecessary and may even be counter-
productive. Second, there was possibly an unspoken concern that any increased
regulation may drive the trading of foreign exchange swaps and forwards to
other foreign exchange trading centers, such as London.
Section 721 of Dodd-Frank authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (“Sec-
retary”) to issue a written determination exempting foreign exchange swaps,
foreign exchange forwards, or both from the definition of a “swap” under the
CEA.219 The US Treasury Secretary proposed in 2011 to exempt foreign
exchange swaps and forwards from the mandatory clearing and exchange trad-
ing requirement, and to not count such swaps and forwards for determining
whether a party was a swap dealer or major swap participant.220
Although the US Treasury appears ready to formally exempt these transac-
tions from the reach of Dodd-Frank, there has been opposition to this action.221
In proposing to exempt foreign exchange swaps and forwards, the US Treasury
noted these markets “already reflect many of the Dodd-Frank Act’s goals
including high levels of price transparency, effective risk management and
electronic trading” and may actually be counterproductive with respect to the
goals of Dodd-Frank.222 The US Treasury also noted that the foreign market
requires physical settlement and fixed terms, has a well-functioning settlement
217 Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act, H.R. 3283, 112th Cong. (2011).
218 See Curbing the Extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives Regulation: An Exami-
nation of the Swap Jurisdiction Certainty Act, MILKEN INST. (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www
.milkeninstitute.org/publications/publications.taf?function=detail&ID=38801305&cat=; see
also Wallace Turbeville, The Ongoing Congressional Assault on International Derivatives
Regulation, DC¸MOS (June 4, 2012), http://www.demos.org/blog/ongoing-congressional
-assault-international-derivatives-regulation.
219 Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,694, 69,694 (Nov. 20, 2012).
220 Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,774, 25,775 (May 5, 2011).
221 Silla Brush, Swap Exemption May Post Risk to U.S. Financial System, Exchange Group
Says, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2011, 1:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-07
/foreign-swap-dodd-frank-exemption-may-open-loophole-exchange-group-says.html (“The
exemption has also been opposed by the AFL-CIO labor union, Democratic Senators Carl
Levin of Michigan and Maria Cantwell of Washington, and Americans for Financial Reform,
a coalition of labor union and consumer watchdog groups.”).
222 Silla Brush, U.S. Treasury Proposes Exemptions for Foreign-Exchange Swaps, BLOOM-
BERG (April 29, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-29/treasury-pro
poses-dodd-frank-exemption-of-foreign-exchange-swaps-forwards.html.
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process, and shorter duration contracts in comparison to other OTC derivative
markets.223
In spite of the US Treasury’s proposal to exempt foreign exchange for-
wards and swaps, the exemption has not yet been granted after eighteen months
because of a perceived political sensitivity on the issue. It appears, however,
that the US Treasury will reach a decision after the US presidential election in
November.224 The CFTC, however, has issued no-action letters225 “providing
temporary relief to firms who would have had to register as swap dealers by the
October 12 deadline. The relief means that firms do not have to count their
foreign exchange swaps transactions in the $8 billion calculation used to deter-
mine a firm’s status as a swap dealer.”226
The foreign exchange swap and forward markets are particularly vulnera-
ble to regulatory arbitrage concerns. The foreign exchange markets, which
would include foreign exchange swaps and forwards, are probably the largest
and most liquid markets in the world. Sixty-five percent of the trading is also
cross-border.227 The foreign exchange trading activities of more non-traditional
participants has also increased.228 More problematic is that certain jurisdictions
enjoy economy of scale advantages, such as London, over other
jurisdictions.229
The volume in North America is truly staggering for foreign exchange
swaps and forwards. The Foreign Exchange Committee in its Semi-Annual
Foreign Volume Survey in April 2012 reported that the average daily volume
in foreign exchanges forwards was approximately $149 billion and the average
daily volume in foreign exchange swaps was $248 billion.230
223 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Notice of Proposed Determination on
Foreign Exchange Swaps and Forwards (April 29, 2011).
224 Emmanuel Olaoye, U.S. Treasury to Move by Year End on Plan to Exempt Forex Swaps,
Sources Say, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012, 5:23 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regula
tory-forum/2012/10/24/u-s-treasury-to-move-by-year-end-on-plan-to-exempt-forex-swaps
-sources-say/.
225 Letter from Gary Barnett, Dir., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, on Time
Limited No-Action Relief (Oct. 12, 2012), available at http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public
/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/12-21.pdf.
226 Olaoye, supra note 224.
227 MONETARY AND ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY: FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND DERIVATIVES MARKET ACTIVITY IN APRIL 2010, at
1 (2010) [hereinafter TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY]  (“As regards counterparties, the
higher global foreign exchange market turnover is associated with the increased trading
activity of ‘other financial institutions’ – a category that includes non-reporting banks, hedge
funds, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies and central banks. among
others.”), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx10.pdf.
228 Id. (“Foreign exchange market activity became more global, with cross-border transac-
tions representing 65 [percent] of trading activity in April 2010, while local transactions
account for 35 [percent].”).
229 Forex History: The Forex Past, Present and Future, FINEXO, http://www.finexo.com
/forex-education/forex-history.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (“As Forex trading has
grown, several international cities have emerged as market leaders. Currently, London,
England has the greatest share of transactions with over 32 [percent] of the total trade
volume.”).
230 FOREIGN EXCH. COMM., SEMI-ANNUAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE VOLUME SURVEY (2012),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/2012/aprfxsurvey2012.pdf.
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The BIS, in its 2010 triennial survey on foreign exchange, described the
composition of global foreign exchange markets:
The relative ranking of foreign exchange trading centres has changed slightly from
the previous survey. Banks located in the United Kingdom accounted for 36.7 [per-
cent], against 34.6 [percent] in 2007, of all foreign exchange market turnover, fol-
lowed by the United States (18 [percent]), Japan (6 [percent]), Singapore (5
[percent]), Switzerland (5 [percent]), Hong Kong SAR (5 [percent]) and Australia (4
[percent]).231
There are clearly other jurisdictions that would be anxious to pick up the slack
if trading foreign exchange swaps and forwards became difficult or expensive
in the United States.
B. Understanding the Unspoken Approach to Global Regulation
As discussed above, the CFTC is determined to eliminate regulatory arbi-
trage from occurring. A key to the strategy appears to be based upon the
demographics of the global OTC derivative market and the importance of swap
dealers to trading activity. The CFTC appears to be gambling that to the extent
that the global swap dealers do business in the United States, the CFTC can use
the extraterritorial powers given to them under Dodd-Frank to curtail regulatory
arbitrage and create a regulatory floor for global OTC derivative regulation.
The CFTC has been leading the way in putting into place derivative regu-
lation, moving “more quickly than other countries” with US officials “trying to
prod the rest of the world to go along with tightened rules being created in the
U.S. . . . .”232 The CFTC and US Treasury have been aggressive in voicing
their opinion that competing jurisdictions should follow their regulatory lead:
Last week, Geithner held a press conference and acknowledged the extraterritoriality
tensions.
He warned other nations not to adopt rules that are softer in order to poach business
from US markets, while also saying regulators need to figure out a sensible way to
apply disjointed rules.
“And because in some areas US reforms are tougher or just different from the rules
forthcoming in other markets, we need to figure out a sensible way to apply those
rules to the foreign operations of US firms and the US operations of foreign firms,”
Geithner told reporters on Thursday.233
Chairman Gensler echoed Geithner’s comments: “ ‘We’re trying to work hand
in hand with the Europeans, trying to get similar comprehensive and compara-
ble rules.’ But he added it would be ‘easier to defer to Europe’ if European
rules matched those developed in the US.”234
Others have also voiced frustrations with the US attitudes toward comity.
“ ‘Part of the problem is the US rushed out their legislation and now it is in the
business of pushing everyone else to follow suit,’ said Anthony Belchambers,
231 TRIENNIAL CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 227.
232 Guevarra, supra note 151.
233 Huw Jones, ET, The New Alien Scaring Global Markets, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2012, 9:59
AM), www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/05/financial-regulation-et-idUSL5E8D2482201202
05.
234 Tom Braithwaite et al., Push to Regulate Derivatives Is Under Strain, FIN. TIMES (July
8, 2011, 12:53 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4340ee5a-a8e9-11e0-ab62-00144feabd
c0.html#axzz2sqx9bVxs.
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chief executive of the London-based Futures and Options Association.”235
Jonathan Macey, in his article on regulatory arbitrage, would probably charac-
terize the efforts of the United States to impose Dodd-Frank standards globally
as “regulatory imperialism.”236
Similar to the importance of casinos to gambling, OTC derivative trading
cannot exist at its current scale without the large OTC derivative swap dealers
and their enormous derivative trading floors and “books” of business. If a regu-
lator is able to control a global dealer, the regulator will indirectly control the
dealer’s customers and the rest of the market, domestic or global.
Global swap dealers have greatly enabled participants to trade by being
willing to act as an intermediary, building huge books of business in the pro-
cess.237 Due to their size, sophistication and huge rolodexes of customers and
contacts, large derivative dealers are able to make markets in various derivative
areas and facilitate the massive amount of trading that currently exists. Rather
than having to locate a counterparty that needs exactly the offsetting position to
a particular desired hedge, a participant instead can approach a dealer to enter
into the offsetting position. After the dealer has entered into the trade with its
customer, it then will enter into an offsetting position with another customer or
other swap dealer to balance its book. Because of this particular business
model, the CFTC through its rulemaking process is able to control not only the
swap dealers, but also all of the swap dealers’ customers.
It is clear that the CFTC has the ability to control the US activities of a
dealer operating in the US. The question is then whether the United States is
able to control the foreign activities of either a US or a foreign swap dealer.
Although the OTC derivatives market is global, the swap dealers that control
the vast majority of the trading are organized and headquartered either in the
United States or in a G20 country. All of them also have substantial US opera-
tions. To the extent that the CFTC can, as a prerequisite to doing business in
the United States, require a swap dealer to meet US standards (or comparable
foreign standards) for its non-US business, it may be able to export US stan-
dards to the rest of the market.
The CFTC will be able to exert enormous influence over global markets if
it can impose regulations on these global dealers. The largest swap dealers in
the world identified by the ISDA are affectionately referred to as the G14 and
control 82 percent of the total notional amount outstanding across the globe.238
Of these fourteen global swap dealers, six are organized in the United States,
three in the United Kingdom, two in France, two in Switzerland, and one in
Germany.239 The concentration of trading activity in the US is even greater:
“According to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, five large
235 Id.
236 See Macey, supra note 119, at 1354.
237 See 6 JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 4.
238 These include Bank of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of
Scotland, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale, UBS, and Wells Fargo. DAVID MENGLE, INT’L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES: CONCENTRATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES
AMONG MAJOR DEALERS 2, 3 (2010), available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas
/research/research-notes.
239 Id. at 2.
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banks—JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Mor-
gan Stanley (MS), and Goldman Sachs (GS)—hold almost 96 percent of the
notional value of all derivatives contracts [in the United States].”240
The remaining large swap dealers that are truly global players are also
principally located in other G20 jurisdictions. Although Japanese swap dealers
have lost much of their luster from the late 1980s, they still exert global influ-
ences. Canada241 and Australia242 both also have world-class derivative
dealers.
In addition to controlling the lion’s share of global OTC derivative activ-
ity, these dealers also have significant business activity in the United States.
The CFTC, by subjecting these global swap dealers to Dodd-Frank, potentially
could compel non-US swap dealers to conform to US rules worldwide.
The following is a summary of the global OTC derivative business done
by a few key swap dealers across the world:
Number of countries Percentage of Percentage of OTC
in which company employees outside derivative activity in
operates the United States United States
Goldman Sachs 33 countries243 48%244 49%245
240 Karen Weise, A Dodd-Frank Regulatory Exemption Grows by 7,900%, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-20/a-dodd
-frank-regulatory-exemption-grows-by-8-000-percent.
241 See CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS DERIVATIVES COMM., CSA CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 91-
407, DERIVATIVES: REGISTRATION 10 (2013), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en
/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20130418_91-407_derivatives-registration.htm. Royal Bank of Canada,
Toronto Dominion, and The Bank of Nova Scotia all have active global derivative books.
See Letter from Canadian Mkt. Infrastructure Comm. to Alberta Sec. Comm’n et al. (June
17, 2013), available at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category9-Com
ments/com_20130617_91-407_cmic_en.pdf.
242 Australian Swap Dealers Being Reporting OTC Derivatives Trades to ASIC Through
DTCC’s Global Trade Repository Service, BUS. WIRE (Oct. 2, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://www
.businesswire.com/news/home/20131002006561/en/Australian-Swap-Dealers-Reporting-
OTC-Derivatives-Trades. In October 2012, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority,
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, and the Reserve Bank of Australia
issued a report recognizing the need for increased regulation of OTC derivatives, and identi-
fied the additional OTC derivative reforms proposed in the Corporations Legislation Amend-
ment Bill 2012 introduced into the Australian Parliament. AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION




243 Office Locations, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are
/locations/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
244 GOLDMAN SACHS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 205 (2012), available at http://www
.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/fulfillment/reports/GS_AR11_AllPages.pdf
(out of 33,300 total employees, 16,100 were not in the Americas).
245 Id. at 93 (credit exposure of OTC derivatives in the Americas equaled $36,591 out of a
total of $74,148 in millions).
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Deutsche Bank 72 countries246 89%247 35%248
UBS 57 countries249 66%250 35%251
Filings with the Federal Reserve show that 77 percent of Morgan Stanley’s fair-
value derivatives and liabilities were outside the United States.252 Similar fil-
ings show “that JPMorgan Chase & Co. had 59 percent of its $188 billion in
overseas branches or international affiliates; Citigroup Inc. (C) had 53 percent
of $122 billion; and Bank of America Corp. had half of $125 billion in non-US
operations in the same period.”253 Specific examples also illustrate this global
activity.254
It appears that some foreign swap dealers not numbered in the G14 are
already willing to register as a swap dealer in the United States in order to
participate in the US market.255 For example, Standard Chartered has indicated
that it will register, although it will be careful to ensure that its other entities do
not.256 Recently, however, some swap dealers have abandoned the US markets
in the face of Dodd-Frank regulation.257
246 DEUTSCHE BANK, ANNUAL REVIEW 2011 33 (2012), available at https://www.db.com/ir
/en/download/Annual_Review_2011.pdf.
247 Id. at 32.
248 Id. at 70 (credit exposure of OTC derivatives in North America equaled _28,070 out of a
total _79,624 in millions). “Within the OTC derivatives business [Deutsche Bank’s] largest
concentrations were . . . in Western Europe and North America . . . .” Id. at 71.





250 Id. (21,746 employees working in the United States out of 64,820 total employees).
251 Id. at 123 (credit exposure of OTC derivatives in North America equaled CHF 13,003
out of a total CHF 37,205 in millions).
252 Brush, supra note 180.
253 Id. “The provision raised the stakes for banks because their swaps business is global. In
2008, Sally Davies, a Fed adviser, said that between 55 percent and 75 percent of US banks’
notional derivatives exposure was with non-US residents.” Id.
254 For example, New York-based Goldman Sachs’s largest counterparty for credit derivatives on
the eve of the credit crisis in June 2008 was Deutsche Bank AG (DB)’s London branch; its third-
largest interest-rate derivatives counterparty was JPMorgan’s London branch; and its largest
counterparty for currency products was Royal Bank of Scotland Plc’s London branch, according
to a 2010 report from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a US panel that investigated the
crisis.
Id.
255 Vaughan & Burne, supra note 203 (“Several larger, internationally focused banks, how-
ever, have reached the conclusion they are better off registering with the CFTC.”).
256 Nitin Gulabani, who heads Standard Chartered PLC’s foreign-exchange, rates and credit
desks, said at the same event that the London-based, emerging markets-focused bank will regis-
ter some of its entities while ensuring that that [sic] others do not do business with U.S.
counterparties.
“We are looking at making sure that entities are either registered, or don’t trade with U.S. per-
sons,” he said.
Id.
257 See infra text accompanying notes 367–68.
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To the extent that trading in the United States remains a priority for all of
these global derivatives dealers, the CFTC has an extraordinary opportunity to
export its standards. Through its extraterritorial jurisdiction, it potentially can
require these same institutions to conduct their non-US OTC derivative activi-
ties pursuant to Dodd-Frank standards.
C. CFTC Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement
The most concrete steps that the United States has taken with respect to
these regulatory arbitrage concerns has been the issuance by the CFTC of the
proposed interpretive guidance and policy statement entitled Cross-Border
Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (the
“Proposed Guidance”), issued on July 12, 2012.258 The CFTC then issued final
guidance on July 26, 2013, a little more than a year after issuing the proposed
guidance, entitled Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Com-
pliance with Certain Swap Regulations (the “Final Guidance”).259 With respect
to security-based swaps, a relatively small part of the OTC derivative market,
the SEC has also issued proposed guidance on application of US rules and
regulations to cross-border situations.260
1. Introduction to the Final Guidance
Although the Proposed and Final Guidance statements are important steps
in dealing with the regulatory arbitrage and extraterritoriality issue, their com-
plexity and controversial provisions may, ironically, only add to regulatory
arbitrage pressures. While the guidance will be critical in applying the CFTC’s
extraterritorial reach, the CFTC waited until July of 2012 to release the Pro-
posed Guidance, only months before the Dodd-Frank mandates begin to
become effective. It then waited over a year to issue the Final Interpretive
Guidance.261
258 Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 12, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Interpretive Guidance] (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R.  pt. 1).
259 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) [herein-
after Final Guidance].
260 Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (May 23, 2013) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013
/34-69490.pdf. This proposed rule has also come under similar criticisms as those of the
CFTC. See Julian Hattem, Businesses Concerned About SEC International Swaps Proposal,
HILL (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/pending-regs/318283
-businesses-concerned-about-sec-international-swaps-proposal-. The proposed SEC rule is
equally as detailed and comprehensive as those issued by the CFTC (650 pages), although
they cover only security-based swaps—a relatively small portion of the OTC derivatives
market. A complete discussion of the SEC rules is beyond the reach of this article.
261 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,292. For a detailed discussion of the Final Proposed
Guidance, see CFTC Finalizes Cross-Border Swaps Guidance and Establishes Compliance
Schedule, DAVISPOLK (July 30, 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files
/07.30.13.CFTC_.Cross_.Border_0.pdf. See also Legal Alert: An End-User’s Guide to the
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Like most of the CFTC regulatory projects, the Proposed Guidance was
long, detailed, and complex, running over thirty pages when published in the
Federal Register. The Final Guidance is even more complex, with the Guidance
Section and the various appendices running sixty-nine pages when published in
the Federal Register. The Final Guidance must also be read in conjunction with
an exemptive order that provides for various phase-ins of the rules issued con-
temporaneously with the Final Interpretive Guidance262 that extends (with cer-
tain key changes) an earlier exemptive order.263
Public response to the Proposed Guidance was swift and detailed. Three
hundred five different parties have provided suggested comments and critiques
to the proposed regulation. Out of the 288 parties, 14 were foreign regulators,
33 were foreign and domestic industry trade groups representing their mem-
bers, 14 were financial institutions, and 7 market participants such as
exchanges and clearinghouses, with the balance being individuals and other
miscellaneous commenters.264 The complexity of the proposed guidance itself
is only equaled by many of the comment letters critiquing it.265
The introduction to the proposed guidance laid out the CFTC’s purpose in
issuing the guidance:
Whether a person’s swap dealing activities or swap positions may require registration
as a swap dealer or major swap participant, respectively, and the application of the
related requirements under the CEA to swaps involving such persons;
Application of the clearing, trade execution, and certain reporting and recordkeeping
provisions under the CEA, to cross-border swaps involving one or more counterpar-
ties that are not swap dealers or major swap participants; and
Describes the policy and procedural framework under which the Commission may
permit compliance with a comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction
to substitute for compliance with the requirements of the CEA.266
In highlighting the need for the guidance, the CFTC noted that Bear
Stearns, Lehman, AIG, JPMorgan Chase, and Long Term Capital Management
all conducted extensive derivative trading activities through non-US affiliates
or branches that exposed the United States to financial risks.267 The CFTC
CFTC’s Final Cross-Border Guidance, SUTHERLAND (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.sutherland
.com/files/upload/AnEnd-UsersGuidetotheCFTCsFinalCross-BorderGuidance.pdf.
262 Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg.
43,785 (July 22, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
263 Final Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed.
Reg. 858, 858–59 (Jan. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
264 See Comments for Proposed Rule 77 FR 41213, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMMISSION, http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1234 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
265 For example, in one of the more comprehensive critiques, SIFMA, a key trade group for
the securities industry in the United States, wrote a sixty-nine page comment letter providing
comments on the 155 pages of proposed guidance. Final Exemptive Order Regarding Com-
pliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 862 n.30. See also SIFMA Submits
Comments to the CFTC on Guidance Related to Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps
Provisions, SIFMA (Aug. 27, 2012), www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=8589940053.
266 Proposed Interpretive Guidance, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214, 41,214 (July 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
267 Id. at 41,215. Commissioner Gensler noted that Long Term Capital Management booked
the “vast majority” of its swaps “in its affiliated partnerships in the Cayman Islands.” Gary
Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statement of Support (June
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believes that even though large financial institutions may conduct their activi-
ties through non-US (i.e., offshore) affiliates, in reality the entity is operating as
a “single business” and should therefore be regulated as a single entity:
These large financial institutions effectively operate their businesses as a single busi-
ness, by virtue of the relationship with the parent company and to each other, with
the constituent parts inextricably linked to each other. The interconnected nature of
the relationships among the affiliated entities within a corporate group means that a
risk in any part of this group, whether in the United States or abroad, can quickly
spread throughout the organization and jeopardize the financial integrity of the entire
group.268
Based on this perceived integration and unity of operation, the CFTC believes
that both the US activities, as well as the non-US trading activities should be
subject to the reforms.
Under Dodd-Frank, financial institutions that “participate in the swaps
market as swap dealers or major swap participants (“MSPs”) . . . must register
and are subject to greater oversight and regulation.”269 This registration
requirement is key to understanding the reach of the proposed guidance.
Prior to issuing the proposed guidance, the CFTC received extensive com-
ment on the Dodd-Frank regulatory arbitrage issue. In the introduction to the
Proposed Guidance, the CFTC summarized the concerns and questions that
participants had about the reach of Dodd-Frank. First, participants wanted the
CFTC to define “the nature of the connections to the United States that would
require a non-U.S. person to register as a swap dealer or MSP under the CEA
and the Commission’s regulations.”270 The CFTC noted the commentators gen-
erally believed that “swap dealing activity directly with U.S. counterparties
should be registered with the Commission as swap dealers” but that “swap
dealing conducted outside of the U.S. between non-U.S. persons is not suffi-
ciently connected to the U.S. to warrant swap dealer registration.”271 Commen-
tators also noted that non-US swap dealers that limit their trading only to US
persons that are registered swap dealers should not have to register.272
Second, commentators wanted the CFTC to define which “Dodd-Frank
Act requirements apply to the swap activities of non-U.S. persons, U.S. per-
sons, and their branches, agencies, subsidiaries and affiliates outside of the
United States.”273 The CFTC noted that commentators generally believed that
“entities outside the United States should comply with rules adopted under the
Dodd-Frank Act with respect to requirements applicable to specific swaps, but
should be subject to home country supervision by their home country regulators
29, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-
117b.
268 Proposed Interpretive Guidance, 77 Fed. Reg. at 41,216. The CFTC further noted that
“[i]n many of the largest financial institutions, the overall business operates as a tightly
integrated network of business lines and services conducted through various branches or
affiliated legal entities which are under the unified management of the parent entity.” Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 41,217.
271 Id. at 41,217 n.20.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 41,217.
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with respect to requirements applicable at the entity level.”274 Commentators
further noted that “a U.S. entity must not be able to conduct swap business with
non-U.S. persons free from regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act by establish-
ing a non-U.S. affiliate and conducting the swap business through the
affiliate.”275
Third, commentators wanted the CFTC to define “the circumstances under
which the Commission would consider permitting a non-U.S. person to comply
with the regulatory regime of its foreign jurisdiction instead of complying with
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission’s regulations promulgated thereun-
der.”276 The CFTC noted that commentators generally believed that “deference
to comparable home country regulation accords with principles of international
comity and is consistent with the approach taken by U.S. banking regulators
with respect to non-U.S. banks.”277 Commentators further noted “comparability
should be determined based on whether the home country entity-level require-
ments are reasonably designed to achieve the same policy objectives as the
corresponding requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act.”278 Finally, commenta-
tors believed that the CFTC “should defer to the home country, entity-level
requirements only when they are comparable.”279
In the Final Guidance, the CFTC has set forth the provisions and
approaches that will be used to deal with the questions of regulatory arbitrage
and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the commentary to the final
guidance, the CFTC laid out the following areas that the final guidance covers:
• interpretation of the term US person;
• swap dealer and MSP registration;
• scope of the term ‘‘foreign branch’’ of a US bank and consideration of
when a swap should be considered to be with the foreign branch of a US
bank;
• a description of the Entity-Level Requirements and Transaction-Level
Requirements;
• the categorization of swaps provisions as either Entity-Level or Transac-
tion-Level Requirements;
• substituted compliance, including an overview of the principles guiding
substituted compliance determinations for Entity-Level and Transaction-
Level Requirements, a general description of the process for compara-
bility determinations, and a discussion of conflicts arising under foreign
privacy and blocking laws;
• application of the Entity-Level Requirements and Transaction-Level
Requirements to swap dealers and MSPs; and
274 Id. at 41,217 n.21.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 41,217.
277 Id. at 41,217 n.22.
278 Id.
279 Id.
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• application of the swaps provisions where both parties to a swap are
neither swap dealers nor MSPs.280
A thorough discussion of each of these areas of guidance is beyond the scope of
this article. The following, however, will briefly describe the application of the
Dodd-Frank to cross-border situations and the CFTC’s stated response to con-
trolling regulatory arbitrage and exercising its extra-territorial jurisdiction.
The key issues to be resolved by the Final Guidance are, first, whether a
non-US swap dealer or major swap participant is subject to the Entity-Level
Requirements imposed by Dodd-Frank, which deal with how a swap dealer or
major swap participant conducts its business both in the United States and
outside the United States. Second, the Final Guidance discusses when a trans-
action will be subject to the Transaction-Level Requirements imposed by
Dodd-Frank, again both when transacted inside the United States and outside
the United States.
As an initial matter, and as well be described below, the Final Guidance
provides a definition as to who will be characterized as a US person for pur-
poses of the Dodd-Frank rules. The Final Guidance provides a detailed and
comprehensive definition of a US person for purposes of the application of
Dodd-Frank to cross-border activities and trading with non-US persons.281 As
will be described below, the application of both the Entity-Level Requirements
and the Transaction-Level Requirements will depend upon whether a party is
characterized as a US person.
280 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,292–93 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 1).
281 A full analysis of the implications of the final definition of a US person is beyond the
scope of this discussion. The definition under the Final Guidance includes the following as a
US person:
(i) Any natural person who is a resident of the United States; (ii) any estate of a decedent who
was a resident of the United States at the time of death; (iii) any corporation, partnership, limited
liability company, business or other trust, association, joint-stock company, fund or any form of
enterprise similar to any of the foregoing (other than an entity described in prongs (iv) or (v),
below) (a ‘‘legal entity’’), in each case that is organized or incorporated under the laws of a state
or other jurisdiction in the United States or having its principal place of business in the United
States; (iv) any pension plan for the employees, officers or principals of a legal entity described
in prong (iii), unless the pension plan is primarily for foreign employees of such entity; (v) any
trust governed by the laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States, if a court within
the United States is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust; (vi)
any commodity pool, pooled account, investment fund, or other collective investment vehicle
that is not described in prong (iii) and that is majority-owned by one or more persons described
in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v), except any commodity pool, pooled account, investment fund,
or other collective investment vehicle that is publicly offered only to non-US persons and not
offered to US persons; (vii) any legal entity (other than a limited liability company, limited
liability partnership or similar entity where all of the owners of the entity have limited liability)
that is directly or indirectly majority-owned by one or more persons described in prong (i), (ii),
(iii), (iv), or (v) and in which such person(s) bears unlimited responsibility for the obligations
and liabilities of the legal entity; and (viii) any individual account or joint account (discretionary
or not) where the beneficial owner (or one of the beneficial owners in the case of a joint account)
is a person described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or (vii).
Id. at 45,316–17.
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Once it is determined that a party or a transaction is subject to the various
requirements, the Final Guidance then provides guidance as to whether a party
may look to non-US requirements, referred to in the Final Guidance as “substi-
tuted compliance,” or whether it will be subject to the Dodd-Frank rules.
There is an important exception to the definition of US person with respect
to the determination of whether or not a non-US person is required to register
as a swap dealer or major swap participant. Essentially a swap dealer that is a
non-US person will be required to register as a swap dealer if its swap dealing
with US persons exceeds the “de minimis” notional threshold amount of $8
billion.282 Upon registration, the swap dealer would be subject to the various
prudential, business conduct, reporting, clearing, and trading requirements of
Dodd-Frank. For purposes of measuring the notional amount, “a U.S. person
should count all of its swap dealing activity, whether with U.S. or non-U.S.
counterparties.”283 In other words, if a non-US dealer exceeded the de minimis
threshold amount, it would need to register.
However, non-US persons are generally allowed to exclude their swap
dealing transactions with a foreign branch of a US swap dealer.284 This is
because the CFTC believes that the application of Dodd-Frank to the US swap
dealer would result in appropriate standards being applied to the non-US dealer
with respect to the transactions in question.285 This carve-out is also important
to protect US dealers. If such a carve-out didn’t exist, non-US dealers that
might otherwise not be subject to Dodd-Frank regulation might avoid doing
business with US dealers in order to avoid being caught by Dodd-Frank. A
similar analysis is applied with respect to whether a non-US person qualifies as
a “major swap participant,” a qualification that entails additional obligations
and duties under Dodd-Frank. In making that determination, a non-US party is
allowed to exclude its trading activities with non-US parties.286
2. Entity-Level Requirements
The Final Guidance holds that a registered swap dealer or major swap
participant will be subject to the Entity-Level Requirements.287 The Final Gui-
dance provides guidance as to whether a non-US person will be required to
register as a swap dealer or MSP and thus be subject to these requirements.
After it is determined that a non-US person is required to register as a regis-
tered swap dealer or major swap participant, the question is whether “substi-
tuted compliance” will be allowable.
The Entity-Level Requirements essentially deal with how a party will
manage its derivative business. The Entity-Level Requirements are broken into
a First Category and a Second Category.288 The First Category requirements
282 See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible Contract Participant,”
77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,634 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
283 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,318.
284 Id. at 45,324.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 45,324–25.
287 Id. at 45,331.
288 Id.
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include (i) capital adequacy, (ii) chief compliance officer, (iii) risk manage-
ment, and (iv) swap data recordkeeping.289 The Second Category requirements
include swap data repository reporting (SDR Reporting) and Large Trader
Reporting.290
3. Availability of Substituted Compliance
The Final Guidance provides that a US swap dealer of a US MSP must
comply with both the First Category and Second Category Entity-Level
Requirements.291 For a registered non-US swap dealer or registered MSP,
“substituted compliance generally would be available for a non-U.S. swap
dealer or non-U.S. MSP . . . regardless of whether the counterparty is a U.S.
person or non-U.S. person”292 for the First Category.
For the Second Category, the Final Guidance provides that for a registered
non-US swap dealer or a registered non-US MSP, “substituted compliance gen-
erally would be available for a non-U.S. swap dealer or MSP only where the
counterparty is a non-U.S. person.”293 In addition, for Second Category
Requirements, the Final Guidance provides that substituted compliance with
respect to SDR Reporting “only where the swap counterparty is a non-U.S.
Person”, and only where “the [CFTC] has direct access . . . to the relevant swap
data that is stored at the foreign trade repository.”294 The Final Guidance, how-
ever, does not allow substituted compliance for Large Trader Reporting.295
As explained above, the Entity-Level Requirements are only applicable to
registered US swap dealers or registered MSPs and are not applicable to a non-
US person who is not a US-registered swap dealer or registered major swap
participant.
4. Transaction-Level Requirements
The Final Guidance provides guidance as to whether a transaction is sub-
ject to the Transaction-Level Requirements. The Transaction-Level Require-
ments are broken in Category A and Category B. All of the Transaction-Level
Requirements except for the business conduct standards are Category A.296 The
Category A Transaction-Level Requirements include the following: (i) clearing
and swap processing; (ii) margin and segregation requirements for uncleared
swaps; (iii) trade execution; (iv) swap trading relationship documentation; (v)
portfolio reconciliation and compression; (vi) real-time public reporting; (vii)
trade confirmation; and (viii) daily trading records.297
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 45,368 n.1.




296 Id. at 45,336.
297 Id.
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5. Category A Requirements
The Final Guidance clarifies that the Category A Transaction-Level
Requirements for US swap dealer or a US MSP (except for the foreign branch
of a US Bank that is a registered US swap dealer or MSP) are applicable
regardless of whether the counterparty is not a US person.298 In other words,
there is no substituted compliance regardless of where the transaction is
executed.
For a foreign branch of a US Bank that is a US swap dealer or MSP, the
Category A requirements are applicable for transactions with a US person.299
Substituted compliance, however, is available for transactions for such a for-
eign branch with a foreign branch of a US Bank that is a US swap dealer or
MSP or a non-US person, regardless of whether the transaction is guaranteed
by a US person.300
For a non-US-registered swap dealer or MSP, the Category A require-
ments are applicable for transactions with a US person.301 Substituted compli-
ance, however, is available for transactions for such a foreign branch with a
foreign branch of a US Bank that is a US swap dealer or MSP or a non-US
person if the transaction is guaranteed by a US person.302 The Category A
transaction requirements do not apply if the transaction is entered into with a
non-US person that is not guaranteed by a US person.303
6. Category B Requirements
The Final Guidance clarifies that the Category B Transaction-Level
Requirements for a US swap dealer or a US MSP (except for the foreign branch
of a US Bank that is a registered US swap dealer or MSP) are applicable
regardless of whether the counterparty is not a US person.304 In other words,
there is no substituted compliance for Category B Transaction-Level Require-
ments regardless of where the transaction is executed.
For a foreign branch of a US Bank that is a US swap dealer or MSP, the
Category B requirements are applicable for transactions with a US person.305
The Category B requirements otherwise do not apply.
7. Non-Swap Dealers and Non-MSP
The Final Guidance provides special rules for parties that are not a regis-
tered swap dealer or registered MSP, regardless if it is a US person or non-US
person. This guidance applies to application of the clearing, trade execution,
real-time public reporting, Large Trader Reporting, SDR Reporting and swap
data recordkeeping (the “Appendix F Requirements”).306








306 Id. at 45,370.
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A US person that is not a registered swap dealer or MSP must comply
with the Appendix F Requirements.307 A non-US Person, that is guaranteed by
a US person, must comply with the Appendix F Requirements with a US per-
son but may apply substituted compliance for trades with a non-US person that
is guaranteed by a US person (but compliance is not required for trades with a
non-US person that is not guaranteed by a US person).308
A non-US person that is not a registered swap dealer or MSP, must com-
ply with the Appendix F requirements for trades with a US person, but is not
required to otherwise comply.309
8. Process of Determining Substituted Compliance
The general rule is that the CFTC will enforce its regulations on an extra-
territorial basis if a non-US person is required to register with the CFTC as
either a swap dealer or a major swap participant or, in certain circumstances,
such person is a non-US person but trades with a US person, or a non-US
person that is guaranteed by a US person. However, the CFTC in the Final
Guidance states that “[c]onsistent with CEA section 2(i) and comity principles,
the Commission’s policy generally is that eligible entities may comply with a
substituted compliance regime under certain circumstances, subject, however to
. . . its examination authority and its enforcement authority.”310 This policy is
referred to in the Final Guidance as “Substituted Compliance.”
Under the Final Guidance, the CFTC will allow compliance with non-US
rules (in place of compliance with the Entity-Level or Transaction-Level
Requirements), if the CFTC determines that “such home jurisdiction’s require-
ments . . . are comparable with and as comprehensive as the corollary area(s) of
regulatory obligations . . . .”311 In a significant break with the Proposed Gui-
dance, the CFTC has agreed that instead of comparing substituted compliance
on a rule-by-rule basis, it will instead rely upon an “outcomes-based report”:
An outcomes-based approach . . . means that the Commission is likely to review the
requirements of a foreign jurisdiction for rules that are comparable to and as compre-
hensive as the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, but it will not require that the
foreign jurisdiction have identical requirements to those established under the Dodd-
Frank Act.312
The CFTC, however, notes that it may still be required to compare the rules on
a piecemeal basis because of foreign jurisdictions adopting their rules on an
incremental basis.313
The Final Guidance sets out the general principles for evaluating a foreign
jurisdiction’s regulations:
In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory requirement(s) is
comparable and comprehensive to the applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and




310 Id. at 45,342.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 45,342–43.
313 Id. at 45,343.
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factors, including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those requirement(s),
the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory requirement(s), the comprehen-
siveness of the foreign regulator’s supervisory compliance program, as well as the
home jurisdiction’s authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant.314
The paragraph concludes again by noting that “comparable does not necessarily
mean identical.”315
The Final Guidelines provide that the determination of substituted compli-
ance will be made by the CFTC based upon a submission by an applicant.316
The applicant, among others, may be either a foreign regulator, a non-US
entity, a US bank that is a swap dealer or MSP with respect to its foreign
branches, or a trade association.317 Any analysis would be made in conjunction
with the regulators of the foreign jurisdiction for which substituted compliance
is requested.318 In making a determination of substituted compliance, it would
enter into a memorandum of understanding or similar agreement with such a
regulator.319
9. Reaction to the Final Guidance
Although the issuance of the Final Guidance is helpful, there is still seri-
ous concern about legal uncertainty and application of the US rules in cross-
border situations. Already several regulators and trade groups have called for
the CFTC to take a “less mechanical approach to determine whether to accept
foreign regulatory standards.”320 One commentator has still recently noted that
the “intensely global nature of derivatives trading can easily result in the appli-
cation of multiple and incompatible legal requirements across legal
systems.”321
ISDA, the principal trade group in the area, is strongly encouraging that
the CFTC and other regulators engage in an “inter-jurisdictional recognition of
derivatives regulation through a principles-based substituted compliance meth-
odology,”322 as well as raising other concerns.323 The Investment Company
Institute had similar concerns with the guidance offered by the SEC on secur-
314 Id.
315 Id.




320 John Bakie, Regulators Urged to Adopt Principles-Based Substituted Compliance,
TRADE NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.thetradenews.com/news/Asset_Classes/Deriva
tives/Regulators_urged_to_adopt_principles-based_substituted_compliance.aspx.
321 James E. Schwartz et al., The Path Forward for EU-US Derivatives Regulation, IFLR
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3247985/IFLR-magazine/The-path-forward
-for-EU-US.
322 INT’L SWAPS DERIVATIVES ASS’N, Methodology for Regulatory Comparisons 1 (2013),
available at http://www2.isda.org/regions/united-states.
323 Stephen O’Connor, Comment: A Framework for Regulatory Co-operation, FIN. TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b5c341ca-0694-11e3-ba04
-00144feab7de.html#axzz2cODkgBDo.
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ity-based swaps and also encourages the SEC to act consistently with the
CFTC.324
In specific jurisdictions, the mechanical implementation of the Final Gui-
dance is also raising concerns. The United States’ efforts to grapple with substi-
tuted compliance with certain Asian jurisdictions is already raising issues.325
Similar concerns are echoed about harmonization with the E.U. under the Final
Guidance.326
D. The Harmonization Challenge
Since the G20 announcement in 2009, there has been an enormous amount
of emphasis among the G20 countries on their OTC derivative reform commit-
ments to harmonize their regulations in order to avoid regulatory arbitrage.
Unfortunately, however, there is no enforcement mechanism to require such
harmonious actions.
1. Consultation
Scholars believe that regulators have strong incentives to coordinate finan-
cial regulation in global markets. Jonathan Macey, in his seminal article on
explaining cross-border cooperation, notes the keys to situations where regula-
tors can successfully battle cross-border regulatory arbitrage:
One of the conditions that leads to regulatory globalization is successful regulatory
arbitrage. When it is possible for firms and industries easily to avoid the reach of
domestic regulators, those regulators will have strong incentives to engage in “cartel-
like” behavior, coordinating with regulators in the jurisdictions to which regulated
entities are moving in order to retain even diluted influence over the activities of such
entities.327
Given the global stakes in properly regulating OTC derivative markets, regula-
tors have been particularly focused on consulting and harmonizing OTC deriva-
tive reforms.
There are several key efforts to facilitate discussion and consultation
among national regulators. As discussed above, one of the key groups that is
hosted by the BIS is the OTC Derivatives Working Group,328 which has been
324 Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., and Dan Waters, Managing
Dir., ICI Global, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 21, 2013),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/27482.pdf.
325 Timothy Sifert, CFTC Rules Divide Asia, IFRASIA (July 20, 2013), http://www.ifrasia
.com/cftc-rules-divide-asia/21097716.article.
326 See Philip Stafford, Quick View: US-EU Swaps Trading Deal Is Not the End of the
Story, FIN. TIMES (July 16, 2013, 1:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3507888e-edfd
-11e2-a325-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2f5LyZe3Y.
327 Macey, supra note 119, at 1375.
328 The ODWG is led by representatives of CPSS, IOSCO, and the European Commission
(“EC”). The SEC co-chairs the ODWG on behalf of IOSCO. The ODWG includes international
standard setters and authorities responsible for transforming the G-20 commitments into stan-
dards and regulations. Jurisdictions include: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, and United States. The ODWG also includes representa-
tives from the European Central Bank (“ECB”), Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”),
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and FSB. The ODWG makes regular progress reports to
the FSB, assessing the adequacy of progress being made to fully and consistently implement the
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actively monitoring the progress of the G20 jurisdictions toward passing OTC
derivative reforms and produced the interim G20 progress reports discussed
above. US regulators have also been willing participants in this group.329
The OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum, hosted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, is another key consultation group.330 In an effort to pro-
mote additional harmonization among different jurisdictions, international reg-
ulators formed in 2009 the OTC Derivative Regulators’ Forum. The Forum is
composed of regulators from thirteen different countries, the European Union,
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and the International
Organization of Securities Commissions.331
The Forum has set out the following objectives to increase global
harmonization:
Provide mutual assistance among the regulators in carrying out their respective
authorities and responsibilities with respect to OTC derivatives CCPs and trade
repositories, and with respect to the broader roles and implications of these infra-
structures in the financial system; Promote consistent public policy objectives and
oversight approaches for OTC derivatives CCPs and trade repositories, including the
development of international cooperative oversight arrangements that may be applied
to individual systems; Adopt, promote, and implement consistent standards, such as
the CPSS [Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems]-IOSCO Recommenda-
tions for Central Counterparties (RCCPs), in setting oversight and supervisory expec-
tations; Coordinate the sharing of information routinely made available to regulators
or to the public by OTC derivatives CCPs and trade repositories; Effectively deal
with common issues collectively and consistently; [and] Encourage strong and open
communication within the regulatory community and with the industry.332
It is unclear at the current time how much the forum’s meetings will serve to
decrease the risk of regulatory arbitrage.
Both the United States and the FSB have been particularly active, working
with the IOSCO and the CPSS (hosted by the BIS), to help harmonize and
develop consistent and harmonious OTC derivative reform standards that can
be adopted by different jurisdictions.333 Although these standard-setting organi-
zations are important, it is still up to the actual jurisdictions to adopt these
standards either in whole or in a piecemeal fashion.
As mentioned above, a particularly successful example of developing stan-
dards (but not necessarily having them enacted) is the Margin Requirements
Paper jointly produced by the CBS and the IOSCO.334 The Margin Require-
G-20 commitments to central clearing, trading on exchanges and electronic trading platforms,
reporting to TRs, and capital requirements.
JOINT REPORT, supra note 115, at 3 n.5.
329
“Staffs are participating in the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) OTC Derivatives
Working Group (“ODWG”), which monitors progress being made in implementing OTC
derivatives market reforms.” Id. at 3.
330 Id. at 12 n.42.
331 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., A Global Framework for Regulatory Cooper-
ation on OTC Derivative CCPs and Trade Repositories app. 1 (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www
.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090924.html.
332 Id.
333 JOINT REPORT, supra note 115, at 3.
334 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS.,
supra note 169, at 1.
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ments Paper, however, has generated considerable attention and controversy.
Similar to the Proposed Guidance, many industry participants have written
comment letters. Since the comment period opened, the BIS has received 101
comment letters, of which approximately 37 were trade groups representing
financial institutions and approximately fifty were from individual financial
institutions.335
Regulators agree that it is important that the margin rules governing OTC
derivatives need to be similar (if not identical) for cleared OTC derivatives as
well as the traditional non-cleared transactions. In fact, margin and collateral
standards are one of the top drivers for regulatory arbitrage. In a show of soli-
darity with IOSCO, Chairman Gensler noted that the draft document’s
approach to margin standards “would lower the risk of financial entities, pro-
mote clearing and help avoid regulatory arbitrage.”336 Although there is no
mechanism to ensure that the G20 jurisdictions adopt consistent margin
requirements, the consultative paper is a start at cross-border cooperation on the
issue.337
As discussed above, a key difficulty in these consultative approaches is
convincing jurisdictions that they should adopt the particular approaches devel-
oped by these organizations:
IOSCO standards are not legally binding – so the organisation cannot force individ-
ual states to comply in full with its standards. But the body has set up an assessment
and enforcement division, which is tasked with examining whether its standards have
been applied. In extreme cases, it could expel a member country for not complying –
although that would be a last resort.338
David Wright, the secretary general of IOSCO, noted “[i]t is unlikely we will
see a single regulator with the legal power in every country in the world to
enforce standards.”339 He continued, however, by stating that “no country
wants to see its name last on a list of countries adopting high-quality practices.
Our role is to encourage compliance as far as humanly possible.”340
Perhaps the best-recognized effort to harmonize international financial
regulation involves the efforts to standardize bank capital requirements
between banks. Commentators have noted that the efforts of CBS operating
335 Margin Requirements, supra note 172.
336 Jim Brunsden & Silla Brush, Basel Group Seeks Tougher Rules for Non-Centrally
Cleared Swaps, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 7, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com
/news/2012-07-06/basel-group-seeks-tougher-rules-for-non-centrally-cleared-swaps; Elliott




337 For a discussion of the issues involved in setting these margin standards, see Brunsden
& Brush, supra note 336.
338 Holley, supra note 336.
339 Id.
340 Id. Wright noted the aspirational goals for these efforts:
Imagine in ten years, we’ll have the best set of rules not just in a few countries, but all around the
world . . . . If we can do this job of supporting high quality securities standards around the world,
investors can have confidence they will be treated, wherever they trade. That’s a world we
should aspire to.
Id.
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under the auspices of the BIS “is perhaps the most significant recent develop-
ment in terms of substantive international supervision of banking—the formu-
lation of uniform guidelines governing the measurement and enforcement of
capital adequacy of banks.”341 The committee’s efforts have resulted in “a mul-
tilateral convergence of regulatory standards.”342
The costs of maintaining bank capital can directly affect bank profitability
and thus can drive regulatory arbitrage. The US General Accounting Office
noted that “[b]ecause holding capital is costly for banks, differences in regula-
tory capital requirements could influence costs, prices, and profitability for
banks competing under different capital requirements.”343
One of the key forums for harmonizing bank capital regulation that is
facilitated through the BIS is the CBS.344 Although the CBS enjoys enormous
influence, it is only a forum and does not have the power to promulgate or
enforce regulations.345 In this particular area, however, regulators from the dif-
ferent jurisdictions agreed to adopt the capital adequacy guidelines as they have
been developed.346 Although the industry has run into trouble in refining, revis-
ing, and updating these standards, as witnessed by the proliferation of Basel I,
II, and III, regulators have been able to achieve consistent standards across
multiple jurisdictions in an important regulatory area.347
Unfortunately, although the G20 all committed themselves to meet the
G20 commitments discussed above, they did not create a way to develop one
single set of reforms or a way to bind themselves to all adopt the same stan-
dards. One commentator has noted that the “G20 has effectively comman-
deered the regulatory agenda since the financial crisis broke, but its
mechanisms for executing the many commitments agreed are not clear
either.”348
The G20 has most certainly lost an opportunity to create uniformity and
conformity by permitting each country to draft its own rules and regulations.
Instead of taking the approach to regulate capital adequacy through the various
Basel accords, each country has instead promulgated its own rules and regula-
tions, with the caveat that it will try to harmonize its regulation with that of
other countries.
341 3 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 15.02, at 15-28.3 (2d ed.
Supp. 2013).
342 Id. at § 15.02, at 15-29.
343 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-953, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: NEW BASEL
II RULES REDUCED CERTAIN COMPETITIVE CONCERNS, BUT BANK REGULATORS SHOULD
ADDRESS REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES 4 (2008).
344 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis
.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
345
“The BCBS is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks
and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to
strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of
enhancing financial stability.” BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANK-
ING SUPERVISION CHARTER 1 (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.pdf.
346 See About the Basel Committee, BANK INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs
/about.htm (last updated June 10, 2013).
347 See id.
348 Phil Davis, Global Standards are Still a Far-off Goal, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2012, 4:10
AM), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f735697c-77e2-11e1-b237-00144feab49a.html.
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2. Kinks in Harmonizing Regulation Across Jurisdictions
It remains to be seen how the harmonization efforts will unfold as the G20
countries attempt to put into place a completely new regulatory regime to regu-
late OTC derivatives. These difficulties emerge for many reasons based upon a
jurisdiction’s expertise and experience with OTC derivatives and with the con-
cerns and preferences of the participants who are organized or trade in that
jurisdiction. There is also concern that jurisdictions, such as the United States,
will insist on determining whether or not a jurisdiction’s regulatory structure is
comparable to their own.
It was hard enough for the G20 to draft general guidelines that all coun-
tries could agree to in 2009 when they committed to reform OTC derivative
regulation by 2012. It will prove even tougher however, to reduce these general
principles and concepts to detailed and useful rules and regulations: “But after
the broad concepts are written into law, then begins the rule making process by
agencies in the US, or national securities regulators across Europe, to turn the
concepts into practical realities.”349 Guy Sears, director of wholesale at the
U.K.’s Investment Management Association noted that,
“[i]t’s fantastic that our leaders want to do things . . . . There is a will to act, but at the
moment there is more communication than co-ordination. The top guys in most coun-
tries are aware of the overlaps and underlaps between regulations, but for political
and other reasons they can’t do anything about them.”350
It is clear that all G20 countries would prefer regulatory regimes that do
not incentivize participation based upon regulatory advantages. There can be
difficulties, however, in reconciling particularly difficult issues. Edouard Vieil-
lefond, managing director in the regulation policy and international affairs divi-
sion at France’s Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers, said: “By far we would
prefer a system based on equivalence and mutual recognition to avoid double or
triple regulation. There will need to be changes on both sides.”351 Mr. Vieil-
lefond further said:
On 90 per cent of the rules we agree with the US. But if we don’t have the same list
of derivatives for central clearing, the same rules for margining and capital including
the same capital and collateral requirements for uncleared bilateral derivatives, it
won’t be manageable. We need to converge.352
Although heroic efforts are being made to harmonize regulations, there
may be philosophical or ideological differences between competing jurisdic-
tions that can result in inconsistent regulation.353 Commentators have already
noted differences between Singapore and the United States and even with the
349 Telis Demos, Financial Reforms: Regulators Aim to Make “Middle Office” a Safer
Place, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012, 5:35 PM), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27810e0e-7f7e-11e1
-b3d4-00144feab49a.html.
350 Davis, supra note 348.
351 Braithwaite et al., supra note 234 (internal quotations omitted).
352 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
353 The risks incurred when jurisdictions are crossed, as highlighted by the RBC case, is also a
consistent theme.
For example, the US and Europe seem set to have different rules on what counts as acceptable
“margin”, the collateral posted at clearing houses. Europe is looking at allowing a wider range of
financial products, in part to accommodate some riskier sovereign bonds.
Demos, supra note 349.
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European Union.354 Singapore, although not a G20 country, has been anxious
to participate as well, already releasing its derivatives regulatory reforms.355
Commentators have noticed, however, that the reforms differ from Dodd-Frank
in several respects.356 Commentators have also noted differences between the
United States and the European Union.357 Analyzing and dealing with such
differences can be time consuming and difficult, requiring great effort to com-
pare jurisdictions.358 Even if the statutory reforms are similar, the real work
involves turning these statutes into comprehensible and usable rules and
regulations.359
A key factor in creating these harmonious structures is a jurisdiction’s
willingness to defer to another jurisdiction’s rules for activities being conducted
there:
354 See E.T. Phones Home: Why the Reach of U.S. Derivatives Law Matters (With Important
Updates on Singapore and Europe), CHATHAM FIN., http://www.chathamfinancial.com/et-
phones-home/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
355 See id.
356 Indeed, last week Singapore released its derivatives regulatory proposal, offering market par-
ticipants the opportunity to consider further the scope of differences in worldwide regulatory
approaches. Like the U.S. and E.U. regulatory regimes, Singapore’s proposal reveals a determi-
nation to implement requirements that reflect lessons learned from the financial crisis. At the
same time, however, Singapore has sought to exercise great care to ensure that commerce is not
disrupted where there is no systemic risk concern. On this latter priority, Singapore’s proposed
approach differs from Dodd-Frank in several noteworthy ways:
1. Financial end users with small derivatives exposures are not subject to clearing requirements
2. Financial entities retain the freedom to transact in the venue they deem most efficient
3. Non-financial end users do not appear likely to be subject to margin requirements on non-
cleared trades
4. Transactions are not required to be reported on a real-time basis.
Id.
357 See id. The Alternative Investment Management Association also noted that the E.U.
rules are proposing to require that “sufficiently liquid OTC derivatives to be traded on
exchanges or organized trading facilities” versus the US standard. See Letter from Stuart J.
Kaswell, Exec. Vice President & Managing Dir., Gen. Counsel, Managed Funds Ass’n, and
Jiøı´ Kro´l, Dir. of Gov’t & Regulatory Affairs, Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, to David A. Stawick,
Sec’y of the Comm’n., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 14 n.50 (Feb. 6, 2013), https://
www.managedfunds.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/CFTC-Further-Cross-Border-Guid
ance-Letter-MFA-AIMA-Final-Letter.pdf [hereinafter Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n Letter].
358 See generally CLIFFORD CHANCE, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N, REGULATION
OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS: A COMPARISON OF EU AND US INITIATIVES (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/09/regulation_of
_otcderivativesmarkets-0.html (comparing EU and US regulatory initiatives).
359 In other global news, the European Union last week signaled what would be a notable depar-
ture from certain rules proposed by U.S. regulatory authorities. The European Securities and
Markets Authority - the key financial rulemaking body in the E.U. - indicated that foreign
exchange (FX) forwards would likely be subject to bilateral margin requirements. By contrast,
the US Treasury Department (and the Monetary Authority of Singapore) proposed exempting FX
forwards from the salient economic requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act. Such differences, when
paired with uncertainties around the territorial reach of U.S. and E.U. law, raise important ques-
tions about which rules would apply to cross border transactions.
E.T. Phones Home: Why the Reach of U.S. Derivatives Law Matters (With Important
Updates on Singapore and Europe), supra note 354.
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European Commissioner Michel Barnier of the Internal Market and Services division
has also called on [Chairman] Gensler and the CFTC to consider the impact of apply-
ing Dodd-Frank regulations to foreign markets.
“The U.S. has shown initiative in developing rules for the derivatives market,”
Barnier said, IFR Asia reports. “I now call on U.S. authorities to show leadership in
applying them fairly. [U.S. regulators] must be prepared to rely on equivalent rules in
host countries.”360
As discussed above, the United States is willing to defer to other jurisdic-
tions for swap activity occurring outside its border if the rules are compara-
ble.361 However, the Unites States is creating rules and regulations that allow
the United States to dictate what they consider to be consistent and comparable
with US regulation.
Small differences between competing jurisdictions’ rules can also make a
difference. Given the size and volume of OTC derivative transactions, what
appears to be comparable may turn out to be quite different. In assessing the
effect of differences between jurisdictions with respect to certain rules, Jamie
Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase noted:
“If JPMorgan overseas operates under different rules than our foreign competitors,
we can no longer provide the best products and services to our U.S. clients or our
foreign clients. . . . The rules at the transaction level about margin reporting, all those
requirements may enable Deutsche Bank to make the better deal.”362
3. Motivations for Differing Rules and Regulations
It may be difficult to harmonize the various OTC rules because different
countries may have different motivations or reasons for their own particular
versions of derivative reforms. These fundamental differences between juris-
dictions have long been a part of the regulatory arbitrage that can go on in
cross-border taxation363 and other regulatory arbitrage situations.
Understanding the rationales and reasons for disagreements over cross-
border taxation rules between countries may be useful to understand why it
may be difficult to harmonize OTC derivative regulation:
Rules vary because of: (1) different policy choices—the political consensus about
tradeoffs may vary among societies with different values, traditions, and expecta-
tions; (2) different judgments about the impact of given rules—to the extent that all
360 Daniel Purt, International Regulators Prepared to Challenge CFTC’s Cross-Border
Actions, BANK CREDIT NEWS (July 25, 2012), http://bankcreditnews.com/news/international
-regulators-prepared-to-challenge-cftcs-cross-border-actions/4786/.
361 See supra Part III.B–C.
362 Silla Brush, CFTC Skips ‘Intergalactic’ Power in Dodd-Frank Guidance, BLOOMBERG
(June 29, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/cftc-skips-intergal
actic-swaps-power-in-dodd-frank-guidance.html.
363 See H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbi-
trage and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 153 (2000); see also Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture International Tax Arbitrage
and the “International Tax System”, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 167 (2000); Mitchell A. Kane,
Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY
L.J. 89, 91 (2004); Phillip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search
for Standards, 3 FLA. TAX. REV. 147, 149, 171 (1996) (noting that cross-border arbitrage
transactions “involve the favorable and inconsistent tax treatment of an item by two or more
jurisdictions”).
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rule making requires decisions to be made without full knowledge of the potential
impact, it is quite plausible for different decision-making groups (countries) to arrive
at alternative determinations; (3) politics—here used in the sense that different politi-
cal systems permit or facilitate different access to rulemakers and allow different
forms of power and influence; (4) randomness; (5) path dependence; and (6)
resources—a country could determine that an otherwise attractive rule is unrealistic
due to administrative, resource, and technical skill constraints.364
As the United States struggles to deal with G20 jurisdictions that are less anx-
ious than others to enact harmonious regulation, it may need to deal with the
fact that, like in the cross-border tax arena, the parties will need to agree to
disagree on certain details and aspects of the final reforms.
Asian regulators have also noted, with respect to OTC derivative reforms,
the importance of appreciating that different jurisdictions may have different
policies and concerns in enacting specific regulations: “Moreover, just as the
CFTC has proposed requirements that are tailored to the US market, there is
also a need for other regulators to cater for special characteristics of their local
markets.”365
For example, many countries may appreciate the need to strengthen OTC
derivative regulation, but do not see the need for the heavier aspects of Dodd-
Frank. For example, jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia did not suffer
the same level of financial panic that occurred during the Great Financial Crisis
and believe that they are already prudently managing their jurisdictions’ pre-
mier financial institutions. Other countries may only have limited OTC deriva-
tive trading and see no reason to create a regulatory infrastructure that they
believe is well beyond their jurisdiction’s needs.
4. “Reverse” Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
As discussed above, even many friendly G20 jurisdictions appear to have
lost their patience with the United States’ unwillingness to compromise and
their extraterritorial approach to regulating non-US institutions. The concern is
whether this discontentment will eventually stymie cooperation and harmony
with respect to regulation.
If the differences between the United States’ and other G20 jurisdictions’
reforms become intractable, the US swap dealers and other US persons may
find themselves the subject of regulatory retaliation by foreign jurisdictions.
“Chris Allen, managing director at Barclays Capital, warned that a broad appli-
cation could lead to overlapping or even conflicting regulation from foreign
regulators, who could be tempted to retaliate against broad U.S. rules, by apply-
ing their own rules in a far reaching way.”366 The end result could be “recipro-
364 Diane M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax
Arbitrage, 44 B.C. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2002).
365 Foreign Regulators’ Letter, supra note 133, at 4. Specifically, the regulators noted that
“in the case of Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore, we are studying whether local market
liquidity can justify implementation of mandatory trading of OTC derivatives products on
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, and the form of trading venue which will best suit
the purpose of improving pre-trade price transparency.” Id.
366 Alexandra Alper, Bankers Air Fears Over Scope of Swaps Rules, REUTERS (Feb. 8,
2012, 5:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-financial-regulation-swaps
-idUSTRE81709I20120208.
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cal foreign regulatory oversight in U.S. markets”367 with much confusion and
little cooperation. This could result in US institutions such as JPMorgan Chase
and Citibank having to comply with G20 rules (inconsistent with Dodd-Frank)
in the United States because of their swap activities in these G20 jurisdictions.
This possibility was probably never seriously contemplated when US policy-
makers were drafting Dodd-Frank and the CFTC was drafting rules.
E. Trading Outside of the US
The possibility that swap participants will pull back from US markets
because of regulatory arbitrage concerns is already becoming a reality:
Banks in Asia are already pulling back on trading derivatives with their U.S. counter-
parts over fears of being sucked into new rules, the chief of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association, or ISDA, said Thursday.
“We have heard there is some pullback,” Robert Pickle, Chief Executive of ISDA
said in an interview in Sydney. “It is an indication that people are thinking of who
they are dealing with and it’s driven not by who they want to do business with or
credit worthiness; it’s driven by regulatory concerns,” he said.368
More troubling is the recent decisions of DBS Group Holdings, a large Sin-
gaporean bank and swap dealer, and Nordea Bank, a large Swedish bank, to not
“register with U.S. regulators to trade complex derivatives with U.S.-based
financial companies. . . .”369 DBS complained that it “doesn’t see the ‘immedi-
ate commercial benefits’ of making the investment necessary to comply with
the strengthened U.S. rules . . . .”370 Other banks are considering similar
actions, “[b]ut some mid-sized non-U.S. banks have told their brokers to stop
doing trades with U.S. firms, in the hope of avoiding the $8 billion threshold
and the burden of becoming a U.S.-regulated dealer.”371
As the registration date approaches requiring foreign banks to register as
swap dealers in the United States, numerous foreign banks have balked at the
requirement. Prior to the CFTC granting a limited temporary waiver372 with
respect to the registration requirement for foreign banks, “many foreign banks
stopped trading swaps both with their [US] headquarters and with their over-
seas units” to avoid the swap dealer registration requirement.373
Similar to the approach adopted by the United States with respect to activ-
ity in G20 countries, the United States and G20 also seem to be betting that a
swap dealer of the necessary size, talents, and connections will not emerge that
is not subject to US or other G20 derivative regulation. Given the proper incen-
tives, however, it is hard to imagine a creative investment banker not being able
to put together such an entity, creating a situation of regulatory arbitrage where
367 Id.
368 Guevarra, supra note 43.
369 Vaughan & Burne, supra note 203.
370 Id. 
371 Luke Jeffs & Nia Williams, Dodd-Frank Forces European Banks to Review U.S. Deals,
REUTERS (Oct. 26, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/26/us-europe
-derivatives-doddfrank-idUSBRE89P0UZ20121026.
372 Letter from Gary Barnett, supra note 225, at 3–4.
373 Vaughan & Burne, supra note 203.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 64 30-APR-14 10:57
Spring 2014] REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 605
a financial institution can trade completely outside of the proposed reforms in
the United States and the other G20 countries.
One issue with regulatory arbitrage is that it is often difficult to locate a
party, such as a swap dealer, in a nonconforming jurisdiction that provides the
same infrastructure, sophistication, capabilities, and personnel as in a higher-
regulated conforming jurisdiction. However, unlike other analogous situations
involving regulatory arbitrage, parties will have no difficulty trading in noncon-
forming markets due to the unique nature of bilateral OTC derivatives markets.
One puzzling aspect of this issue is that in spite of all of the regulatory
preparations going on in the United States and G20 jurisdictions, global OTC
derivative trading done through bilateral agreements continues unabated. As
measured by the notional amount, the BIS estimates that the volume of OTC
derivatives was $32 billion higher in December of 2012 than it was in Decem-
ber of 2010.374 Many customers, in fact, continued to drag their feet to prepare
for the reforms375 as the G20 countries attempt to put in place an arguably new,
transparent, and improved regulatory environment and trading infrastructure.
All of this suggests that parties appear to be unimpressed with the purported
gains from a new regulatory environment and appear content to continue trad-
ing on a bilateral basis.
Since the early 1980s, global financial markets that trade OTC derivative
markets have existed across the globe. There currently already exist financial
institutions that have the capability to make markets and trade OTC derivatives
in almost every region. Each of these institutions have trading floors, personnel,
and the sophistication to continue trading in the same way that they have done
since the market began. In analogous scenarios involving regulatory arbitrage,
many nonconforming jurisdictions often have to build infrastructure to support
demand caused by changes in regulation. With respect to OTC derivative
reform, this infrastructure is essentially already in place.
1. Non-US/G20 Jurisdictions
It is certainly possible to find sophisticated financial institutions that
already trade OTC derivatives in jurisdictions outside of the G20. The jurisdic-
tions of organization of the 200 primary members of the ISDA are illustrative
of the global reach of the market.376 Primary members of the ISDA represent
the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions that actively participate
in the ISDA and typically would either be a swap dealer or would generally be
active on both sides of a market.
Although there are twenty-two US members and ninety-three E.U. pri-
mary members of the ISDA, there are a number of primary members organized
in a jurisdiction other than the United States or the European Union. This diver-
374 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 17, at app. A, at 141.
375 Will Acworth, FCM Leaders Discuss Industry Outlook, FUTURES INDUSTRY, June 2010,
at 19, 19–21 (discussion of effect of uncertainty on customers), available at http://www
.futuresindustry.org/files/css/magazineArticles/article-1462.pdf.
376 Primary members are large financial institutions that typically either act as a dealer or
are very active traders in the market. For a list of primary members, see ISDA Members:
Primary, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/membership/members-list/primary/ (last visited Feb.
25, 2014).
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sity includes six in Australia, three in Brazil, seven in Canada, eight in China,
five in India, five in Israel, twelve in Japan, one in Kazakhstan, four in Malay-
sia, one in Namibia, one in Nigeria, one in Pakistan, four in Russia, two in
Singapore, ten in South Africa, nine in South Korea, nine in Switzerland, two
in Taiwan, and one in the United Arab Emirates.377 Without taking into
account the US and E.U. countries, there are primary members in twenty-one
countries (with a total of ninety-two members).378 Of those twenty-one coun-
tries, eleven are not in the G20 (with a total of twenty-eight non-G20 primary
members).379 All of these twenty-one countries (in addition to the E.U. coun-
tries) will need to adopt OTC derivative regulations comparable with the
United States if regulatory arbitrage is to be avoided.
One tool that the CFTC has to combat the formation of such dealers in an
unregulated jurisdiction is Section 715 of Dodd-Frank. The Section provides
the CFTC with teeth in punishing foreign swap markets if “the regulation of
swaps . . . markets in a foreign country undermines the stability of the United
States financial system . . . .”380 In such a situation, the CFTC “may prohibit an
entity domiciled in the foreign country from participating in the United States
in any swap . . . .”381 The net effect is that if the CFTC believes that a foreign
market has not enacted sufficient reforms or rules such that it creates instability
in the United States, it can prohibit the participants from such markets from
trading in the United States. This may discourage a jurisdiction from permitting
the formation of such entities.
2. Building Non-US/G20 Dealers
One concern is that, even if a less-regulated jurisdiction can be identified
as a possible trading jurisdiction, would a swap dealer in such a jurisdiction
have sufficient capital or expertise to be a credible alternative to those global
swap dealers organized in G20 countries (and thus subject to higher regula-
tion)? Historically, the industry has already worked through an analogous situa-
tion when it created credit-worthy entities to deal with a perceived worsening
of creditworthiness among the major dealers themselves in order to continue
trading with risk-averse customers.
In an effort to generate additional business in the 1990s under these condi-
tions, several dealers formed what is commonly referred to as AAA trading
entities, going by such names as Swapco, Lehman Brothers Derivative Prod-
ucts, and Goldman Sachs Mitsui Marine.382 These entities were all highly rated
377 Id. The identification of origin of organization of the 200 ISDA primary members is
admittedly imprecise and difficult to determine, with it being probable that there are errors in
these determinations.
378 See id. The list of banks was categorized by the author.
379 See id.
380 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 715, 124 Stat. 1647 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 8304 (2012)).
381 Id.
382 Tracy Corrigan, Salomon Sets Up Triple-A Rated Derivatives Unit, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1993, at 19 (“[M]any potential clients are unwilling to deal with institutions rated less than
double A.”); see also Rosemary Bennett, Triple-A Vehicles Provoke Suspicion Among
Users, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1994, at 58, 58 (“The shrinking universe of triple-A banks cannot
satisfy demand for the top credit rating among derivatives’ users.”); William B. Crawford,
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due to their amount of capital, structure, and their being typically bankruptcy
remote.383 It is possible that a group of investors could create and capitalize a
“AAA” rated swap dealer entity in a less-regulated jurisdiction in order to cap-
ture business with entities trying to avoid the new OTC derivative reforms.
In our world of modern technology and mobility, it should be straightfor-
ward to create such a swap dealer. As trading floors proliferate across the
globe, it should be possible to recruit experienced and savvy personnel to trade,
manage, and run a trading floor and derivative book. Journeymen derivative
salesmen with rolodexes full of anxious customers could be recruited to create
a critical mass to make such a book of business possible. Although there would
clearly be regulatory and practical barriers to implementing such a strategy,
there may be sufficient profit potential in continuing to trade outside of the
proposed regulatory reforms that such a possibility could become a reality.
3. The Transparency and Success Paradox
The very success of the Dodd-Frank and G20 reforms may actually facili-
tate regulatory arbitrage. A key goal of the OTC derivatives is to increase trans-
parency in the market, particularly for pricing. As more OTC derivatives are
exchange traded, public pricing becomes readily and easily available, poten-
tially available to those that do not avail themselves of US markets and that
instead trade in less-liquid and less-regulated jurisdictions.
A key disadvantage to the current market (and arguably a continued disad-
vantage to less-regulated jurisdictions) is limited pricing transparency.384 This
lack of transparency in the less-regulated jurisdictions should actually then
encourage a party to trade in the United States and G20 as the markets become
more transparent. The paradox, however, is that because this pricing trans-
parency in the US and G20 markets is public, it will make pricing in other less-
regulated markets transparent as well.
A party not subject to Dodd-Frank or G20 rules will immediately be able
to determine if the pricing quoted to it in the less-regulated jurisdiction is fair
because the pricing in the regulated markets will become more transparent.385
Paradoxically, as pricing becomes more transparent in US and G20 markets,
parties trading in less-regulated jurisdictions will become more confident as
they are able to compare their pricing (in bilateral trading) against publicly
available information in higher-regulated jurisdictions.
4. The Credit Worthiness Conundrum
The recent spate of increased clearing of OTC derivatives highlights a
peculiar problem for conforming jurisdictions that require OTC derivatives to
be cleared through clearinghouses. Making these G20 jurisdictions safer may in
some limited ways make them riskier.
Jr., In Swaption World, It Has to Be AAA, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1994, at C1; Michael Peltz,
Wall Street’s Triple-A for Effort, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1993, at 89, 89 (partici-
pants are demanding collateral upon downgrade of their counterparty).
383 Bennett, supra note 382, at 58, 63.
384 See supra Part II.D (discussion of the value of transparency).
385 See supra Part II.D.
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As swap dealers such as Morgan Stanley faced credit rating downgrades,
concerned counterparties attempted to move much of their trading with these
dealers to clearinghouses in order to minimize their credit risk: “ ‘I would say
that the majority of customer clearing has not been because of Dodd-Frank but
because of counterparty credit concerns,’ said one person with knowledge of
the move but who was not authorised to speak on behalf of participants.”386 In
other words, a key motivator for moving to an OTC derivative cleared environ-
ment was to shift the credit risk away from the bilateral trading relationship and
into a safer clearinghouse. Further downgrading of the dealer community
would arguably accelerate that trend.387 Counterparties would thus lay off their
own credit risk by trading with downgraded dealers by only clearing such
trades through clearinghouses.
Such an analysis suggests a strong motivation for a non-US person (not
registered with CFTC) to trade with US persons in a clearinghouse environ-
ment when trading with less credit worthy dealers. The non-US person would
then trade with more credit-worthy dealers in less or non-regulated jurisdictions
not subject to the same Dodd-Frank/G20 regulation. The end result, oddly
enough, would introduce risk in to the regulated jurisdictions and move trades
with more credit worthy entities into less-regulated jurisdictions.
5. A Different form of Regulatory Arbitrage: The “Futurization” of
the Swaps Market
In an extraordinary transformation, a different form of regulatory arbitrage
has sprung up to deal with “jurisdictional” regulatory arbitrage issues caused by
Dodd-Frank. As opposed to the regulatory arbitrage discussed in this paper
where parties move to different jurisdictions to do the same transactions, parties
are now either recasting their OTC derivatives as futures or simply replacing
their hedging transactions with exchange-traded futures instead of OTC deriva-
tives.388 This type of regulatory arbitrage “exploits the gap between the eco-
nomic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, taking
advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal
labels that track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.”389
386 Demos & Alloway, supra note 198.
387
“ ‘A downdraft in credit ratings for the entire dealer community could potentially accel-
erate the move towards greater adoption of central clearing ahead of mandatory clearing
requirements,’ the analysts wrote in a note this week.” Id.
388 Will Acworth, Futurization: Dodd-Frank Drives Swaps-to-Futures Migration, FUTURES
INDUSTRY, Jan. 2013, at 33, 33, available at http://www.futuresindustry.org/futures-industry
.asp?iss=209&a=1531; CFTC Staff to Host Public Roundtable to Discuss the “Futurization
of Swaps”, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
Events/opaevent_cftcstaff013113 (last updated Feb. 4, 2013) (select “Roundtable Video”);
Swap Futurization Could Spell Imperfect Hedging, EUROMONEY, http://www.euromoney
.com/Article/3187664/Swap-futurization-could-spell-imperfect-hedging.html (last visited
Feb. 25, 2014).
389 Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010); see also
Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early History of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 94 (2008); Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives
and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
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As participants deal with the uncertainty and costs of trading OTC deriva-
tives under Dodd-Frank, this appears to be driving them away from the OTC
derivatives market and into the exchange traded futures market. Commentators
have noted that a “big concern for the swaps industry is that final Sef rules may
be too strict and impose higher costs on users of OTC products, only encourag-
ing greater use of futures.”390
In an effort to avoid being treated as a swaps dealer under Dodd-Frank or
to avoid other concerns with Dodd-Frank, parties are turning to the exchange-
traded futures market. CFTC Commissioner Scott O’Malia noted the following:
This may have come as a surprise to some, but not to those who trade in these
markets. Given the inconsistency in the Commission’s interpretation of its own rules,
the lack of regulatory certainty and the increased cost of compliance with the Com-
mission swaps regulations, including the complicated and controversial swap dealer
definition rules, swap customers have turned to futures markets for regulatory
certainty.391
The calculus is not whether futures are better or a safer alternative to OTC
derivatives, but rather whether they avoid Dodd Frank.
Already there is evidence in the OTC energy derivatives market that par-
ticipants are trading in different ways through the futures market to avoid
Dodd-Frank. For example, “[l]ast month, IntercontintentalExchange (ICE) con-
verted its cleared energy swaps to futures, partly to help companies such as
commodities trading houses to avoid the cost of designation as swap
dealers.”392
The CME has also been aggressive in helping participants avoid being
characterized as swap dealers: “CME Group, the largest US derivatives
exchange, started allowing more OTC swaps to be executed as so-called
‘block’ futures trades, which ‘will not be subject to swaps regulation,’ it said in
a notice.”393
In spite of whatever arguments parties may make that this may not neces-
sarily be a bad thing, market participants note that the key driver is the regula-
tory burdens being placed on OTC derivatives: “ ‘Certainly I don’t think we’d
be here talking about swap futures if it weren’t for Dodd-Frank regulation,’
said Michael Riddle, chief operating officer at Eris Exchange. ‘That’s kind of
the key driver here.’ ”394 Another market participant has noted the same
rationale:
390 Michael Mackenzie & Gregory Meyer, US Swaps Shake-up Set to Boost Exchanges, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cadeef74-2377-11e2-a46b
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2epX3MxAp.
391 CFTC’s O’Malia Says Cross-Border Approach Suffers from Flaws, AUTOMATED-
TRADER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.automatedtrader.net/headlines/137233/cftcs-omalia
-says-cross_border-approach-suffers-from-flaws.
392 Mackenzie & Meyer, supra note 390; see also John McCrank, UPDATE 2-ICE’s Swaps
Switch Moved Up to October from January, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:06 AM), http://
in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/intercontinentalexchange-swaps-idINL4E8K43SX201209
04; Birth of a Market? As Dodd-Frank Takes Hold, Swaps Futures Are In the Limelight,
AUTOMATEDTRADER (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.automatedtrader.net/headlines/141712
/birth-of-a-market-as-dodd_frank-takes-hold—swaps-futures-are-in—the-limelight [herein-
after Birth of a Market?].
393 Mackenzie and Meyer, supra note 390.
394 Birth of a Market?, supra note 392.
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“I think that’s going to be either an accelerator for swap futures or it may slow down,
depending on which way it goes,” Vedbrat [managing director and co-head of elec-
tronic trading and market structure at BlackRock] said. “You know, if we see some-
thing very prescriptive like we always have to quote to five dealers I think that the
swaps futures market will take off much faster.”395
A key tradeoff in this futurization of swaps is that parties lose the advantages of
customized or bespoke trades; the ability to tailor a hedge to a particular risk:
“This migration raises the prospect that once interest rates or energy prices
change rapidly, many investors may be caught out by relying on a future rather
than a customised swap that better matches their portfolio’s risk.”396 In some
ways, the inability to customize their hedge may actually increase the risk of a
transaction, even if it is cleared.
It is also unclear if regulators have thought through whether any surge in
trading “futures” on swaps to replace OTC derivatives may pose any unin-
tended consequences. One issue may be concerned with volumes, increased
concentrations with clearinghouses, or significantly greater cash flows being
run through clearinghouses.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As explained above, the US approach to containing regulatory arbitrage is
principally first to harmonize US regulation with competing jurisdictions, and,
second, through the use of brute force of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The rec-
ommendations below attempt to provide suggestions for ways to minimize reg-
ulatory arbitrage and maximize the cooperation of competing jurisdictions with
the United States.
A. Balancing Safety Against Regulatory Arbitrage
US policymakers and regulators are aware that regulatory arbitrage could
inadvertently trigger financial instability in the United States if swap activity
moves to unregulated jurisdictions to escape the costs of Dodd-Frank regula-
tion. Although much of the regulatory arbitrage may be to G20 jurisdictions
where regulation is comparable, it may move to darker unregulated jurisdic-
tions as well. The United States may want to consider accepting a lower level
of regulation in order to minimize regulatory arbitrage.
There would appear to be a tradeoff between the level of regulation and
the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage. In other words, if one could measure the
level of regulation on a continuum, first, at what point of increasing regulation
do non-US persons in the US market move to other less- (or non-) regulated
jurisdictions? And, second, at what point of increasing regulation do US per-
sons attempt to structure their swap activities away from the United States?
Arguably, if the United States were to lessen the US level of regulation of OTC
derivative markets, that should decrease the amount of regulatory arbitrage,
minimizing the possibility that the risks will simply be transferred to unregu-
lated jurisdictions.
395 Id.
396 Mackenzie & Meyer, supra note 390.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ213.txt unknown Seq: 70 30-APR-14 10:57
Spring 2014] REGULATORY ARBITRAGE 611
The “Regulatory Arbitrage Frontier” Figure below (see Figure 1) attempts
to illustrate the relationship between increasing regulation (with a correspond-
ing increase in burdens and costs) and increased regulatory arbitrage (i.e., par-
ties shifting their trading to less-regulated markets). The Y-axis in the table
provides a measurement between zero regulation and infinite regulation (i.e., a
total ban in a jurisdiction on OTC derivative trading). For purposes of this
discussion, assume that US markets are regulated at a higher level than G20
jurisdictions. The X-axis in the table provides a measurement of increasing
regulatory arbitrage (i.e., the amount of swap activity that will occur outside of
a jurisdiction because of increasing regulation).
Figure 1 further assumes that functioning OTC derivative markets will be
developed outside of G20 jurisdictions, assuming that the burdens of trading at
a particular level of regulation exceeds any benefit from trading in the regulated
market.
FIGURE 1 – THE REGULATORY ARBITRAGE FRONTIER
For example, at the “0, 0” coordinate, there is no regulation. Accordingly,
if there was zero regulation, there would be no motivation for regulatory arbi-
trage, and therefore regulatory arbitrage would be zero. As regulation increases,
it is assumed that parties would respond by moving swap trading activity
outside of regulated markets (if legal, practical, or possible). Conversely, if
increasing regulation made swap activity trading less beneficial, eventually all
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swap trading would be done outside of US regulation. This relationship is illus-
trated by the diagonal line labeled the “Regulatory Arbitrage Frontier.”
The “Regulatory Arbitrage Frontier” first illustrates that regulatory arbi-
trage will begin immediately (albeit at a de minimis level). Policymakers
should be aware that anytime the burdens of regulation at a particular point
exceed the benefits of the trade at the particular point, regulatory arbitrage will
occur unless a jurisdiction can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over that
trading activity.
Second, because we are assuming that US regulation is greater than G20
Regulation, for purposes of this figure, the “Regulatory Arbitrage Frontier”
demonstrates that once the United States increases its regulation above the G20
level of regulation, regulatory arbitrage will cause trading activity to move
from the United States to a G20 jurisdiction or to a less-regulated jurisdiction.
The only way for the Unites States to decrease that regulatory arbitrage is either
through extraterritorial enforcement by the CFTC or by decreasing the level of
US regulation until the US regulation is equal to the G20 Regulation.
Any gap along the “Regulatory Arbitrage Frontier” will result in regula-
tory arbitrage occurring between the higher regulated jurisdiction and the lower
regulated jurisdiction. The only solution for the United States to decrease the
amount of regulatory arbitrage that is leaking into G20 jurisdictions is to close
the gap between the two levels of regulation.
As the United States struggles to deal with potential regulatory arbitrage,
the question becomes: at what point does increasing the level of US regulation
lead to an unacceptable amount of regulatory arbitrage? The United States
appears to believe that it has already determined the appropriate amount of
regulation and is trying to deal with potential regulatory arbitrage through the
force of extraterritorial regulation. However, if either non-US or US partici-
pants are able, through the help of clever investment bankers, to move signifi-
cant swap activity out of the United States or G20 jurisdictions, the end result
may be significant swap activity in unregulated markets that may present possi-
ble systemic financial risks to the United States in the future.
There is also the possibility, however, that the United States will not have
to engage in this calculus, betting that the US race to the top will create a
trading environment so robust, safe, transparent, efficient, and profitable that
regulatory arbitrage will not rear its ugly head. Instead of fleeing US markets,
participants will flock to the United States to trade.397
B. Balancing Appropriate Regulation with Inter-Jurisdictional Harmony
As the United States pursues its rule-making activity to implement Dodd-
Frank, it is consulting and meeting with the G20 and other jurisdictions to pro-
mulgate US rules and regulations that are comparable or “harmonious” with
these competing jurisdictions. To avoid regulatory arbitrage between the vari-
ous jurisdictions, however, either the United States or the competing jurisdic-
tions must be willing to compromise in order to eliminate the differences in
regulation.
397 See supra text accompanying notes 150–51.
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Foreign regulators have lectured the United States that there is more to
meeting the G20 commitments than simply enacting legislation:
But as has been continuously stressed by G20 leaders since 2009, domestic legisla-
tion alone does not fulfil the political aim that was agreed in Pittsburgh and reaf-
firmed in Toronto in 2010. Regulation across the G20 needs to be carefully
implemented in a harmonised way that does not risk fragmenting vital global finan-
cial markets.398
They continue by urging the United States “to take the time to ensure that
US rulemaking works not just domestically but also globally.”399 Asian regula-
tors have also urged restraint in rushing to implement regulations: “Considera-
tion should also be given to deferring the application of the relevant
requirements until there is international consensus on how such cross-border
transactions should be regulated.”400
This relationship between the appropriate level of regulation between
competing jurisdictions can be illustrated by the “Compromise Frontier” in Fig-
ure 2. Figure 2 assumes that the US regulation will be at a higher level than
G20 regulation. Figure 2 illustrates how either the level of US regulation must
be lowered to the level of G20 regulation or the level of G20 regulation must
increase if regulatory arbitrage is going to be minimized. The Y-axis is the
Level of Regulation and the X-axis is intended to show how the parties will
need to compromise in order to close the gap or differences between US regula-
tion and G20 regulation. As long as the US and G20 jurisdictions are unwilling
to compromise over the rules, there will exist a difference in regulation which
could result in regulatory arbitrage as participants attempt to move away from
the United States to a jurisdiction with lower regulation. The diagonal line
between the two levels of regulation is the “Compromise Frontier” and repre-
sents how either the United States or G20 (or both) must change their level of
regulation if the gap that will trigger regulatory arbitrage can be avoided. As
parties move along the “Compromise Frontier,” eventually the parties will
reach a point of compromise about the amount of regulation that is appropriate.
C. More Liberal Approach to Substituted Compliance
There is evidence that foreign governments are becoming much less toler-
ant of the United States’ continued position that foreign regulation must be
highly comparable to that of the United States. As explained above, the Final
Guidance suggests that the CFTC, on a unilateral basis, will review the individ-
ual regulatory requirements of foreign jurisdiction to determine if the regula-
tions are comparable. Although the Final Regulation provides that the review
for comparability will “in most cases, involve consultation with the regulators
in each jurisdiction for which a substituted compliance application has been
submitted,” there is ultimately no requirement on the CFTC to respect or accept
a regulator’s position on an issue.401
398 Osborne et al., supra note 201.
399 Id.
400 Foreign Regulators’ Letter, supra note 133, at 3.
401 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,344 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
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FIGURE 2 – THE COMPROMISE FRONTIER
In an extraordinary public letter to Chairman Gensler of the CFTC dated
October 12, 2012, from the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the U.K., the Com-
missioner for Internal Markets at the European Commission, the Minister of
State for Financial Services of Japan and the Minister of Finance for the Gov-
ernment of France, the regulators expressed their concerns:
We of course recognise and understand the need for US and other regulators to sat-
isfy themselves on the adequacy of regulation in other jurisdictions. But we would
urge you before finalising any rules, or enforcing any deadlines, to take the time to
ensure that US rulemaking works not just domestically but also globally. We should
collectively adopt cross border rules consistent with the principle that equivalence or
substituted compliance with respect to partner jurisdictions, and consequential reli-
ance on the regulation and supervision within those jurisdictions, should be used as
far as possible to avoid fragmentation of global markets. Specifically, this principle
needs to be enshrined in CFTC cross border rules, so that all US persons wherever
they are located can transact with non-US entities using a proportionate substituted
compliance regime.402
Commenters have further noted that foreign regulators in general are becoming
increasingly impatient with the CFTC’s insistence on determining comparabil-
ity to CFTC rules.403
402 Osborne et al., supra note 201.
403 This is an understated letter to the CFTC saying that the CFTC’s cross-border rules do not
work, and that they should not be adopted until harmonized with the rules of non-U.S. regulators
and that the CFTC’s final rules must recognize that non-U.S. firms should be deemed to have
complied with any U.S. rules by virtue of compliance with home-country rules. In earlier letters,
the non-U.S. regulators had sounded a harsher tone, albeit with the same message: the CFTC
needs to back off on regulation of non-U.S. swaps dealers.
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Such direct public lobbying by foreign regulators may hopefully temper
the CFTC’s enthusiasm for enforcing its own standards through extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The CFTC will need to recognize sooner, rather than later, that
other G20 jurisdictions are not going to tolerate the United States holding for-
eign G20 banks to higher standards of regulatory form than these jurisdictions
recognize as necessary.
D. Reaching Out to Non-G20 Jurisdictions
The most serious long-term concern of regulatory arbitrage is that swap
dealers will spring up in non-G20 jurisdictions that have not enacted OTC
derivative reforms. For such jurisdictions, providing a forum for unregulated
OTC derivative trading will be similar to the function that tax havens provide
offshore companies with a tax-free business environment.404 The United States
and G20 countries should aggressively court these jurisdictions and encourage
them to enact rules and regulations that would meet the US standard of “substi-
tute compliance.”
The main question of such a scenario is where such trading would arise.
Singapore, for example, would certainly have the sophisticated financial envi-
ronment and capabilities to provide such a non-US/G20 trading environment.
Fortunately, Singapore does not appear to be even remotely interested in
becoming a rogue state that offers non-US persons opportunity to trade free of
OTC derivative reforms. In fact, Singapore is well ahead of most jurisdictions
in offering OTC derivative regulatory reforms.405 Singapore is also well ahead
of most jurisdictions in attempting to provide a way to clear OTC derivatives
over the past decade, well before G20 countries were even considering such a
requirement.406 Ironically, however, a large Singaporean swap dealer has
recently announced that it will not trade in the United States due to the high
Dodd-Frank regulatory costs.407
As explained above, however, it is not necessary to find a sophisticated
non-G20 jurisdiction such as Singapore to host unregulated OTC derivative
trading. Because the necessary capital, personnel, and technology can easily be
imported into such a jurisdiction, it would be relatively easy for a non-US per-
son, interested primarily in avoiding US and G20 regulation, to set up shop and
Steven Lofchie, Joint Cautionary Letter from the EU, France, Japan and the UK to the
CFTC on U.S. Cross-Border Swaps Regulation, CENTER FIN. STABILITY (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://centerforfinancialstability.org/wp/?p=594.
404 See supra Part II.
405 MAS Reviews Regulation of the Derivatives Market in Singapore, MONETARY AUTHOR-
ITY SING. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.mas.gov.sg/en/News-and-Publications/Press-Releases
/2012/MAS-Reviews-Derivatives-Market.aspx; see also MONETARY AUTH. OF SING., CON-
SULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES 1 (2012), available at
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/publications/consult_papers/2012/13%20February
%202012%20Proposed%20Regulation%20of%20OTC%20Derivatives.pdf.
406 The Singapore Stock Exchange provides derivatives clearing for OTC interest rate
swaps for example. See Derivatives Clearing, SING. EXCHANGE, http://www.sgx.com/wps
/portal/sgxweb/home/clearing/derivatives (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
407 See NEERAJ BATRA, TABB GRP., WHO ARE THE SWAP DEALERS? 2 (2013), available at
http://www.cmegroup.com/education/files/tabb-dealers-2013-04-19.pdf; Vaughan & Burne,
supra note 203.
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provide a means to trade OTC derivatives outside of the G20. To arrest such
activities, the US and G20 jurisdictions need to work with non-G20 jurisdic-
tions to enact similar derivative reforms.
E. Critique of CFTC Final Guidance
As mentioned above, the guidance issued by the CFTC has provided an
avalanche of comment letters, suggesting a variety of substantive and more
technical changes that deal with how the CFTC should exercise its extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. A review of the guidance408 and the numerous comments criti-
quing it, suggest a number of key changes that will help reduce regulatory
arbitrage and eliminate much of the uncertainty and confusion in the Proposed
Interpretive Guidance. The comments below only address a few of the more
salient critiques provided and do not discuss the numerous more technical
changes that market participants believe should be made as well.
1. Permit “Substituted Compliance” for Non-US Persons in all
Situations
One key concern with the concept of substituted compliance is that it does
not deal with the most common situation of a US swap dealer entering into a
swap with a non-US person with respect to Transaction-Level Requirements
(except with respect to the foreign branch of a US Bank that is a swap dealer or
MSP).409 The final guidance generally does not permit substituted compliance
to apply in this particular situation, regardless if such non-US person is other-
wise subject to comparable regulation in another jurisdiction. In other words,
there will always be the possibility of duplicative and inconsistent non-US reg-
ulation applied to the non-US person in trading with a US person.410
If the United States is concerned about the financial stability of the non-
US person, it does not make any sense to allow “substituted compliance” in
some situations and not in others. For example, why is it acceptable or safe to
allow a non-US person to use substituted compliance with a non-US person but
not with a US person. If the non-US person, when it complies with substituted
compliance with a non-US person, is not a risk to the United States, why would
it put the United States at risk to trade with a US person using substituted
408 See supra text accompanying notes 259–86.
409 Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n Letter, supra note 357, at 13.
410 Various parties have commented about the necessity to avoid duplicative and conflicting
regulations between jurisdictions. See Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice Presi-
dent, Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n 2 (Aug. 27, 2012), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicCom-
ments/vIEWcOMMENT.ASPX?ID=58652&SearchText=SIFMA; Letter from Patrick Raaf-
laub, Chief Exec.Officer, Swiss Fin. Mkt. Supervisory Auth., and Mark Branson, Head of
Banks Div., Swiss Fin. Mkt. Supervisory Auth., to Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n 1 (July 5, 2012), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicCom
ments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58317&SearchText=SWISS%20FINANCIAL%20MARKET
%20SUPERVISORY; Letter from Masamichi Kono, Vice Comm’r for Int’l Affairs, Fin.
Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Hideo Hayakawa, Exec. Dir., Bank of Japan, to Gary
Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 1–2 (Aug. 13, 2012), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58383&SearchText=
BANK%20OF%20JAPAN.
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compliance. Provided that the rules and regulations are comparable, substituted
compliance should be permitted for a non-US person in all circumstances,
regardless as to whether a US person is involved.
2. Making Determinations on an Individual Requirement Basis Rather
than the Foreign Regulatory Regime as a Whole
One concern in numerous comment letters was that the Proposed Interpre-
tive Guidance provides that a determination of whether a jurisdiction’s rules
meet the “substituted compliance” test should be done on an individual require-
ment basis.411 In an important compromise, the CFTC has agreed to an “out-
comes-based approach”, as discussed above, but this determination will still be
done by individually analyzing thirteen different categories of regulatory obli-
gations.412 In other words, although the regulations do not need to be identical
and the CFTC will look to whether such regulation achieves the same goals as
the CFTC regulations, there is no authority for the CFTC to consider the for-
eign regulatory structure as a whole.
For example, if done on an individual requirement basis, the CFTC must
question whether a competing jurisdiction’s mandatory exchange-trading
requirement is comparable with that of the United States. As long as the non-
US person’s jurisdiction has a mandatory exchange-trading requirement that is
comparable, this becomes a straightforward determination. It becomes more
complicated, however, if a jurisdiction has made a decision that mandatory
exchange trading is not required in that particular jurisdiction.
A straightforward reading of the Final Guidance would suggest that the
non-US person, if it were a registered swap dealer under Dodd-Frank, would
still be required to comply with the mandatory exchange-trading rule, even
though its home jurisdiction finds it unnecessary or problematic in that jurisdic-
tion. In other words, the CFTC is only willing to grant comity on a require-
ment-by-requirement basis to a foreign jurisdiction, as opposed to recognizing
the safety and soundness of a foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory regime, consid-
ered as a whole.
This is in contrast to a test (not permitted under the Proposed Interpretive
Guidance) in which the CFTC were to make a determination as to whether the
entire jurisdiction’s regulatory structure or requirements, considered as a
whole, is comparable to Dodd-Frank. For example, if a jurisdiction’s require-
ments, considered as a whole, were comparable to Dodd-Frank, a non-US swap
dealer would not be required to comply with individual Dodd-Frank require-
ments (such as mandatory exchange trading) that were not found in that juris-
diction’s rules.
As explained above, jurisdictions have many rationales for agreeing, or
not agreeing, with another jurisdiction’s regulations,413 refusing to adopt those
411 See Letter from Walt Lukken, President, Chief Exec. Officer, Futures Indus. Ass’n, to
David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 5–6 (Aug. 27, 2012), avail-
able at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58679&Search
Text=FUTURES%20INDUSTRY%20ASSOCIATION.
412 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,344 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
413 See supra text accompanying notes 411–12.
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that it finds counterproductive or even injurious to that particular jurisdiction. A
thoughtful set of regulatory reforms enacted by one jurisdiction may be just as
safe and effective at eliminating risks as another jurisdiction’s, albeit that the
individual components of the regulation may differ. If the CFTC considers the
absence of one particular reform to be so critical to the safety and soundness of
a jurisdiction, it can find that the jurisdiction’s entire regulations, taken as
whole, are not comparable to the United States and need not permit substituted
compliance. Otherwise, insisting on comparable regulation with every element
of Dodd-Frank regulation, even though such a jurisdiction provides a safe regu-
latory environment, would seem unnecessary and perhaps contemptuous or dis-
dainful of another jurisdiction’s regulatory decision-making process.
3. Divergent Versus Comparable Rules and Regulations
A sister concern of the above issue is that, when comparing individual
regulatory requirements, the CFTC rules only provide for comity and substi-
tuted compliance when there is a comparable rule.414 The rules do not provide
for how to deal with situations in which other jurisdictions have made decisions
not to impose a particular requirement. For example, if a competing jurisdiction
did not have a mandatory exchange-trading requirement, then substituted com-
pliance would not be possible and the non-US person would be required to
conform to the Dodd-Frank rule. In other words, there is no mechanism in the
Proposed Interpretive Guidance to allow the CFTC to exempt compliance from
a particular rule because a competing jurisdiction does not provide such a
requirement.
The CFTC should consider providing guidance as to when such an exemp-
tion from a requirement for a non-US person, based on the absence of such a
rule in a competing jurisdiction, is permissible. Such guidance might consist of
requiring the CFTC to consider why that particular requirement is absent or if
there are compensating requirements that make up for its absence.
CONCLUSION
The effort to reform the OTC derivative markets by the United States and
G20 jurisdictions may constitute one of the most aggressive regulatory reform
efforts ever attempted for a global capital market. These new rules and regula-
tions will cause industry participants to completely redesign their business
practices and processes, all done in an effort to make US markets safe from
systemic failures caused by OTC derivative losses. This regulatory effort, as
evidenced by the thousands of pages of new statues and regulations promul-
gated by Congress and the CFTC to carry out Dodd-Frank, will serve as a case
study for the “do’s and don’ts” of regulatory reforms for future decades.
The regulatory effort is complicated by the size, global reach, and com-
plexity of the OTC derivative market, and has resulted in great uncertainty with
respect to how OTC derivative markets will operate and appear in the coming
414 Final Guidance, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,344 (“Where no comparability determination can be
made, the non-U.S. swap dealer . . . may be required to comply with the applicable Entity- or
Transactional-Level requirements . . . .”).
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years. As capital flows almost seamlessly around the world, policymakers and
regulators are concerned that the different degrees of regulation that may
emerge from this global regulatory reform effort may result in regulatory arbi-
trage as participants may attempt to trade in less-regulated markets. In contrast,
US regulators hope that the reforms will result in more stable, transparent, and
efficient markets, enticing existing and new participants to continue trading in
the US. The uncertainty, costs, and heavy regulation that has come out of these
reform efforts, however, may prove to be a strong motivator for parties to find
the most regulatory friendly trading environment.
The United States and the other G20 countries have tried to deal with the
risk of regulatory arbitrage in several different ways. The United States appears
convinced that making global OTC derivative dealers comply with either
Dodd-Frank or comparable G20 regulations as a ticket to trading in the US
market will prevent OTC derivative dealers from trading in unregulated juris-
dictions. Technocrats from the various G20 countries are also working tire-
lessly to harmonize the different regulatory regimes in such a way that they are
each consistent and comparable with each other, again reducing the motivation
for participants to search out lightly regulated environments.
The CFTC has recently issued final proposed guidance describing how it
will impose Dodd-Frank requirements on the non-US derivative activities for
both US and non-US persons. Although complicated and long, this guidance at
least serves as a starting point for negotiations with other jurisdictions over the
extraterritorial reach of the CFTC and Dodd-Frank. The concern, of course, is
that clever investment bankers will eagerly develop new programs, structures,
and entities to exploit the inconsistences that will inevitably develop as these
OTC derivative reforms are put into law in competing jurisdictions.
Reforming global capital markets is never simple, especially one as nim-
ble and fast moving as OTC derivatives. Already beginning, it is inevitable that
regulatory arbitrage will occur as firms attempt to avoid Dodd-Frank regulation
and escape to less-regulated jurisdictions. As the United States attempts to limit
regulatory arbitrage opportunities, it must at a minimum close the regulatory
gap between the United States and the other G20 jurisdictions. Although the
CFTC has been given extraterritorial jurisdiction powers by the US Congress, it
must judiciously use them to avoid infuriating foreign jurisdictions and driving
OTC derivative trading even further into unregulated environments.
